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«DIKE», «MOIRA», «BIOS» AND THE LIMITS TO UNDERSTANDING IN SOLON, 13 (WEST) *

Synopsis

Prior interpretations of Solon's poetic fragments have failed to recognize properly the dichotomy between Solon's use of *dike*, which he applies primarily to the *polis*, and *moira*, which he applies primarily to a person's lot in life, including the individual pursuit of material values. This article explains this distinction by considering *moira* in poem 13, the «Hymn to Muses», in contrast to *dike* in the more political poems, such as poem 4, the «Hymn to the City», and 36, the «Hymn to Himself».

Bifurcated justice?

As in so many areas, Gregory Vlastos highlighted a vital issue in his investigation of justice in the poetry of Solon. Vlastos described a «bifurcation of justice» in Solon's thought, a split in basic methodology between his «justice of the πόλις» and «justice of wealth». «In political justice he is a great innovator, for he thinks of it as an intelligible

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order of reparation. In acquisitive or distributive justice, he is a traditionalist» [1]. Beyond the *hybris* of unjust men and the «inevitable» reparation that follows, the similarity between the two categories of justice ends. Vlastos here presents his first objection to a unified view of Solon's justice:

> 1. There is no suggestion that in the case of wealth the sequence of «injustice» and «reparation» is a natural, self-regulative process. There is no parallel here to the observable chain of consequences, (injustice - bondage - strife) which we met in the account of political justice, hence no explanation of *how* the original injustice leads to «disaster» (ἄτη). (Vlastos, *Studies* cit., p. 46)

The poet's view of the pursuit of wealth can be found in passages such as this:

> Μοῖρα δέ τοι θνητοῖσι κακὸν φέρει ἠδὲ καὶ ἐσθλόν;
> δῶρα δ᾽ἄφυκτα θεῶν γίγνεται ἀθανάτων.
> πᾶσι δέ τοι κίνδυνος ἐπ᾽ἔργμασιν, οὐδέ τις οἶδεν
> πῇ μέλλει σχήσειν χρήματος ἀρχομένου (Sol. 13.63-66) [2]
>
> *Moira* brings good and evil to mortals,
> the gifts of the immortal gods may not be escaped.
> There is risk in all actions, and no one knows
> how something, having started, will end up (Sol. 13.63-66)

Such passages contrast utterly with Solon's view of the *polis*, as seen in his descriptions of *Dike* and *Eunomia*, which bring understandable consequences inevitably [3]. But the problems involved in understanding matters of material values are wider than Vlastos brings out. Solon's problem is not only to explain how an «original injustice» leads to ruin for any particular man, but to explain why men both just and unjust can fail or succeed, despite the best laid plans and actions. How can these incongruities be understood? Is there a pattern underlying the pursuit of material sustenance and wealth?

Vlastos lists a second objection to support his claim that Solon's justice is «bifurcated»:

> 2. For all of Solon's initial assurance that unjustly got wealth will not last (13.11-13), he is promptly forced to admit that it may well outlast the life of the unjust man himself; the pursuing justice may only catch up «with the innocent, their children or their seed after them» (13.31-32). (Vlastos, *Studies* cit., p. 46)

The important passage here is:

> ἀλλ᾽ὁ μὲν αὐτίκ᾽ἔτεισεν, ὁ δ᾽ὕστερον· οἵ δὲ φύγωσιν
> αὐτοί, μηδὲ θεῶν μοῖρ᾽ἐπιοῦσα κίχῃ,
> ἤλυθε πάντως αὖτις· ἀναίτιοι ἔργα τίνουσιν
> ἢ παῖδες τούτων ἢ γένος ἐξοπίσω (Sol. 13.29-32)
>
> One man gets what he deserves right away, another later; and if some flee, and escape the onrushing fate of the immortals,
> it comes surely sometime. The innocents pay for the deeds
> or their children or their *genos* thereafter (Sol. 13.29-32)

Vlastos then notes that there is nothing «so characteristic of the magical view of justice as the postulate that punishment descends biologically upon the sinner's posterity» [4].

An answer to Vlastos' second objection can be inferred without difficulty. In archaic Greece an enemy would certainly turn upon the children of those holding an obligation, and a pursuer (such as a creditor) would enforce his prerogatives upon an innocent son as upon his father [5]. Indeed high-level legal distinctions used to explain

[1] G. Vlastos, *Studies in Greek Philosophy*, D.W. Graham (ed.), Princeton 1995, pp. 32-56. Adkins answers Vlastos by placing Solon firmly within a Homeric mode of thought: «Solon has one vocabulary for both political and distributive justice»: A.W.H. Adkins, *Poetic Craft in the Early Greek Elegists*, Chicago - London 1985, p. 124. B. Manuwald, *Zu Solons Gedankenwelt*, «RhM» 132 (1989), p. 1, cites Vlastos' «Zweiteilung» (bifurcation) as the first rejection of Jaeger's Vergeltung and Strafe thesis.

[2] All fragments numbered as per M.L. West, *Iambi et Elegi Graeci ante Alexandrum Cantati*, Editio Altera, Oxford 1998, unless stated otherwise. All translations are my own, or modified from D.E. Gerber, Cambridge (Mass.) - London 1999.

[3] See, *e.g.*, fragment 4.14-16: δίκη knows what is and was, and retribution surely comes; and 4.30-39, Εὐνομίη makes things right.

[4] Vlastos, *Studies* cit., pp. 46-47.

[5] Apart from the implications of 13.29-32, the only reference to debts in Solon, ὑπὸ χρειοῦς φυγόντας, is ambiguous: 36.10-11. Theognis, 203-208 for inherited debts. C.M. Bowra, *Early Greek Elegists*, London 1938, p. 95: unjust money-making may turn against heirs. Also A.W.H. Adkins, *Moral Values and Political Behaviour in Ancient*

how a protagonist could pursue a debtor but not his land, such as the Roman *ius ad personas, ad res* and *ad actiones*, are distinctly anachronistic. Further, there is no reason to import the idea of mortgage; land was the primary value, and taking a person's land, livestock or material resources to repay an informal barter loan is plausible. Having observed such actions, Solon would have been accurate to conclude that innocent persons were indeed at risk due to no fault of their own. There is no need to see this conclusion as «magical».

However, Vlastos' first objection is more fundamental and difficult. Solon's world certainly does not work the same way in matters of wealth attainment as it does in political matters. A split between the actions necessary to earn a living and the consequences of those actions was obvious. Good men do fall to evil and evil men to good. This is not an understandable order akin to what Solon sees in his *polis*. His uses of *moira* to describe a man's mortal and material lot in life suggest that Solon may have understood these matters in a way that differs fundamentally from the ordering of the *polis* by *dike*.

