snippets

Contents

EDITORIAL STATEMENT

1. Purpose.

The aim of *Snippets* is to publish specific remarks that motivate research or that make theoretical points germane to current work. The ideal contribution is the ideal footnote: a side remark that taken on its own is not worth lengthy development but that needs to be said. One encounters many short comments of this kind in the literature of the seventies. We feel that there no longer is a forum for them. We want *Snippets* to help fill that gap.

2. Content.

We will publish notes that contribute to the study of syntax and semantics in generative grammar. The notes are to be brief, self-contained and explicit. They may do any of the following things:

- point out an empirical phenomenon that goes against accepted generalizations or that shows that some aspect of a theory is problematic;
- point out unnoticed minimal pairs that fall outside the scope of any existing theory;
- point out an empirical phenomenon that confirms the predictions of a theory in an area where the theory has not been tested;
- explicitly describe technical inconsistencies in a theory or in a set of frequently adopted assumptions;
- explicitly describe unnoticed assumptions that underlie a theory or assumptions that a theory needs to be supplemented with in order to make desired predictions;
- call attention to little-known or forgotten literature in which issues of immediate relevance are discussed.

We also encourage submissions that connect psycholinguistic data to theoretical issues. A proposal for a pilot experiment in language acquisition or language processing could make for an excellent snippet.

The earliest *Linguistic Inquiry* squibs exemplify the kind of note we would like to publish. Some of them posed unobserved puzzles. For instance, a squib by Postal and Ross in LI 1:1 ("A Problem of Adverb Preposing") noted that whether or not we can construe a sentence-initial temporal adverb with an embedded verb depends on the tense of the matrix verb. A squib by Perlmutter and Ross in LI 1:3 ("Relative Clauses with Split Antecedents"), challenging the prevailing analyses of coordination and extraposition, noted that conjoined clauses neither of which contain a plural noun phrase can appear next to an "extraposed" relative that can only describe groups. Other squibs drew attention to particular theoretical assumptions. For instance, a squib by Bresnan in LI 1:2 ("A Grammatical Fiction") outlined an alternative account of the derivation of sentences containing believe and force, and asked whether there were principled reasons for dismissing any of the underlying assumptions (among them that semantic interpretation is sensitive to details of a syntactic derivation). A squib by Zwicky in LI 1:2 ("Class Complements in Phonology") asked to what extent phonological rules refer to complements of classes. None of these squibs was more than a couple of paragraphs; all of them limited themselves to a precise question or observation.

3. Submission details.

Snippets is an electronic journal. We will publish issues roughly twice a year, and all issues will remain on the website.

Snippets is intended as a service to the linguistics community. Consequently, authors are advised that, when they submit to *Snippets*, we understand them as allowing their submission to be reproduced if published. At the same time, the rights for the notes themselves will remain with the authors. As a result, citation of *Snippets* material will have to indicate the author's name and the specific source of the material.

We will accept electronic submissions at the address snippetsjournal@gmail.com. Electronic submissions may take the form of (a) the text of an e-mail message, or (b) an attached file. The attached file should be a simple text file, a Word file (Mac or Windows), or a Rich Text Format (RTF) file. All submissions must state the name and affiliation of the author(s), and a (postal or electronic) return address.

Submissions are to be a maximum of 500 words (including examples), with an additional half page allowed for diagrams, tables and references. Given that we envision the submissions themselves as footnotes, the submissions may not contain footnotes of their own. The ideal submission is one paragraph; a submission of five lines is perfectly acceptable. We will not consider abstracts.

4. Editorial policy.

Submissions will be reviewed by our editorial board, and review will be name-blind both ways. We will provide a response within 3 months of the moment when we acknowledge receipt of a submission. At the same time, we do not guarantee more than a simple yes/no response to the submitter. We will not require revisions (barring exceptional cases). We allow resubmission (once) of the same piece.

1.

