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Notes on the Tradition of the Peace of Callias*

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ABSTRACT: An examination of Plut. *Cim.* 13, 4-5 and Harp. A 261 Keaney *s.v.* Ἀττικοῖς γράμμασιν suggests that fourth-century historians Callisthenes (*FGrHist* 124 F 16) and Theopompus (*FGrHist* 115 F 154) challenged the view of contemporary Athenians – attested especially in rhetorical writings – that the Peace of Callias was concluded in the 460s BC in the aftermath of the battle at the river Eurymedon. Such a view described the peace as unilateral, i.e., not implying any obligation on the part of the Athenians. The fact that Callisthenes and Theopompus did not accept that tradition, doesn't imply, per se, that they believed that no peace between Athens and Persia was ever concluded in the V century BC. On the contrary, the peace of 449 BC, as described by Diodorus in XII 4, 4-6 on the basis of fourth-century sources (Ephorus among them), was bilateral, i.e., it implied obligations on both sides (Athens and Persia); whether Callisthenes and Theopompus also disputed that peace was made in 449, is unclear. In addition, this paper explores the possibility of changing the unknown Νέσσου ποταμοῦ with Νείλου ποταμοῦ in the so called 'Aristodemus' (*FGrHist* 104 F 1, 13, 2).

KEYWORDS: Aristodemus; Athens; Callisthenes; Diodorus; Ephorus; Harpocration; Peace of Callias; Persia; Plutarch; Theopompus – Aristodemo; Arpocrazione; Atene; Callistene; Diodoro; Eforo; Pace di Callia; Persia; Plutarco; Teopompo.

The Peace of Callias is a thorny issue in several respects: both its authenticity, its date (in the 460s or in 449 BC?), even the number of the agreements (some argued for two Peaces of Callias, the first in the 460s and the second in 449, restating the first) have been widely discussed by modern scholars¹. Also ancient writers disputed its authentic-

* I thank Christopher Tuplin for profitable discussion on an earlier draft of this paper, and also the anonymous readers for their observations on my text. Obviously any mistakes remain exclusively mine.

¹ Bibliography is necessarily selective. Against the historicity of any Peace of Callias, see especially Meister 1982; for the historicity of the peace in ca. 449 BC, see, among others, Wade-Gery 1940; Meiggs 1972, 129-151, 487-495; Bengtson 1975², nr. 152; Fornara 1977, nr. 95; Blamire 1989, 145; Fornara - Samons 1991, 85 and 171 ff.; Stylianou 1992; Cawkwell 1997 and 2005, 140-141, 280-281. Critics now incline towards the authenticity of the peace in 449: see Hyland 2018, 15 ff. For the theory of

ty². It is not my intention here to tackle the whole issue and review all available evidence; rather, I'd like to make some observations on the tradition about the peace, with reference, in particular, to authors such as Diodorus, Plutarch, Harpocration, the so called 'Aristodemus', and fourth-century historians to whom they bear testimony (Callisthenes and Theopompus, in particular). First of all, we will see that fourth-century historians mainly challenged the view of contemporary Athenians – attested especially in rhetorical writings – that the peace was concluded in the 460s BC and was unilateral, i.e., it didn't imply any obligation on the part of the Athenians (§§ 1-2). The fact that they did not accept a tradition which dated the peace to the 460s BC and qualified it as a Persian surrender to Athens, doesn't imply that, according to them, no peace between Athens and Persia was ever concluded in the V century BC. Second, we will consider the possibility of a correction of the unknown Νέσσου ποταμοῦ in Aristodemus' text, confirming an important detail of the terms of the peace as reported by Diod. XII 4, 4-6 (§ 3).