Strictly speaking, we should not assume that Solon has a concept of «justice» at all; he thinks of course only of *dike*, *tisis*, *moira* and the like, and he may or may not think of these concepts in «political» and «distributive» senses. But Vlastos explains Solon by dichotomizing the single English term «justice» in precisely this way. In English, each idea is an application of justice. One concerns itself with political and legal administration, and the other with the distribution of wealth. Vlastos' political and distributive *diaeresis* has affinities with Plato and Aristotle, but it may be wildly anachronistic for the early sixth-century if not flat out wrong. Does Solon have concepts of «distributive justice» and «political justice»? Is there one single, «bifurcated» Greek idea to express these ideas, or are there two distinct terms and concepts explaining what are to Solon two different things? This paper maintains the latter. It is appropriate to begin here by examining Solon's use of terminology.

Greece from Homer to the End of the Fifth Century, London 1972, p. 43. *Ath. Pol.* 2.2 states that prior to Solon, οἱ πένητες, τὰ τέκνα and αἱ γυναῖκες ἐδούλευον: the poor, their children and women were enslaved.

Solon's terminological distinctions: poem 13 versus poems 4 and 36

The essential treatment of wealth in Solon is poem 13, his «Hymn to the Muses». Even a cursory look shows important thematic differences between this prayer and the more political poems 4 and 36. Poem 13 begins asking for wealth (ὄλβος) from the gods and renown (δόξα) from men, and immediately distinguishes wealth which is proper and god-given from that which comes unnaturally. Poems 4 and 36, along with 9, 11, 32, 33, 34 and 37, rather focus on affairs in the *polis*: poem 4 begins «our city …» (ἡμετέρη δὲ πόλις, 4.1), and poem 36 with Solon's own political action, «On account of these things I brought the people together» (ἐγὼ δὲ τῶν μὲν οὕνεκα ξυνήγαγον δῆμον, 36.1-2). Poem 13 is thematically closer to poems 14, 15, 23, 24 and 25, which address human affairs in terms wider than political order, and poem 27, which is concerned with the stages of a person's life, than it is to the poems that are focused on the *polis*.

This division is supported by terminology. There is no mention of *polis* in poem 13 at all, and no direct concern for either how a *polis* is to be ordered or the ramifications of ordering it improperly. In poem 13 Solon does not use the language of the *polis*: missing are *hybris*, *hesychia* «peace or calmness», *eleutheria* «freedom», *Eunomia* «Good Order», *astoi* «citizens», *demos* or *hegemones* of the *demos* «people» or «leaders of the people», *phylai* «tribes», *philos* «friend» and descriptors such as *demosion* «public» and *pasei polei* «entire *polis*» [6]. Nor is there any concern for *stasis* «civil strife», *polemos* «war», *doulosyne* «slavery» and similar notions [7]. There is no mention in poem 13 of the consequences of *hybris* spreading through the community; the overriding concern is rather with the proper and improper means to pursue and attain wealth, including the transmission of one man's obligations onto another and the alighting of wealth first on one man and then another.

The issue of wealth and its attainment is primarily a matter of a person's own *bios*, a general term denoting a person's maintenance

[6] ὕβρις, ἡσυχία, ἐλευθερία, Εὐνομία, ἀστοί, δῆμος or ἡγέμονες of the δῆμος, φύλαι, φίλος, or descriptors such as δημόσιον or πάσῃ πόλει.

[7] στάσις, πόλεμος and δουλοσύνη.

of his life by pursuing material values [8]. The only two mentions of *bios*-words in Solon are in poem 13: 13.72, which speaks of *bios* as the broad «life-style» in any particular manifestation, and 13.50, which identifies βίοτον with artisanship skills. The 6 examples of human action in lines 43 through 62 are all directly concerned with six ways to pursue the means to life. Although these actions have important relationships to the *polis*, these relationships are not Solon's concern here. In contrast with all of this, Poems 4 and 36 are rather centrally concerned with the consequences of actions in the *polis*.

Poem 13 also deals with ἔργα, the particular deeds and their products connected with the pursuit and production of material values. Of 20 noun / verb forms of ἐργ- in Solon, 10 are in poem 13 [9]. But only in poem 13 are ἔργα connected to specific means of earning a living: they are related to artisans through Athena and Hephaistos (13.50) and physicians through Paion (13.57). Only in this poem does Solon refer to general results of human action in the sense of «works of men» (καλὰ ἔργα, 13.21). In poem 13 the consequences of certain actions are directed at particular persons and not against the *polis*; 13.31 has the «innocents» suffer the retribution due to the ancestor, but never claims that everyone will suffer as in poem 4 [10]. In poem 13 Solon generalizes this in terms of particular men: there is risk in all deeds, and good things happen to those who act well and *vice versa*, 13.65, 67, 69 [11]. However, the consequences for the political community remain unstated.

[8] Βίος is normally translated as «mode of life»; «lifetime»; «livelihood, earning a living»: *Greek-English Lexicon*, Liddell and Scott (eds.), Oxford 1968. This refers primarily to the physical actions necessary to maintaining one's life; these actions are the pursuit of material goods, wealth and values.

[9] ἔργμα forms: 4.11 as 13.12; 7; 13.65. ἔργον forms: 4.36, 37; 11.8; 13.16, 21, 31, 41, 50, 57; 26.1; 27.12; ἔρδω forms: 13.67, 69; 27.12; 34.7; 36.17.

[10] 4.17: And now this inescapable wound comes to the entire city (τοῦτ᾽ἤδη πάσῃ πόλει ἔρχεται ἕλκος ἄφυκτον); 4.26: Thus the public evil comes to the house of each man (οὕτω δημόσιον κακὸν ἔρχεται οἴκαδ᾽ἑκάστῳ).

[11] The pre-eminent archaic poem dealing with the need to work for material sustenance is Hesiod's *Works and Days*. *Bios* in Hesiod can mean the products of action, such as a barn full of grain, that are necessary for life; *bios* as a proper lifestyle brings the material values needed to live. Specific passages connecting such products to work (ἔργα and related forms) include *Works and Days*, 42-44; 229-232; 306-307; 314-316; 394-400; 576-581. In 314-316, for instance, Hesiod counsels Perses to turn to your work (εἰς ἔργον) and attend to your livelihood (μελετᾶς βίου). 394-400 enjoins a person to work

The ἐργ- word-forms do act as a bridge between individual action and the results in the *polis*; in poem 4 overbearing deeds and deeds of contention (ὑπερήφανα ἔργα and ἔργα διχοστασίης) are soothed and stopped by *Eunomia*. Solon here generalizes the beneficial results of Good Order, as he earlier described the political consequences of Disorder [12]. Clearly human actions have consequences for human life in general as well as for the community, but there is a distinct difference in focus in poem 13. To illustrate this difference, 13.12 and 4.11 each use the phrase «persuaded by unjust deeds», although in poem 4 the citizens are persuaded, while in 13 the persuasion is that of wealth itself. There are no citizens spoken of in poem 13 because there is no *polis* being considered.