Katrin Axel-Tober, Patrick Grosz – *University of Tübingen*
Even strong evaluatives can occur under negation

Evaluative speaker-oriented adverbs (*unfortunately, fortunately, luckily*) are ungrammatical in contexts such as the scope of negation ((1b)) and conditional antecedents ((1c)). It is an ongoing debate whether such constraints are syntactic (cf. Haegeman 2010) or semantic (cf. Ernst 2007, 2009) in nature.

(1) a. They **fortunately** have not withdrawn their funds.
     b. * They have not **fortunately** withdrawn their funds.
     c. * If they **luckily** arrived on time, we will be saved.
        (Ernst 2007:1027)

Ernst (2007, 2009) observes that negated conditional antecedents, (2), allow for a subset of speaker-oriented adverbs, such as *mysteriously* in (2a). He explains this observation by analyzing evaluatives as Positive Polarity Items (PPIs). These can be 'indirectly licensed' if they modify a proposition that is implied to be true (here: 'they decided to resign'). However, Ernst introduces a distinction between 'weak evaluatives' (such as *mysteriously*) and 'strong evaluatives', such as *fortunately, unfortunately* and *luckily*. He claims that the latter cannot occur in negated conditional antecedents, illustrated in (2b) (his judgment). He then develops a system that derives this distinction.

(2) a. If they hadn't **mysteriously** decided to resign, things would have been fine.
     b. * If they hadn't **fortunately** decided to resign, things would have been fine.
        Ernst (2007:1029)

Crucially, Ernst's empirical generalizations do not seem correct. 'Strong evaluative' adverbs can occur in negated conditionals quite freely, (3)-(4) being two representative examples.

(3) I would have lost data if I hadn't **fortunately** kept a copy of the data on my MacBook.
     ('Automated backups to servers only when I'm in the office', blog post, 4/1/2010, on *Geekery*)

(4) That being said, if Ledger hadn't **unfortunately** passed away prior to the film's release, no one would be talking about an Oscar nomination.
     ('The Dark Knight: DVD Talk Review of the Theatrical', blog post, 7/9/2008, on *DVD Talk*)

On the one hand, such data support and strengthen Ernst's semantic analysis of evaluative adverbs as PPIs that can be indirectly licensed. On the other hand, they clearly undermine the proposed distinction between 'weak' and 'strong' evaluatives.

What we observe from the constructed examples in (5) is that the distribution of 'strong evaluatives' in negated conditionals is mainly constrained by pragmatic inferences: Negated antecedents that contain a positive adverb (*fortunately/luckily*)

correlate with negatively evaluated consequences (*things would have been worse* in (5a)). Contrastively, negated conditional antecedents that contain a negative adverb (*unfortunately/sadly*) correlate with positively evaluated consequences (*things would have been fine* in (5b)). This is due to conflicting entailments in the unacceptable cases. For instance, in (5a), *unfortunately* would trigger the entailment that it was unfortunate that they decided to resign. This conflicts with the entailment that things would have been worse if they had not decided to resign. The resulting implicature would be that it is unfortunate that things are not worse, which is clearly deviant. Notably, such a conflict does not always arise, e.g. it does not arise in (4); this follows from the pragmatic / extra-linguistic nature of the perceived conflict.

(5) a. If they hadn't {**fortunately/#unfortunately**} decided to resign, things would have been **worse**.

   ⟹   Implicature: It is **fortunate/#unfortunate** that things are not **worse**.

   b. If they hadn't {**unfortunately/#fortunately**} decided to resign, things would have been **fine**.

   ⟹   Implicature: It is **unfortunate/#fortunate** that things are not **fine**.

References
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Appendix: Additional data from corpora

unfortunately

His own good sense might have checked him, if Aunt Kipp hadn't **unfortunately** recovered her voice at this crisis […]

   (Louisa M. Alcott. 1868. *Kitty's Class Day And Other Stories.*)

I would have rated this 3 stars if I had not **unfortunately** ordered the calamari […]

   (online review on *Yelp*, September 12, 2010)

fortunately

I did so, and was glad of the chance, for I was tired, and was, moreover, near the first crossing of Roanoke, which I would have been compelled to wade, cold as the water was, if I had not **fortunately** met this good man.