1. CALLISTHENES' (AND OTHERS') SCEPTICISM ABOUT THE PEACE IN THE 460S

Plutarch *Cimon* 13, 4-5 reads:

Τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον (*scil.* the Athenian victory at the river Eurymedon) οὕτως ἐταπεινώσε τὴν γνώμην τοῦ βασιλέως, ὥστε συνθέσθαι τὴν περιβόητον εἰρήνην ἐκείνην, ἵππου μὲν δρόμον ἡμέρας μῆρας αἰεὶ τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς ἀπέχειν θαλάσσης, ἔνδον δὲ Κυανέων καὶ Χελιδονίων μακρὰ νηὶ καὶ χαλκεμβόλῳ μὴ πλέειν. καίτοι Καλλισθένης (*FGrHist* 124 F 16) οὐ φησι ταῦτα συνθέσθαι τὸν βάρβαρον, ἔργῳ δὲ ποιεῖν διὰ φόβον τῆς ἡττῆς ἐκείνης, καὶ μακρὰν οὕτως ἀποστήναι τῆς Ἑλλάδος, ὥστε πενήκοντα ναυσὶ Περικλέα καὶ τριάκοντα μόναις Ἐφιάλτην ἐπέκεινα πλεῦσαι Χελιδονίων καὶ μηδὲν αὐτοῖς ναυτικὸν ἀπαντῆσαι παρὰ τῶν βαρβάρων. ἐν δὲ τοῖς ψηφίσμασιν ἃ συνήγαγε Κρατερὸς (*FGrHist* 342 F 13) ἀντίγραφα συνθηκῶν ὡς γενομένων κατατέτακται.

Plutarch is talking about the historicity of a peace between Athens and Persia after the battle at the river Eurymedon, the greatest success of Cimon³. Here he quotes two sources, the fourth-century BC historian

the double peace (first concluded in the 460s, and then restated in 449), see Badian 1987 and 1993, 1-72, endorsed by Green 2006, 182-183, n. 19.

² See Plut. *Cim.* 13, 4-5 (Callisthenes *FGrHist* 124 F 16 and Craterus *FGrHist* 342 F 13); Harp. A 261 Keaney, *s.v.* Ἀττικοῖς γράμμασιν (Theopompus *FGrHist* 115 F 154). On both texts and their interpretation, see below.

³ On the value of the battle at the river Eurymedon in Plutarch's *Life of Cimon*, see Muccioli 2012, 154-155 and Zaccarini 2014.

Callisthenes of Olynthus and the third-century BC collector of decrees Craterus of Macedon⁴. Since the meaning of the Greek is partly under discussion, we shall give a full translation of the text only after we have made the two following points:

(1) καίτοι Καλλισθένης οὐ φησι ταῦτα συνθῆσθαι τὸν βάρβαρον, ἔργῳ δὲ ποιεῖν διὰ φόβον τῆς ἡττης ἐκείνης, says Plutarch. What does the biographer mean by Καλλισθένης οὐ φησι, «Callisthenes does not say» or «Callisthenes denies»? Following an original intuition by Eduard Meyer, A.B. Bosworth maintains that οὐ φησι means «does not say»⁵. If so, Callisthenes would not have talked about any peace, and he should therefore be removed from the number of those who discussed the existence of a formal peace between Athens and Persia. However, Plutarch's text reads ἔργῳ δὲ ποιεῖν (*scil.* Callisthenes says that): it is quite possible that it was Callisthenes who opposed a *de facto* situation with a *de iure* peace; and if this is the case, Callisthenes was unquestionably denying the existence of a formal peace between Athens and Persia after the battle at the river Eurymedon⁶. Such a possibility becomes probability when one first takes into consideration the full context of Plutarch's argument, which is indeed a discussion about the authenticity of a peace after the battle of Eurymedon⁷, and second, the fact that writers contemporary to Callisthenes set the peace in the 460s, e.g. Lycurgus in *Contra Leocratem* 73 (ca. 330 BC)⁸. Also the inflated figure of the Persian ships (600!), which

⁴ On Callisthenes, see Prandi 1985 and Rzepka 2016. On Craterus, see Erdas 2002 and Carawan 2007.