To summarize to this point, poem 13 is not political *in the same sense* as 4 and 36. By political I mean explicitly concerned with matters of the *polis*. This conclusion fits a thinker like Solon, who tells us in many places that he is dealing directly with the *polis*. In poem 13 the relationship between biotic and political actions needs to be inferred; the *polis* context is not made explicit. In poems 4 and 36 it is rather the specific actions by which wealth is attained that must be inferred. In these verses Solon is more concerned with the wider problem of *hybris* in the community than he is with the details of particular human actions. Consequently, it should not be surprising if Solon's ultimate conclusions in poem 13 differ from the other fragments. The point here is not to draw categorical fences around the poems, but to respect Solon's ability to focus on different aspects of human life and to accentuate those aspects in relationship to each other [13].

(ἐργάζευ) the work (ἔργα), else his family will be forced to seek sustenance (βίοτον) through neighbors.

[12] Compare to fragment 11.8: he tells the crowd that they fail to see the deeds of a wily man (εἰς ἔργον δ᾽οὐδὲν γιγνόμενον βλέπετε).

[13] Many interpretations of poem 13 have been promoted. R. Lattimore, *The First Elegy of Solon*, «AJPh» 68.1 (1947), pp. 161-179, sees no subject to the poem, despite its understandability as a unity. U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Sappho und Simonides*, Berlin 1913, sees the desire for wealth, and K. Reinhardt, *Solon's Elegie* εἰς ἑαυτόν, «RM» (1916), sees τὸ σπεύδειν. Bowra, *Early Greek Elegists* cit., p. 99, sees «human error». B.M.W. Knox, *Solon*, in P. Easterling - B.M.W. Knox (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Classical Literature: I. Greek Literature*, repr. Cambridge 1985, p. 148, sees prosperity. D.E. Gerber, *A Companion to the Greek Lyric Poets*, Leiden - New York - Koeln 1997, p. 115, notes that «Solon's primary theme is wealth,» as 1970, p. 124.

The difference in subject between *polis* and *bios* in poems 4 and 36 versus poem 13 is accompanied by a corresponding difference in normative terminology, between *dike* and *moira*. *Dike*, the retribution which follows human actions, is with one exception mentioned only in the context of the *polis*: twice in poem 4 and three times in 36 [14]. 13.8 is Solon's sole attempt to apply the principle of *dike* to the acquisition of wealth: «justice surely comes later» (πάντως ὕστερον ἦλθε δίκη). But, as the poem continues the shortcomings in the attempt become overpowering. The only other *dike* word in poem 13, «persuaded by unjust deeds» (ἀδίκοις ἔργμασι πειθόμενος, 13.12), found similarly in 4.11 (as ἀδίκοις ἔργμασι πειθόμενοι), strengthens the connection to poem 4 implied in 13.8, and explains the poet's prior generalization that wealth acquired improperly follows against its nature and results in destruction [15]. But *dike* then vanishes from poem 13, an indication that Solon resolves the problems in the poem by some means other than *dike*.

The concept used in poem 13 to describe why things occur as they do in human life is rather *moira*. In Solon's fragments *moira* is never applied to the *polis*; verses 13.30 and 63 relate *moira* to *bios*; 20.4 and 27.18 relate it to death. 11.2 is the closest to a strictly political application of *moira*, although Solon addresses his audience in the second person; *moira* applies to the men, and neither *polis* nor *astoi* are mentioned [16]. This paper will argue that *moira* and *dike* are

[14] 4.14, the *astoi* fail to guard the sacred foundations of Justice (οὐδὲ φυλάσσονται σεμνὰ Δίκης θέμεθλα): 4.36: [*Eunomie*] straightens crooked judgments ([Ευνομίη] εὐθύνει δὲ δίκας σκολιάς); 36.3: In the court of Time these things will be witnessed (συμμαρτυροίη ταῦτ' ἂν ἐν δίκῃ χρόνου); 36.16: fitting together force with justice (ὁμοῦ βίην τε καὶ δίκην ξυναρμόσας); 36.19 fitting straight justice onto each man's case (εὐθεῖαν εἰς ἕκαστον ἁρμόσας δίκην).

[15] 13.12 has wealth «persuaded by unjust deeds»; 4.11 has the citizens so persuaded.

[16] 11.1-2: «If you have suffered these most grievous pains through your own actions, do not place the blame for your lot on the gods» (μὴ θεοῖσιν τούτων μοῖραν ἐπαμφέρετε). Solon's applications of *Moira* are consistent with other elegiac and iambic poets. For *moira* and *death* see Theognis, 340, 820, 1300; Tyrtaeus, 7.2; Callinus, 1.15, as 119.2B. Archilochus, 16 is anachronistic due to its use of *tyche*. Adespota Iamblica 35.16 for connection to profit (κέρδος) (fragmentary); Semonides, 7.104 has both the *moira* of the divine and the *charis* of man (ἢ θεοῦ μοῖραν ἢ ἀνθρώπου χάριν). Homer has *moira* as a norm: e.g., *Odyssey*, 17.335 and 580 for outside *moira* and according to *moira* (παρὰ μοῖραν and κατὰ μοῖραν). A.W.H. Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility: A Study in Greek Values*, Oxford 1960, pp. 17-18 stresses the scales of *Il.* 8.70 f. as «fates of death,» not «fate» in a deterministic sense.

not a single concept dichotomized, but rather two distinct concepts dealing with related but different aspects of human life.

The *polis* and *dike* versus *bios* and *moira* distinction also coheres with Solon's two perspectives on time, in the *polis* and in human life. The difference here is the existence of a *telos* (τέλος): *telos* is used in 13.17 and 28, the ultimate end that is knowable only by Zeus, and in 13.58, to indicate the limits to human foresight available to a physician. Zeus completes (τελέσῃ) the first period of life in 27.3, and if someone were to reach the tenth stage in due order (τὴν δεκάτην δ' εἴ τις τελέσας κατὰ μέτρον ἵκοιτο), then his allotted death (μοῖρα θάνατου) is not unseasonable, 27.17-18 [17]. The end, then, is of an individual's life, either in the material allotment that he ultimately receives, or in the fated death that none can foresee and that none can escape.

In contrast to a person's life, time in the *polis* is referred to as *chronos* (χρόνος) and is never associated with any *telos*. Solon wishes that the rule of Philocyprus over Solioi be πολὺν χρόνον, 19.1, and he predicts that, in the court of time (ἐν δίκῃ χρόνου) his reputation in Athens will be exonerated because of the justness of his actions, 36.3. That there is no *telos*, *moira* or death applicable to the *polis* indicates an important difference between his views of individual life and of the *polis*. To Solon the allotted death that comes upon a man has no counterpart in the *polis*, and the *telos* that comes to each man is beyond the scope of *dike* either to know or to change.

These terminological and conceptual examples suggest that Solon does not think the same way about the order in the *polis* as he does about the order underlying each person's life. Closer consideration of poem 13 will reveal the reasons for this division in his thinking.