   (David Crockett. 1834. *Narrative of the Life of David Crockett of the State of Tennessee.*)

This event could have had a very bad ending if we had not **fortunately** been in the right place at the right time.

   ('Portsmouth Association of Yacht Security (PAYS)', blog post, February 20, 2012, on *Easy Go Adventures*)

luckily

It's my belief you just slipped in when poor old Mrs. Winter was out of the way for a minute, and if I hadn't **luckily** caught you in the very act you would have been off with your pockets crammed—

   (S.E. Cartwright. 1899. *The Eagle's Nest.*)

if my sister had not **luckily** brought some concealer and foundation, I would have had raccoon eyes for the ceremony

   (online review on *Yelp*, June 10, 2012)

Parallel corpus data can be found for the German counterparts "leider" (sadly), "glücklicherweise" (luckily/fortunately) and "unglücklicherweise" (unfortunately).

2.

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Not all locative subjects are arguments: two classes of weather verbs

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The question of whether meteorological verbs have an external argument corresponding to a spatio-temporal argument has been around for some time, both in traditional grammars (Bello 1847: §773) and in early formal approaches (see Bolinger 1977, Ruwet 1991 for discussion); it has received some renewed attention from the locative subject hypothesis (Fernández-Soriano 1999). While Fernández Soriano has shown that verbs like *llover* 'rain' have a locative subject, the question remains whether that locative starts as an argument of the verb or not. Here we will show that the locative subject is an argument in the class of (1a) –*amanecer* 'dawn', *atardecer* 'dusk', *anochecer* 'nightfall'– but not in (1b) –*llover* 'rain', *nevar* 'snow'–, where *aquí* 'here' is directly merged in a subject position.

(1) a. Aquí amanece tarde.
      here dawns late 'Here, the dawn is late'
   b. Aquí llueve mucho.
      here rains a lot 'Here, it rains a lot'

Consider the possibility of having a depictive adjective in the predicate. This is possible with the *amanecer*-class, but not with the *llover*-class; this suggests that only the first class has a verb-internal constituent able to license the adjective's agreement.

(2) a. ...este raro domingo que amaneció soleado y *atardeció nublado*
      this weird Sunday that dawned sunny and got.dark cloudy
      *(*www.nosolosurf.com/2010/04/half-moon.html*)*
   b. *Llovió nublado.
       it.rained cloudy

The *amanecer*-class can take DPs with spatial or temporal meaning. The *llover*-class does not.

(3) a. El 5 de junio *anocheció lluvioso* y gris.
      the 5th of June nightfalled rainy and grey
      'At nightfall the 5th of June, it was rainy and grey'
   b. *El día llovió.
       the day rained

The presence of these DPs provides further evidence that *nublado* in (2) is an adjective: they control agreement.

(4) a. Los días amanecían siempre nublado-s.
      the days dawned   always   cloudy-pl
   b. La mañana amaneció nublad-a.
      the morning dawned cloudy-fem

Only the *amanecer*-class allows preverbal definite DP subjects. The *llover*-class accepts a noun phrase provided it is non-definite, post-verbal and denotes a theme –the entity that falls from the sky– (5).

(5) a. Llueven piedras.
        rain.3pl stones 'It rains stones'
     b. Nievan fractales.
        snow.3pl fractals
        (http://cientificamentecorrecto.wordpress.com/2012/02/02/nievan-fractales/)
     c. *Las piedras llueven.
         the stones rain

The *amanecer*-class allows for a use as a light verb, with a personal subject, and a compulsory depictive where the verb only places the time of the day where the subject had some state (6). Personal subjects, even in a metaphorical reading, are impossible with the *llover*-class (7).

(6) a. Juan amaneció enfermo.
        Juan dawned   sick
        'At dawn, Juan was sick'
     b. Atardecí sin cosechar esperanza.
        I.dusked without gathering hope
        'At dusk, I had got no hope'
        (http://mispoesias.com/ver_poesia.phtml?cod=347340)

(7) *Juan llovió sangre.
      Juan rained blood
      Intended: 'Juan bleed as if it rained blood'

The contrasts above can be understood if only the *amanecer*-class has an external argument position –occupied by a spatio-temporal argument in their strong use– which is also available in the light verb use.