⁵ Bosworth 1990, endorsed by Badian 1993, 71-72; Rzepka 2016, *ad loc.* Cf. Meyer 1899, 3-4.

⁶ See Samons 1998, 137, n. 28 and Parmeggiani 2011, 410, n. 66. For further objections to Bosworth's reading, see Carawan 2007, on Craterus F 13.

⁷ So Plutarch's context suggests: see, in particular, ὡς γενομένων. Stylianou's argument (1992, 348) according to which Plutarch connects the peace with the Eurymedon because he was misled by Callisthenes, whose thesis was «that no treaty of peace was ever concluded between Athens and Persia, but that [...] Persian warships had kept well away from the Aegean in the decades which followed Eurymedon», assumes that all the testimonies that Callisthenes knew claimed that peace was made in 449 BC, and therefore that Callisthenes was questioning peace in 449. This is to be proved. Also Blamire's argument (1989, 148), according to which «Kallisthenes 124 F 16 had presumably stated that it was Kimon's victory at the Eurymedon, and not the peace allegedly negotiated by Kallias, which terminated the Persian Wars. Plutarch [...] believed, on the authority of Krateros, that the treaty was authentic, and so, finding that Kallisthenes had discussed it in the context of Eurymedon, proceeded to register it as a consequence of that battle», is affected by the same *a priori*. See also *infra*, n. 15.

⁸ Pace Stylianou 1992, 344-346, Lycurgus' τὸ κεφαλαῖον τῆς νίκης (*Leoc.* 73) clearly means the *synthekai* between Athens and Persia as the main consequence of the success

were defeated at the river Eurymedon according to the fourth-century Attidographer Phanodemus (a colleague of Lycurgus)⁹, may speak for an Athenian view on the Eurymedon as a most resolute event, preparatory to peace. Callisthenes was probably arguing against a thesis which was widespread in fourth-century Athens¹⁰.

Taken as it is, Plutarch's text therefore suggests that Callisthenes denied that a peace was made between Athens and Persia in the 460s¹¹.

(2) Some scholars suggest that Craterus' inscription was about the peace in 449 BC, and Plutarch was wrong in using it as evidence for a peace in the 460s¹². Both claims need proof. Craterus' fragment is without book number; as for its contents, Plutarch's text is consistent, and taken as it

at the river Eurymedon. Stylianos, by stating that Lycurgus, by that expression, means «the total victory over Persia» as a «long process» ending in 450/49 BC, assumes what needs to be proved, i.e., that Lycurgus meant the war as a *continuum* until to 450/49.

⁹ Plut. *Cim.* 12, 6 (Phanodemus *FGrHist* 325 F 22). Quite tellingly, Plutarch sets in opposition Phanodemus' data with Ephorus' soberer estimate (350 Persian ships; cf. *FGrHist* 70 F 192). Cf. Diod. XI 60, 6 and *POxy.* XIII 1610 (Ephorus F 191): 340 ships. See Parmeggiani 2011, 376 ff. Note that Phanodemus' figure is exactly half of that given by Isocrates for the Persian fleet at the time of the battle at the Eurymedon in *Paneg.* 118 (1,200 ships), where a contextual mention of the peace also occurs (118-120).

¹⁰ See *infra*, § 2, with n. 23.