[17] M. Marcovich, *Heraclitus: Greek Text with a Short Commentary*, Merida (Venezuela) 1967, p. 554, implies influence by Solon upon the Stoics through Heraclitus, connecting Sol. 27.3 to Heraclit (testimonium), A18: Ἡ. καὶ οἱ Στωικοὶ ἄρχεσθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τῆς τελείοτητος περὶ δευτέραν ἑβδομάδα, περὶ ἣν ὁ σπερματικὸς κινεῖται ὀρρός.

The insufficiency of «dike» in matters of personal action

Given the basic distinctions between matters of the *polis* and matters of wealth attainment, we can now consider poem 13 in more detail. The basic focus of Solon's *Musenelegie* is set in the first 6 lines: Solon prays for wealth from the gods and reputation from men [18]. With δόξα «reputation» dropped after line 6 the relationships between people are never again primary: poem 13 is from then on concerned almost exclusively with a person's attainment of material goods and its consequences [19]. The poem, in other words, passes the «desert island test»: its general principles would be applicable to a Philoktetes on a desert island, who would need to obtain material goods to stay alive but could question whether his actions are improving his lot in the long run [20]. On this island one would still face an allotted death (μοῖρα θάνατου), and concern for the *moira* of material values would be vitally important, but social issues such as civil strife, war or slavery could never arise, and one could never speak of «our *polis*», of bringing the people together, or of just versus unjust dispute resolution [21].

From this introduction Solon turns to the terms in which it is proper to obtain wealth. He wants wealth, but not unjustly, since «*dike* surely comes later» (πάντως ὕστερον ἦλθε δίκη, 13.8). This line bears strong resemblance to his generalization that underlies the order in the *polis*, 4.16: «in time retribution surely comes» (τῷ δὲ χρόνῳ πάντως ἦλθ᾽ἀποτεισομένη), the inevitable retribution that follows every evil action. In poem 4 hubristic actions to attain wealth in the *polis* result in robbing, stealing and the retribution of *dike*, which are metaphorically an inescapable wound falling on the entire *polis* and a public evil coming to home of anyone who tries to hide. The hypothesis that Solon is actually thinking causally about the *polis* (albeit in a non-self-conscious way) is supported in his exhortation to *Eunomia*, which, by eliminating *hybris*, brings the *polis* to the opposite condition [22]. In other words, *dike* applies to the *polis* in both good and bad conditions; according to poem 36, it is fitted harmoniously with force (βία), and is fitted alike to each man's case by written laws. The application of *dike* to the *polis* has been widened to include both a *proper* condition of the *polis* and the *process* of dispute settlement [23]. *Dike* defines the inevitability of consequences that follow from human actions and the resulting condition of the *polis*.

[18] Disagreement reigns over the first lines of the poem. M. Finkelberg, *The Birth of Literary Fiction in Ancient Greece*, Oxford 1998, p. 162, interprets 13.1-2 as a calling for «happiness and good fame». E.K. Anhalt, *Solon the Singer: Politics and Poetics*, Lanham 1993, p. 13 n. 4, for the address to the Muses as a typical archaic theme, see G. Nagy, *The Best of the Achaeans: Concepts of the Hero in Ancient Greek Poetry*, Baltimore - London 1979, pp. 271-272, and B. Gentili, *Poetry and Its Public in Ancient Greece: From Homer to the Fifth-Century*, A.T. Cole (tr.), Baltimore - London 1988, p. 159. K. Alt, *Solons Gebet zu den Musen*, «Hermes» 107 (1979), p. 390, notes that Solon follows Hesiod in praying for σωφροσύνη, «die Einsicht in der Maß», citing Hesiod, *Theogony*, 52 f. and *Scutum*, 206. R.L. Fowler, *The Nature of Early Greek Lyric: Three Preliminary Studies*, Toronto - Buffalo - London 1987, p. 79, notes that «lines 1-8 are the germ of the whole». J. Christes, *Solon's Musenelegie*, «Hermes» 87 (1986), pp. 163-190, for antitheses between goettlicher Weitsicht and menschlicher Kurzsicht, as the commentary of I.M. Linforth *Solon the Athenian*, Berkeley 1919, contrasts man's ignorance with a god's omnipotence. Wilamowitz 1913, p. 259, notes that in line 7 «ist χρήματα identisch mit ὄλβος». His Greek paraphrase of the poem uses πλοῦτος. Anhalt, *Solon* cit., p. 25: ὄλβος is material wealth since true happiness cannot be responsible for *hybris*.

[19] Similarly, the «personal» context in poem 13 differentiates Solon's perspective from that of Hesiod, especially as regards the five ages of man: the fate of particular persons, not a race of men, is Solon's concern.

[20] In Sophocles' *Philoctetes*, 32, Philoktetes must go forth and search for sustenance in a short-range sense; coming upon the island, Odysseus asks οὐδ᾽ἔνδον οἰκοποιός ἐστί τις τροφή.

[21] *Dike* in Sophocles' *Philoctetes* is always social: Odysseus claims justice in scheming against Philoctetes (line 82); Philoctetes attributes injustice to Odysseus (408); Philoctetes claims that the gods protect unjust things such as Odysseus (449-450); Neoptolemus asks godspeed to wherever the god thinks is right: Philoktetes has given him the bow, and the prayer is bound up in his suffering at the hands of Odysseus (781); if the gods care for *dike*, you will be punished for what you did to this man (1036); Odysseus claims to be just (1050); man argues what is just (= his own case) (1140); Neoptolemus says he took the bow shamefully and not by *dike* (1234); δίκαια is better than σοφῶν, and Odysseus wonders why it is just (1246-1247); with right he has no fear of the army (1251); it is not just to pity or feel sorry for self-inflicted wounds (1320). As for fate, Neoptolemus says *moira* caused Achilles to die (331); the Chorus sings of a hateful *moira* to Philoctetes, who did nothing to deserve what he got (680); *moira* takes Philoctetes when he sails away with Heracles (1461).

[22] Fragment 6.3-4 exhibits similar thinking: τίκτει γὰρ κόρος ὕβριν, ὅταν πολὺς ὄλβος ἕπεται / ἀνθρόποις ὁπόσοις μὴ νόος ἄρτιος ᾖ: For *hybris* breeds excess, whenever much wealth follows men who are not sound of mind. See Theognis, 693-694.

[23] Solon fragment 12 attributes *dike* adjectivally to the sea, as a calm condition that requires a motive force to stir up.

Poem 13 begins by using a similar sense of *dike* to explain matters of wealth. In Solon's mind the inevitability of *dike* assures that what occurs will be understandable, and consistent with one's actions. As «in time retribution surely comes» in 4.16 explains civil strife in the *polis*, and as poems 9 and 11 present explanations for tyranny in terms of the consequences of improper thoughts and actions, so Solon first considers *dike* in poem 13.8 to be the guiding principle underlying each person's pursuit of wealth. This statement is Solon's own personal persuasion, derived from his core evaluations and applied as a generalization to explain matters of *bios*. It is of the greatest significance that this is the first and only mention of *dike* in the prayer [24].