References
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Fernández-Soriano, O. (1999) "Two types of impersonal sentences in Spanish: Locative and dative subjects". *Syntax* 2/2, 101-140.
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3.

Claire Halpert and David Schueler – *University of Minnesota, Twin Cities*
That sentential subjects are (linked to) DPs is explained herein

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We present evidence that the argument position associated with sentential subjects ((1)) is always a DP. This is compatible either with Davies and Dubinsky's (2000) claim that the sentential subject is a CP embedded in a DP shell, or Alrenga's (2005) claim that the CP is in topic position, linked to a null DP in argument position.

(1) That John left early upset me.

    Observations about the verb *explain* by Pietroski (2000, 2005), combined with new observations of the results of passivization, shed light on this question. Pietroski notes that the thematic relation between *explain* and its lower argument is different when that argument is a bare (declarative) CP ((2a)) than when it is a DP ((2b,c)). In the former case, the CP is the *explanans*, or what serves to help one understand, while in the latter the DP is the *explanandum*, or thing to be understood.

(2) a. John explained that Fido barked.
    b. John explained the fact that Fido barked.
    c. John explained that.

Pietroski analyzes this pattern by claiming that DPs and CPs must occupy different slots in the theta grid of *explain*. Of note, then, is what happens with a sentential subject of passivized *explain*.

(3) That Fido barked was explained.

In (3), *that Fido barked* is understood as an *explanandum*, like the DPs in (2). This contrast between subject and object CPs receives a ready explanation if in order to be a sentential subject, the phrase merged in argument position must always be a DP. For Davies and Dubinsky, the CP itself first merges with a silent D before merging in its theta position, which must, following Pietroski's generalization, be a position that bears the *explanandum* thematic relation.

    Note also that the so-called extraposed sentential subject of passivized *explain* ((4)) is an *explanans*. This supports the claim (e.g. Stroik 1996) that postverbal sentential subjects appear in their base position--or at least have never been in subject position--and hence are CPs. Framing the alternation in terms of movement ties in Bresnan's (2001) observation that some passivized or topicalized CPs are grammatical where an *in situ* CP counterpart is not (*in situ* cases require a DP).

(4) It was explained that Fido barked.

Since the *explanans* reading in (2a) is obligatory, the Davies and Dubinsky analysis requires that there is no legitimate structure for (2a) where the CP merges with a D but remains in object position. CPs as complements of null D can only appear in derived

positions. On Alrenga's account, this pattern arises because "moved" CPs are in fact linked to null DP arguments.

An Acc-Ing gerund also must be an *explanandum* ((5)). If Reuland (1983) and Pires (2007) are correct that Acc-Ing is clausal (modern TPs), then a DP or TP can be an *explanandum*, while a CP must be an *explanans*. A simpler theory is that Acc-Ing gerunds, like sentential subjects, are DPs (Abney 1987), though unlike sentential subjects they can appear in base or derived positions.

(5) John explained Fido barking.

References

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4.

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Having 'need' in Farsi

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Harves and Kayne (2012) argue that only those languages that have a transitive verb of possession also have a transitive 'need', which takes a nominative subject and an accusative direct object (with no preposition). Based on the distribution of transitive 'have' and 'need', they distinguish three types of languages: (i) Be-languages that lack possessive 'have' and transitive 'need', such as Russian, Hindi and Hungarian, (ii) Have-languages with transitive 'need', such as English, Icelandic and Basque, and (iii) Have-languages without transitive 'need', such as French, Latin and Farsi.

The present snippet aims to provide data showing that Farsi is a Have-language that allows transitive as well as non-transitive 'need' with different syntactic properties. It is also shown that Farsi uses 'be' to express predicative possession in idiomatic expressions.

Firstly, as can be seen in (1), *ketab* 'book' can appear as the accusative direct object of *ʔehtiaj daštæn* 'to need' (as in (1a)) or as the object of the preposition *be* 'to' (as in (1b)).

(1) a. ʔin ketab-o   ʔehtiaj dar-æm   (transitive 'need')
　　　 this book-OM need   have-1SG
　　　 'I need this book.'

　　 b. be ʔin ketab ʔehtiaj dar-æm   (non-transitive 'need')
　　　　to this book   need   have-1SG
　　　 'I need this book.'

Interestingly, however, when *ketab* 'book' appears between the preverb *ʔehtiaj* 'need' and the light verb *daštæn* 'to have', it must necessarily be the object of the preposition *be* 'to'. This is illustrated in (2a-b).

(2) a. ʔehtiaj be ʔin ketab dar-æm   (non-transitive 'need')
　　　　need   to this book   have-1SG
　　　 'I need this book.'

　　 b. * ʔehtiaj ʔin ketab-o   dar-æm   (transitive 'need')
　　　　　 need   this book-OM have-1SG

As can be seen in (3)-(4), this seems to be a standard behavior for objects of Persian complex predicates that can appear in transitive or non-transitive form.

(3) a. be ʔin ketab dæst zæd-æm   (non-transitive)
　　　　to this book hand hit.PST-1SG
　　 b. dæst be ʔin ketab zæd-æm
　　　　hand to this book hit.PST-1SG
　　　 'I touched this book.'

(4) a. ʔin ketab-o dæst zæd-æm   (transitive)
     this book-OM hand hit.PST-1SG
  b. * dæst ʔin ketab-o zæd-æm
      hand this book-OM hit.PST-1SG
    'I touched the book.'

The only case where the accusative direct object can appear between the preverb and the light verb is the case of clitic pronouns, as in (5a). The clitic pronoun *-eš* 'it' can also be the object of the preposition *be* 'to', as in (5b).

(5) a. ʔehtiaj-eš dar-æm   (transitive 'need')
     need-it   have-1SG
  b. beh-eš ʔehtiaj dar-æm (non-transitive 'need')
     to-it   need   have-1SG
    'I need it.'

Secondly, Farsi uses another complex predicate, *lazem daštæn*, to express transitive 'need'. This is shown in (6).

(6) a. ʔin ketab-o lazem dar-æm   (transitive 'need')
    this book-OM necessary have-1SG
   'I need this book.'
  b. * be ʔin ketab lazem dar-æm
     to this book necessary have-1SG

Thus, Farsi is a Have-language with both transitive and non-transitive 'need'.

In addition, as Farsi is a Have-language, we do not expect that it uses 'be' to express possession. Yet, there are fixed expressions with idiomatic reading in this language where possession is expressed by *budæn* 'to be'. This can be seen in (7). Note that, similar to Be-languages, the case on the possessees *nun* 'bread' and *ʔab* 'water' is nominative.

(7) nun-et   næ-bud   ʔab-et   næ-bud
   bread.NOM-you.GEN NEG-be.PST.3SG water.NOM-you.GEN NEG-be.PST.3SG
   lit. 'You didn't have bread? You didn't have water?'
   idiomatic 'You had everything you needed, so why did you do x?' (x determined in
    context)

The nouns *nun* 'bread' and *ʔab* 'water' may occasionally be replaced with other nouns such as *xune* 'house', *pul* 'money', etc. However, these substitutions do not change the idiomatic interpretation.

Reference
Harves, S. and R.S. Kayne. (2012) "Having 'need' and needing 'have'." *Linguistic Inquiry* 43(1), 120-132.

5.

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An argument against null prepositions in certain stative passives

Fruehwald and Myler (2013) contend that certain stative passive sentences (found in certain English dialects) like in (1) do not involve null prepositions as sketched in (2).

(1) I'm done my homework.
(2) I'm done [$_{PP}$ Ø my homework]

They note that the putative null preposition in (2) does not have the same meaning as overt prepositions. For example, the overt preposition *with* allows instrumental readings as well as what they deem 'result state' readings as seen in (3). This ambiguity is not found in stative passives like (4), only the result state reading is possible. Therefore, according to them, there is no null preposition.