Solon uses πάντως ὕστερον ἦλθε δίκη in 13.8 as a principle. By a «principle» I mean a generalization based on existing understanding, applied to new situations as a guide to understanding and to action. A principle offers a means of evaluating new observations against existing understanding. The application of a principle is tested by consistency with the new material; if the new material contradicts the principle, then either the principle or the application are in error. Solon knows none of this; he merely attempts to explain wealth acquisition according to his existing understanding that πάντως ὕστερον ἦλθε δίκη.

The lines 13.7-16 follow as a guide to action, distinguishing wealth that is acquired according to the gods (πλοῦτον δ' ὅν μὲν δῶσι θεοί) and that which men honor from *hybris* (ὅν δ' ἄνδρες τιμῶσιν ὑφ' ὕβριος) (13.9, 11). Emily Anhalt sees Solon's focus as on «on the causal connections between human nature, human activities and human fortunes» [25]. But at the stage of lines 7-17 it is impossible to know what Solon has in mind, and we might wonder if Solon himself knows what he is really after. An abstract idea such as «causal connection» should not be attributed to an archaic thinker without strong evidence [26]. We do know that he starts with his own persuasion that improper actions are followed by inevitable retribution, which grows until it lashes out like a wind, 13.17-25. The storm vivifies the abstract generalization in 13.8, presenting the abstract idea of retribution in concrete terms and creating a point of focus for the audience [27]. The key idea here is not his understanding of «causality» or «causal connections», but rather of comprehensive inevitability, the sense in which he refers to one thing leading to another.

From this generalization in the form of a simile Solon narrows his focus to consider what happens to particular men. In lines 25-28 Zeus' retribution is consistent and inevitable, even a bit lenient, but whoever holds evil in his *thumos* always becomes visible and gets his retribution in the end. This is so far a naïve view of retribution, broadly consistent with Solon's understanding of the *polis* but without any real test in matters of personal action. As he turns to examples of particular men he discovers a problem, as seen in lines 13.29-32 (cited earlier). One man, meeting his fated death, dies leaving an unresolved debt, obligation, or unresolved vengeance, which is taken out on his children or his family. Another, fleeing into foreign lands but avoiding the onrushing *moira*, leaves his innocent family destitute [28]. Another simply dies, his plans incomplete, unable to see the onrush of

[24] F. Solmsen, *Hesiod and Aeschylus*, Ithaca 1949, pp. 107-108, and H. van Wees, *The Mafia of Early Greece: Violent Exploitation in the Seventh and Sixth Centuries BC*, in K. Hopwood (ed.), *Organised Crime in Antiquity*, London 1999, pp. 1-51, stress the concrete nature of Solon's observations, from different perspectives.

[25] Anhalt, *Solon* cit., p. 18.

[26] See M. Vegetti, *Culpability, Responsibility, Cause: Philosophy, Historiography and Medicine in the Fifth-Century*, in A.A. Long (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy*, Cambridge 1999, pp. 271-289. Finding a dearth of evidence for a neutral idea of «cause» through the fifth century, Vegetti observes that moral/judicial language, i.e., of culpability and responsibility, permeated early Greek thought. There was no neutral «causation» in archaic thought.

[27] Lattimore, *First Elegy* cit., p. 164, thinks that the simile of the storm is «the projection of a sequence irrelevant to the original context». I cannot agree. The «pure illustration» is not irrelevant for an audience looking to understand an abstract maxim such as πάντως ὕστερον ἦλθε δίκη. As H. Fränkel, *Dichtung und Philosophie des fruehen Griechentums*, M. Hadas (tr.), Oxford 1975, p. 136, states, «In a single poem the reaction of the speaker to what is at that moment happening is given objective existence». I observe that archaic logic functions primarily to relate abstract formulations to perceptible phenomena, not to connect abstractions by means of syllogistic reasoning. Thus Solon so often follows his generalizations with concrete examples. In addition to 13.8 f. see 4.17 f. (the inescapable wound, reduced to the effects on individual citizens); 13.35 f. (examples of mistaken understanding); 13.43 f. (examples of ways of earning a living).

[28] The latter is one of the φυγόντες, 36.10-11, implied in 4.23-25. The phrase μηδὲ θεῶν μοῖρ' ἐπιοῦσα κίχῃ in 13.30 parallels 20.4, Solon's emendation to Mimnermus' poem 6, ὀγδωκονταέτη μοῖρα κίχοι θανάτου. Μοῖρα θανάτου is the fate of death which meets each person in Solon's fragment 27.18. This suggests that the exile escapes immediate death from his pursuer.

death, leaving a family without resources [29]. Despite many difficulties in interpretation, Solon sees that what follows is not consistent with what was done earlier. A person does not always get his due.

This is a direct contradiction to the promise that *dike* made in line 13.8, and to her consequences in the *polis* in poem 4. The contradiction is not that innocents suffer due to others, since this is true in the *polis* also, but that the guilty can escape what was supposed to be inevitable. Solon muses over this dilemma, presenting the problem as Theognis did when he asked Zeus how equal *moira* can come to men holding a *noos* that turns to *sophrosyne* as to *hybris* [30]. The indication that Solon was grasping something new is a viable explanation for his tentativeness in poem 13. The central problem of the poem, the lack of consistency between means and ends in human life, is derived from observable instances of results not matching expectations and of failure to achieve certain results despite best efforts [31]. It is no longer possible for him to maintain that *dike* surely comes later, at least not in the predictable sense that it comes to the *polis* [32]. The idea that *dike* does not follow according to a person's actions shakes his view of the world to its core. If not *dike* then what does explain human affairs?

«To noein» and the challenge of «to pathein»

In poem 4 the reasons for the problems in the *polis* are in the *noos* (νόος) of the citizens; a *noos* that is «unjust» (*adikos*) leads to hubristic action and the destruction of the political community [33]. Archaic *noos* is notoriously difficult to translate; it can run the gauntlet of

[29] Theognis, 903-930 for death as thwarting the best-laid plans; 205-208 for debts and children.

[30] Lines 373-380.

[31] Noted by W.C. Greene, *Moira: Fate, Good and Evil in Greek Thought*, Cambridge (Mass.) 1944, pp. 36-39; Adkins, *Moral Values* cit., pp. 43-45.

[32] Lattimore, *First Elegy* cit., pp. 164, 174, notes the inadequacy of the account preceding line 25. 13.8 needed expansion because «it implied that punishment came immediately or simply; and Solon knows that this is not true»; «such expansion is characteristic of the poem».

[33] δήμου ἡγεμόνων ἄδικος νόος: 4.7.

archaic psychic qualities from disposition to habituation to intellectual understanding. Von Fritz, establishing the basics of the term *noos* prior to the Presocratic philosophic innovations, sees a basic meaning in Homer as «to realize or to understand a situation» [34]. This understanding is more comprehensive or profound than what is immediately obvious to one's eyes. The primarily intellectual interpretation that I am adopting for Solon's verses is based on several factors. First, Solon himself explains that the citizens of Athens do not understand (οὐ γὰρ ἐπίστανται) how to restrain themselves, and consequently they act with *hybris*, revenge and violence. Further, Solon's entire approach is based on statements that flow from abstractions to observable instances, and that serve to exhort his audience through persuasion. Solon's placing of *noos* at the starting point of the problems in the *polis* supports the conclusion that Solon sees improper conduct as following from an improper understanding that is combined with material goods beyond a person's power to control [35].