(3) a.   I'm done with the computer
     b.   *Instrumental reading:*   Done using it
     c.   *Result state reading:*   Done building it
(4) a.   I'm done the computer
     b.   *Instrumental reading:*   *Done using it
     c.   *Result state reading:*   Done building it

This sort of reasoning, based on interpretive distinction, is not persuasive. There is no reason to require that different lexical items have the same interpretation. The null preposition need not have the same range of meanings as the overt preposition *with*. Unfortunately this is the only sort of argument that Fruehwald and Myler offer against the null preposition analysis.

There is however a clearer means to argue against the null preposition analysis: the Law of Coordination of Likes (Williams 1981). In dialects that allow this sort of stative passive, it is possible to coordinate two objects (5). It is also possible to coordinate prepositional phrases when both conjuncts have the result state reading (6).

(5) I'm done (both) my homework and my chores.
(6) I'm done (both) with my homework and with my chores.

Note also that it is possible to coordinate null-headed phrases with overtly headed ones:

(7) Jill saw cats and some dogs at the pound.

It is however *not* possible to coordinate one of these stative passive objects with a result state prepositional phrase. This seems to be due to a violation of the Law of Coordination of Likes in that the unacceptability persists even when different coordinators are used (cf. Schachter 1977):

(8) a.   *I'm done (both) my homework and with doing my chores.
     b.   *Jill is either done her homework or with doing her chores.
     c.   *I'm done my homework but not with doing my chores.

This is a better argument against the null prepositional account of these stative passives. It is possible to coordinate result state arguments either with prepositions or without, but not with a mix. This is unexpected under a null preposition analysis.

References

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6.

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The gender of bound variable **he**

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Paradigms (1) and (2) are important in work on the interpretation of gender and number features on bound variable pronouns:

(1) Every professor$_i$ was decorating his$_i$/her$_i$/their$_i$ office.

female scenario: the professors are presupposed to be female: *his, √her
male scenario: the professors are presupposed to be male: √his, *her
mixed scenario: otherwise: $^{\%}$their, $^{\%}$his

(Percus 2006; for other studies of the mixed scenario or "epicene" *he*, see Whitley 1978, Mackay 1980, Meyers 1990, Newman 1997, Balhorn 2004, with literature)

(2) Only the professor$_i$ was decorating her$_i$ office.
= The professor, who is female, was decorating her office; and no one else, male or female, was decorating his or her office.

Percus (2006) sets out the situation and develops one current line of analysis:

(i) In (1), a [fem] feature in the structure with *her* restricts the interpretation to female humans, and for speakers without *his* in the mixed scenario, [masc] does to male humans.

(ii) For speakers with *his* in the mixed scenario, *his* also occurs in a structure without [masc];similarly, *their* here cannot be restricted to denoting pluralities.

(iii) (2) indicates that the gender of bound variable pronouns does not restrict the denotation of the pronouns themselves, since the VP needs to be interpretable as the gender-less predicate *was decorating one's own office*; rather, gender is interpreted on the binder, *the professor*, and the pronoun gets it invisibly to interpretation, say at PF.

However, at least some -- perhaps all -- speakers who accept *his* for the mixed scenario of (1) do not accept analogous uses of *his* in (3) and (4) (cf. Whitley's 1978:20 "not just sexist, but downright bizarre" *Either Hal or Mary sank his teeth into my apple*):

(3) #Every man and woman$_i$ was decorating his$_i$ office.
#Each/#neither spouse$_i$ signed his$_i$ name. [excludes women and would use *husband*]

(4) Contexts: The participants are a mixed group of men and women:
Every participant$_i$ had to ask another participant$_j$ if he$_j$ would be willing to marry him$_i$. [excludes heterosexual couplings]
#Every participant$_i$ had become an uncle or an aunt in his$_i$ twenties.
#No participant$_i$ realized that the gene therapy could make him$_i$ pregnant whether he$_i$ was a man or an infertile woman.

The examples seem to differ from (1) in that women as well as men are salient among the values ranged over by *he*. The effect is distinct from that in (5), where *his* is barred because the predicate usually restricts the context to women:

(5) No participant$_i$ had been pregnant in her$_i$/#his$_i$ twenties.