This basically intellectual approach is mirrored in poem 9, which cites ignorance (ἀϊδρίη) as the cause of tyranny and knowledge as the solution: «now it is right to consider all things» (ἤδη χρὴ πάντα νοεῖν). Similarly poem 11.5-6 cites an empty *noos* as why the crowd granted arms to tyrants, claiming that «each one of you walks in the steps of a fox, but altogether you have an empty *noos*» [36]. Sullivan observes similarly a relationship between seeing with one's eyes, *noos* and the context of a political assembly; *noos* in passage 11.6 «pays attention to the leaders but fails to grasp the significance of their deeds», preventing the Athenians from seeing «the truth of the present situation». «Lack of activity in the *noos* may affect how the eyes see or fail to see», with the result that a poorly functioning *noos* perceives and accepts what the leaders say while evading what they do [37].

[34] K. Von Fritz, ***NOOΣ*** *and* ***NOEIN*** *in the Homeric Poems*, «Classical Philology» 38 (1943), pp. 79-94; and, ***NOYΣ,*** ***NOEIN*** *and their Derivatives in Pre-Socratic Philosophy (excluding Anaxagoras)*, in A.P.D. Mourelatos (ed.), *The Presocratics*, New York 1974, pp. 23-85.

[35] See, again, fragment 6.304, note 23 above.

[36] ὑμέων δ' εἷς μὲν ἕκαστος ἀλώπεκος ἴχνεσι βαίνει,
σύμπασιν δ' ὑμῖν χαῦνος ἔνεστι νόος (Sol. 11.5-6).

[37] S.D. Sullivan, *Noos and Vision: Five Passages in the Greek Lyric Poets*, «Symbolae Osloenses» 63 (1988), pp. 9-11. See also S.D. Sullivan, *A Study of the Psychic Term νόος in the Greek Lyric Poets (excluding Pindar and Bacchylides)*, «Emerita» 57 (1989), pp. 129-168.

For Solon the solution to the problems of the *polis* lies in education about how to live under *Eunomia* [38]. Τὸ νοεῖν, then, is the basic solution to the wound on the *polis*, an understanding deeper than immediate observation that is manifested in the written laws and straight justice of poem 36. Τὸ νοεῖν expresses the verbal idea behind ἤδη χρὴ πάντα νοεῖν in 9.6, even though Solon does not use the articular infinitive and has no abstract understanding of an intellectual process. The important point here is that the *polis* is understandable, and that proper consideration of its entire situation is necessary to protect it.

In poem 13 Solon also turns to what we know, but he infuses this with a skepticism that is missing in his political exhortations:

> θνητοὶ δ᾽ὧδε νοέομεν ὁμῶς ἀγαθός τε κακός τε,
> εὖ ῥεῖν ἥν αὐτὸς δόξαν ἕκαστος ἔχει,
> πρίν τι παθεῖν (Sol. 13.33-35) [39]
>
> We mortals, both base and noble, think this,
> each of us expects that things are going well;
> Until experience hits us (Sol. 13.33-35)

The pivotal phrase is line 35: our understanding lasts only until we experience otherwise, πρίν τι παθεῖν. In contrast to the *polis*, our knowledge of the direction our life is taking is at best tentative and subject to contradiction from experience at any time. Under such conditions, it is difficult to see how τὸ νοεῖν or δίκη can provide any guide to us in living life well.

The centrality of τὸ παθεῖν in Solon is illustrated elsewhere. In 4.8 ἄλγεα πολλὰ παθεῖν is a culmination of the unjust actions of the leaders of the δῆμος, which are concretized in terms of direct experience, and in 11.1 Solon demands that his audience not blame the gods for such sufferings. In 24.4 to experience a pleasant life with basic material goods, γαστρί τε καὶ πλευραῖς καὶ ποσὶν ἁβρὰ παθεῖν

[38] ταῦτα διδάξαι θυμὸς Ἀθηναίους με κελεύει: «These things my heart bids me to teach the Athenians» (Sol. 4.30).

[39] It is pointless to enter into the endless critical discussions of line 34. I accept with West εὖ ῥεῖν; cfr. Theognis, 639-640: πολλάκι πὰρ δόξαν τε καὶ ἐλπίδα γίνεται εὖ ῥεῖν / ἔργ᾽ἀνδρῶν, βουλαῖς δ᾽οὐκ ἐπέγεντο τέλος.

is a positive experience, equated with growing wealthy [40]. But πρίν τι παθεῖν in 13.35 contradicts rather than supports the understanding that has been developed so far, and is the point at which Solon realizes that there is a profound problem with the application of the principle of *dike* to *bios*.

What and how we think and are disposed (νοέομεν), to what extent and for what purpose, as well as the expectation (δόξα) that we derive from this understanding, are all challenged by this experience. We think things are well, until we experience the opposite – and we can do so at any time. We respond by staring open-mouthed and engaging in foolish hopes, 13.35-36 [41]. These challenges to our self-understanding and to Solon's principle of *dike* as inevitable are indicated in the four examples he presents after πρίν τι παθεῖν. It is noteworthy that he follows this generalization with particular cases, a pattern that is consistent with his approach to the earlier principle of δίκη in 13.8:

> χὥστις μὲν νούσοισιν ὑπ᾽ἀργαλέῃσι πιεσθῇ,
> ὡς ὑγιὴς ἔσται, τοῦτο κατεφράσατο·
> ἄλλος δειλὸς ἐὼν ἀγαθὸς δοκεῖ ἔμμεναι ἀνήρ,
> καὶ καλὸς μορφὴν οὐ χαρίεσσαν ἔχων·
> εἰ δέ τις ἀχρήμων, πενίης δέ μιν ἔργα βιᾶται,
> κτήσασθαι πάντως χρήματα πολλὰ δοκεῖ (Sol. 13.37-42)
>
> One man, oppressed by miserable disease
> deems he will be healthy, he plans this.
> Another man, being cowardly, thinks himself brave;
> and the ugly man thinks he is handsome.
> If a man is poor, violated by poverty,
> he thinks he will surely possess great wealth (Sol. 13.37-42)

37-38 and 41-42 are future-oriented in that they project a misevaluation of what has yet to occur: the sick man is wrong to think that he will be well; and a poor man errs when he deems himself to be rich

[40] For τὸ ἁβρὰ παθεῖν: Semonides, 7.57; Theognis, 474. M. Treu, *Von Homer zur Lyrik*, München 1968, p. 273, credits Sappho; see 177.