In contrast, speakers who allow *they* in the mixed scenario of (1) do so even when the singularity of its denotata is made salient as in (6). This is reassuring for analyses where plurals in general and the 'epicene' *they* in particular can denote singulars (Sauerland 2008): *they* is allowed in (6) instead of more restrictive singular pronouns, unlike what happens in (5), because it avoids specifying gender, one of its 'distancing' or 'deindividuating' properties discussed in Newman 1997, Balhorn 2004.

(6) {Every participant$_i$ / No participant$_i$ / The participants each$_i$} claimed that they$_i$ ate **alone** (**won**, **were better than all the others**).

For the speakers in question, then, bound-variable *his* sometimes can and sometimes cannot be used to denote female humans. This leaves open the analysis. One possibility is to continue with the hypothesis of an interpretively unrestricted *he* and bar it from contexts like (4), for instance if they somehow require the binder to be both [fem] and [masc], transmission of which to a bound variable leaves it unrealizable. Alternatively, *he* might always be interpretively restricted to male humans, as argued in experimental and corpus studies of the mixed scenario (e.g. Mackay and Fulkerson 1979; for other literature see Hellinger 2005) -- these account for mixed uses through androcentric prototypes -- while one might also or alternatively seek a link with "pragmatic slack" phenomena where aspects of meaning like plurality are set aside (Lasersohn 1999, Brisson 2003, Malamud 2012). One boundary condition on analyses, and a possible factor in the variation, is the behaviour of grammatical gender languages like French or Czech, and earlier stages of English: in contexts like (4) in French, pronouns with epicene antecedents like masc. *humain* 'human', fem. *sentinelle* 'guard' agree in gender without any interpretive restrictions, while pronouns with bigender antecedents like masc./fem. *linguiste* 'linguist' do tend to show the effect in (4), restricting masc. pronouns to male humans (cf. also Cacciari et al. 2011).

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7.

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Restrictor set readings across ontological domains in ASL

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It was shown in Schlenker 2011, 2013 that in ASL nominal, temporal and modal generalized quantifiers can introduce loci (= positions in signing space) that denote the 'maximal set,' i.e. the maximal set of objects that satisfy both the restrictor and the nuclear scope. Here we call attention to a strategy used (in one informant's ASL) to represent *restrictors* of generalized quantifiers. Interestingly, this strategy can establish a separate locus for a restrictor set that is disjoint from the locus for a maximal set – despite the fact that their denotations are in a subset-superset relation (by contrast, nominal examples with the same property discussed by Schlenker et al., to appear, involved loci that were embedded within each other).

The **nominal case** is illustrated in (1). It involves three loci, whose positions are represented in (2) (boxed ratings are on a 7-point scale, with 7 = best; inferences were obtained by way of multiple choice questions; numbers such as *(14, 162; 163)* are references to the original video, followed by the video(s) with ratings).

(1) 7 POSS-1 STUDENT [SOME AMERICAN]$_a$. BUT [HAVE FOREIGN]$_c$. IX-arc-a LAZY. IX-arc-c WORK-WORK. UNDERSTAND-UNDERSTAND, **IX-arc-c [SOME SHORT]$_b$. IX-arc-b GENIUS.**
'[Some of my students]$_a$ are American. But I also have [foreign students]$_c$. They$_a$ [= my American students] are lazy, while they$_c$ [= my foreign students] are hard-working. See, among them$_c$, some$_b$ are short. They$_b$ [= the short foreign students] are geniuses.' (14, 162; 163)
Inferences: (i) The speaker's students who are geniuses are those that are foreigners and are short. (ii) The speaker's students who are hard-working are those who are foreigners (whether short or not).

(2) Approximate areas associated with the loci in (1) (from the signer's perspective)

c   b   a

Locus *a* refers to the speaker's American students, and locus *c* to the speaker's foreign students. Both are introduced by way of existential constructions, and retrieved by the plural pronouns *IX-arc-a* and *IX-arc-c* respectively. In addition, *IX-arc-c* serves as the restrictor of the existential construction *[SOME SHORT]$_b$*, which ends up meaning 'some of my foreign students are short' (since *c* denotes the set of the speaker's foreign students), and introduces a maximal set locus *b* denoting the speaker's short foreign students. As is clear in the boldfaced part of (1), restrictor set and maximal set loci are clearly distinguished and are not embedded within each other, despite the fact that their denotations are in a subset-superset relation. It is this anaphoric strategy that we now investigate in the temporal and modal domains.