[41] The connection between ἐλπίς and disaster is deep: Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 500, for a hope that is not good, which accompanies a lazy man without certain livelihood (*bios*). Semonides, 29 (Diehle), for ἐλπίς as present in each man, and growing in his chest, it becomes a foolish disposition (κοῦφον θυμόν).

πάντως [42]. Πάντως here, the descriptor used of *dike* in 13.8, is contradicted in a way that never occurs with *dike* in poems 4.16 and 28; Solon's point in 13.42 is that this is *not* going to occur πάντως, despite what he thinks In 13.39-40 the mediocre man thinks he is and will remain a good man, and the ugly man handsome; such misevaluations are more closely set in the here and now. In each case a man's understanding is flawed, and he is left without the certainty of knowable consequences that *dike* provides for the *polis*.

To illustrate the «seeming» nature of this understanding, Solon uses δοκεῖ specifically in these examples of character and wealth. Δοκέω plus the future infinitive is also untrue in 34.2, «each one of them seemed to be going find much wealth» (κἀδόκ[ε]ον ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ὄλβον εὑρήσειν πολύν) although Solon exempts himself from such skepticism in 32.4-5, «for in this way I think that I shall be superior to all men» (πλέον γὰρ ὧδε νικήσειν δοκέω / πάντας ἀνθρώπους). Solon's focus in poem 13 on what «will be» links the tenses through necessary consequences while exposing shortcomings in our ability to understand what is, was and will be. Solon then turns to an observation that is rooted in the present, «one man hustles about one way, another man another» (σπεύδει δ᾽ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος), followed by six ways of earning a living, 43-62. But these examples neither refute nor obscure his primary point: that there are limitations upon the human ability to understand what is and was that make it impossible for us to know what will be [43].

Solon's two uses of *doxa* (δόξα) illustrate the two temporal perspectives. The first, at 13.4, is a past-focused «reputation» and the second, at 13.34, the traditional «expectation» for the future. For Homer, *doxa* is always «expectation», a projection into the future akin to the «expectation» of Solon's opponents in 34.1: ἐλπίδ᾽εἶχον ἀφνεήν [44]. Solon's *doxa* «expectation» in 13.34 is similar: an expectation for ὕστερον based upon a self-evaluation of one's situation now. However, *doxa* in 13.4 is rather a positive evaluation of one's self by

[42] Linforth, *Solon* cit., comment to 13.38 for «plan».

[43] Poem 39 for σπευδεῖν: σπεύδουσι δ᾽οἱ μὲν ἴγδιν, οἱ δὲ σίλφιον, / οἱ δ᾽ὄξος indicates distinct pursuits for different people. Σπεύδουσι is otherwise in codd.

[44] D.A. Campbell, *Greek Lyric Poetry: A Selection of Early Greek Lyric, Elegiac and Iambic Poetry*, new edn., London 1982, comment for Homeric οὐδ᾽ἀπὸ δόξης «and not other (wise) than one expects».

others, a «reputation.» Similar reputations are found in poems 1 and 10 (a challenge to Solon's existing reputation for madness); 2 and 3 (need to avoid αἶσχος); 21 (reputation after death) [45]. To Solon the positive evaluation of a person by others, 13.3-4, and the positive expectations of a person with respect to his own fate, 13.34, are fundamentally similar. In each case the evaluation is an ill-defined «seeming», subject to the sufferings of experience that can fall at any moment [46]. Solon attributes such erroneous «seemings» to one's own understanding of one's self in a variety of pursuits.

Charles Kahn bases the negative views towards νόμος in the fifth century on «an epistemological tradition going back to Parmenides, according to which the customary views of mortals can represent only falsehoods or at best mere appearances» [47]. Solon, I submit, participates in the tradition leading to Parmenides by positing a split between τὸ νοεῖν and τὸ παθεῖν, understanding and experience. However, Treu seems to misunderstand Solon and his time when, discussing 13.39-40, he states: «zugleich aber ist dies die Zeit im griechischen Geistesleben, die das Auseinanderklaffen von Schein und Sein entdeckt hat» [48]. Solon might agree that he (or his condition) is different than what he thinks it is, but he would certainly not understand a reference to the abstract τὸ εἶναι «being» of a person; the attribution of Sein may be two generations early. Further, the distinction is not with Schein «appearance» but with τὸ παθεῖν, the archaic Erfahrung that knows no difference between outward appearances and being. Solon's dilemma is that what he knows can never be certain, not that what he sees is somehow different than what is. For Solon, what he experiences *is* what is real, and the order underlying the changing experiences of life is simply not fathomable [49].

[45] Similar is the spurious 31 prayer for κῦδος for the θεσμοί.

[46] W. Donlan, *The Aristocratic Ideal in Ancient Greece: Attitudes of Superiority from Homer to the End of the Fifth Century B.C.*, Lawrence 1973, p. 5, sees this in Homer: how one «seemed» to others was the index of a ones identity and worth.

[47] C.H. Kahn, *Pre-Platonic Ethics*, in S. Everson (ed.), *Ethics*, Cambridge 1998, p. 38.

[48] Treu, *von Homer* cit. 1968, p. 273.

[49] Poem 16 and 17 are respectively two and one line fragments expressing the hidden nature of wisdom and the *noos* of the immortals. The context of the verses is unrecoverable.

In poem 4.16 Solon claims that *Dike* knows what is and was, and that her retribution follows inevitably. In poem 13 she fails to follow-up. Man's ability to understand what actions are necessary to guarantee a positive result is hampered by natural and psychic factors beyond his control. Clearly natural events such as rain, storms, crops, the sea and especially death remain beyond human reach. Psychically, however, a basic limitation to human foresight makes it impossible to know either what we *are* or what we *should do*, even in situations that are under our control. Failure here is of τὸ νοεῖν. The political question of poem 9, how to direct one's conduct to achieve a desired outcome, is impossible to answer when directed to a particular person's *bios*. The injunction of 9.6, «now it is right to consider (νοεῖν) all things» is simply useless.

«Moira»: the second best explanation

With τὸ νοεῖν shattered and *dike* not working, Solon changes his mind about how the affairs of life are to be explained. This is not a bifurcation of justice, but the eviction of *dike* from matters of *bios* and her replacement with *moira* as the source of man's lot in life. Solon's change may be seen in his turn from «*dike* surely comes later», 13.8, to «*Moira* brings good and evil to mortals» (Μοῖρα δέ τοι θνητοῖσι κακὸν φέρει ἠδὲ καὶ ἐσθλόν, 13.63) [50].

Solon's *Moira* does not eliminate the need for either human action or human thought, but in matters of *bios* she does redefine the role of both. The intellectual error leading to tyranny in the *polis* is understandable and preventable, and men are culpable for the outcome, but this is not so for matters of individual human action. This is illustrated in the arbitrary blinding and unblinding of men:

> ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν εὖ ἔρδειν πειρώμενος οὐ προνοήσας
> ἐς μεγάλην ἄτην καὶ χαλεπὴν ἔπεσεν
> τῷ δὲ κακῶς ἔρδοντι θεὸς περὶ πάντα δίδωσιν
> συντυχίην ἀγαθήν, ἔκλυσιν ἀφροσύνης (Sol. 13.69-70)

[50] Greene, *Moira* cit., pp. 36-39, sees the poem as concerned with *dike*, 1-32, and *moira*, 33-76, and connects it to Sem. 1.