It is a traditional idea that *when*- and *if*-clauses can function as restrictors of temporal and modal generalized quantifiers respectively (e.g. Kratzer 1986, de Swart 1995). Significantly, we find the same effect where these constructions are concerned. The **temporal case** is illustrated in (3), with the loci as shown (see Schlenker, to appear, ex. (21b) for a preliminary example with inferential data). Three temporal loci are introduced in (3), with a contrast between times at which the speaker plays with other people – denoted by locus *a* – and times at which he plays with the addressee – denoted by locus *c*, which is explicitly introduced by a *when*-clause. A third locus, *b*, is introduced by a main clause with the temporal adverb *SOMETIMES*. An inferential task shows that the pronoun indexing locus *c* yields a 'restrictor set' reading, and ends up denoting the times at which the speaker and addressee play together; while the locus indexing locus *b* yields a 'maximal set' reading, and denote the times at which it is both the case that the speaker and addressee play together, and the speaker loses. The **modal case** appears in (4) and, again, the main facts are as in (1): *IX-b* yields a 'maximal set' reading, and ends up referring to *those accessible worlds in which the speaker and addressee play together and the speaker loses*; while *IX-c* yields a 'restrictor set' reading, and refers to the set of *all accessible worlds in which the speaker and the addressee play together*.

(3) *Context:* I often compete with you or with others.

6.3 [SOMETIMES IX-1 PLAY WITH OTHER PEOPLE]$_a$. BUT [WHEN THE-TWO-1,2 PLAY TOGETHER]$_c$ [SOMETIMES IX-1 LOSE]$_b$. IX-b IX-1 NOT HAPPY BUT IX-c GET-PILE MUCH MONEY, IX-a LITTLE MONEY.
'Sometimes$_a$ I play with other people. But [when you and I play together]$_c$, sometimes$_b$ I lose. Then$_b$ [= when you and I play together and I lose] I am not happy, but then$_c$ [= whenever you and I play together] I make a lot of money; then$_a$ [= when I play with other people] I just make a little money.' (12, 161; 12, 162; 12, 167; 14, 15)
Inferences: (i) The speaker gets lots of money under the following condition: the speaker and addressee play together.
(ii) The speaker is unhappy under the following condition: the speaker and addressee play together and the speaker loses.

(4) 6.5 [TOMORROW POSSIBLE IX-1 PLAY WITH OTHER PEOPLE]$_a$. BUT [IF THE-TWO-1,2 PLAY TOGETHER TOMORROW]$_c$ [POSSIBLE IX-1 LOSE]$_b$. IX-b IX-1 NOT HAPPY BUT IX-c MUCH MONEY, IX-a LITTLE MONEY.
'Tomorrow I might$_a$ play with other people. But [if you and I play together tomorrow]$_c$, I might$_b$ lose. Then$_b$ [= if you and I play together and I lose] I won't be happy, but then$_c$ [= if you and I play together] I will make a lot of money; then$_a$ [= if I play with other people] I will just make a little money.' (12, 150; 12, 151; 12, 152; 12, 166; 14, 14)
Inferences: (i) The speaker gets lots of money under the following condition: the speaker and addressee play together. (ii) The speaker is unhappy under the following condition: the speaker and addressee play together and the speaker loses.

We have thus seen that in the nominal, temporal and modal domains alike, loci can be established by restrictors in general, and by *if-* and *when*-clauses in particular – and indexing these loci gives rise to truth conditions that are clearly distinct from 'maximal set' readings. Finally, the fact that the same quantificational and anaphoric resources are available in the nominal, temporal and modal domains further strengthens the case for a uniform grammatical approach to individual, temporal and modal reference, as suggested in Schlenker 2006 and Bittner 2001, among others.

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