> The man trying to act well, but blind to what will occur,
> falls into great calamity and trouble
> but to him acting badly the god grants good luck in all things,
> releasing him from his folly (Sol. 13.67-70)

When it comes to pursuing wealth one cannot know when good or evil will follow; erring in matters of *bios* due to lack of understanding does not mean that one cannot end up successful. But men do not pursue wealth in a vacuum. The *polis* is of course where one lives, and unjust actions in the *polis* lead necessarily to destruction. In this sense poem 13 has powerful political implications. The tension in poem 13 leads Solon to reconfirm the political consequences of unjust actions in the last lines of the poem: excess leads to calamity, and Zeus sends retribution, which lights on one man then another, 13.73-76. However, despite the compromise in the «necessary but not sufficient» formulation, Solon's split between matters of the *polis* and of *bios* remains deep. In matters of *bios* man's ephemeral nature returns him to the realm of incomprehensible circumstances, thereby absolving him of culpability for his lot [51]. Hesiod's claim in the *Works and Days* that «the gods keep hidden from men the means of life» (κρύψαντες γὰρ ἔχουσι θεοὶ βίον ἀνθρώποισιν) is an opposite of Solon's view that «for those of us who now hold the greatest means of livelihood hustle doubly» (οἳ γὰρ νῦν ἡμέων πλεῖστον ἔχουσι βίον, διπλάσιον σπεύδουσι) [52]. Solon places any peculiar work in each man's hands but places the ultimate results of that work into the hands of *Moira*.

According to *dike*, hubris in the *polis* results in inevitable destruction for all. According to *moira* results may or may not follow according to previous actions. A combination of the *dike* and *moira* perspectives shows that proper action is necessary but not sufficient to guarantee a good outcome to one's efforts. In matters of *bios*, a single negative occurrence can wipe out any number of positives, by destroying the political community, while no accumulation of positives can be large enough to guarantee that calamity is not about to fall on a person. In summary, bad actions must lead to destruction in

[51] Lattimore, *First Elegy* cit., p. 169: «οὐ προνοήσας attaches no particular blame».
[52] Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 42; Sol. 13.72.

the *polis* (*dike*) whereas good actions cannot guarantee good results personally (*moira*).

Calling back on the Hesiodic tradition, the good strife (ἔρις) of *Works and Days*, 11-26 is now shown to be based upon misidentifications and false pretenses, and «whoever strives» (ὅς σπεύδει) is misled about his ability to attain a good end. Hesiod's inability to explain *why* a man who works is to be given wealth, other than by the will of Zeus, leaves a vacuum when Solon removes Zeus from direct involvement in human affairs. When Solon denied the gods' responsibility for the *polis* in the political poems he posited a causal principle by which he could understand the workings of that *polis* [53]. In this way he eliminated the arbitrary from political life. But in matters of *bios* he was buried under a barrage of observations in which results did not follow as *dike* should have mandated, and he was left without an explanation for why. *Moira* fills the vacuum in human understanding brought about by the removal of the gods from direct control over human affairs, while explaining why bad things happen to good people and *vice versa*. Without a rational explanation, and with divine intervention crippled in the *polis*, Solon retreated into a position that recalled the traditions of a far-seeing Zeus while anticipating the divisions between knowledge and opinion to be explored by Parmenides and later philosophers.

The inability to know the end of all things has been taken as the core of Solon's philosophy, exemplified in the Herodotean idea that no man can be judged happy until he is dead [54]. Yet the latter idea has no expression in Solon's poems, and divine interference as well as unknowable human fortune have ample precedents before Solon [55].

[53] Solon denies that the gods destroy the *polis* in poems 4.1-2 and 11.1-2. Of 6 mentions of Zeus in the corpus of poems, 1 is spurious (fragment 31) and 4.1-2 denies his power over the *polis*. Zeus is efficacious only in poem 13, lines 1, 17, 25 and 75. None of these passages are directed at the *polis*. I also reiterate: Solon understands a «causal principle» only implicitly, in terms of a necessity that underlies events.

[54] As T. Harrison, *Divinity and History: The Religion of Herodotus*, Oxford 2000, pp. 31-63, places such a «Solonian philosophy» as central to Herodotus, although noting that neither historical accuracy nor consistency in the *Histories* is to be expected.

[55] C.C. Chiasson, *The Herodotean Solon*, «GRBS» 27 (1986), pp. 249-262. Early sources are listed in Harrison, *Divinity and History* cit., pp. 38-39 ns. 17-20; p. 50 claims that «the sentiment of death being preferable to life is first expressed by Solon through the story of Cleobis and Biton (1.31.3)».

If it is possible to reason from Solon's words to the Herodotean view of death then this reasoning applies to works far earlier than Solon. But further, even if Herodotus is expressing the logical consequences of Solon's *Moira*, this remains only one aspect of Solon's thought, and not, I contend, the core of his political thought. Solon's *Moira* is rather a counter-revolutionary idea that was necessitated by Solon's observations that good actions do not lead inevitably to good ends. That a god is angry or jealous «constitutes for Herodotus a deduction from the course of events» [56] is true for Solon as well, and in each case the deduction is conditioned by a common heritage of fatalism stretching back to Homer and before.

This conclusion, of course, does not require that we assume any order of composition for Solon's poems; the *polis*/*bios* divide is real irregardless of the order of composition. It is undeniable, however, that Solon rejects *dike* in poem 13 and replaces her with *moira*.

There is a split in Solon's thought, but it is not a bifurcation of justice. In the political poems 4, 9 and 11 the denial of arbitrary divine intervention and the affirmation of human thought and action validated human responsibility for *polis* affairs by bringing consistency to the outcomes of human action. We may understand this as «political justice», but to Solon it is simply *dike*. In poem 13 the limitations placed on human knowledge and the reinstatement of the arbitrary in matters of personal striving releases men from culpability. Knowability and actionability are the two conditions required for human responsibility. The sky in poem 9 is (in principle) understandable but it is not actionable; conversely, *bios* in poem 13 is actionable but ultimately not knowable. Solon's rejection in poem 13 of an efficacious view of human knowledge and action re-establishes the arbitrary as an explanation for inconsistencies in human life, a precursor to the concept of *tyche* as based on occurrences other than what were intended. With respect to material circumstances and the inevitable death we face, human thought and action are limited; the arbitrary nature of these results place them under the jurisdiction of *moira*. To Solon an undesired result in the *polis* must be the result of corrupted human actions; this is *Dike's* promise. In a person's life such a calamity is due to *Moira*, who brings good and evil arbitrarily, as she wishes.

[56] Harrison, *Divinity and History* cit., 2000, pp. 32-33.