¹¹ It is difficult to say more. Scholars dispute if Callisthenes' statement appeared in the *Hellenika* (see e.g. Jacoby 1919, 1695-1696 and Prandi 1985, 55) or in the *Alexandrou Praxeis* (see e.g. Schwartz 1900, 109; Bosworth 1990, 5 ff. and Badian 1993, 71), hence making their inferences. But since the fragment is without book number and other Callisthenes' fragments do *not* provide reference points on the matter, one simply cannot say in which work and where in the narrative Callisthenes stated what he did. He may even have dealt with the issue of the Peace of Callias in more than one work, or in more points of the same work, for in his age – the age of the Peace of Antalcidas, of Philip II's plans of attack on Persia and of Alexander the Great's conquest of Asia – the Peace of Callias was a very important issue. Bosworth argues that, since Callisthenes was a flatterer of Alexander, the Peace of Callias was for him «an uncomfortable theme, best buried in tactful silence» (1990, 8, n. 48). But I don't see how an explicit mention of the Peace of Callias would have diminished the greatness of Alexander's deeds – on the contrary, explicit mention would have emphasized it: while the Athenians had found an agreement with the Persians, Alexander defeated them once and for all. In this regard, it is worth noticing that Diod. IX 10, 5 testifies to a criticism of the Athenians for they preferred friendship and alliance with Artaxerxes rather than war (see *infra*, n. 28 for details): one may even wonder if Diodorus' source was contrasting the Athenians' agreement with the Persians with Alexander's conquest of Asia.

¹² See e.g. Blamire 1989, 148; Erdas 2002, 176-177, cautiously suggesting that Plutarch may have conflated two different negotiations, one (unsuccessful) in the 460s, with which Callisthenes dealt, the other (successful) in 449/8 BC, whose inscription was collected by Craterus.

is, it suggests that Craterus' inscription was about an agreement in the 460s¹³.

Now we can give Plutarch's text a full translation:

Such a deed (*scil.* the Athenian victory at the river Eurymedon) so diminished the purpose of the King that he concluded that famous peace, according to which he was to keep away from the Hellenic sea as far as the travel of a horse in a day, and was not to sail west of the Cyanean and Chelidonian islands with armoured ships of war. And yet Callisthenes denies that the barbarian made any such terms, but says he really acted as he did through the fear which that victory inspired, and kept so far aloof from Hellas that Pericles with fifty, and Ephialtes with only thirty, ships sailed beyond the Chelidonian islands without encountering any navy of the barbarians. But in the decrees collected by Craterus there is a copy of the treaty, as though it had actually been made.¹⁴

If we take Plutarch's remarks as they are – and there is no reason not to do this – the overall picture is clear: after Cimon's victory at the river Eurymedon, the Great King was forced to make a peace with Athens; Callisthenes stated that there was no formal peace at that time, but rather, that the King acknowledged the freedom of the Greeks of Asia *de facto*; Plutarch questioned Callisthenes' opinion on the matter, by stressing that Craterus, in his collection, registered an inscription with the text of a peace between Athens and Persia after the battle at the river Eurymedon.

Callisthenes' fragment therefore testifies to the existence of an ancient *querelle*. In this respect, it is worth emphasizing that Callisthenes questioned the existence of a formal peace between Athens and Persia *in the 460s*: whether Callisthenes also denied the existence of a formal peace in 449, is not clear¹⁵. Much the same may be suspected for Theo-

¹³ On the possibility that *schol. T* in Hom. *Il.* XIV 230 (Craterus *FGrHist* 342 F 18) refers to the inscription of the Peace of Callias collected by Craterus, see Wade-Gery 1940, 155-156; Erdas 2002, 215-218 and Carawan 2007, *ad loc.* As Erdas rightly points out (2002, 218), this is far from sure.

¹⁴ Transl. Perrin 1914, partly revised.

¹⁵ We could be sure that Callisthenes denied the existence of *any* Peace of Callias (that is, also of a peace between Athens and Persia in 449 BC), if we were sure that the naval operations he mentioned, by Pericles and Ephialtes beyond the Chelidonian islands (*Cim.* 13, 4), could be dated to a time after 449 BC. But we are not: Ephialtes died ca. 461 BC, and Pericles' initiative could well be dated to any moment in the 450s, if not before 460 BC, as the joint reference to Ephialtes may suggest (cf. Meiggs 1972, 79; Bosworth 1990, 12 and Vattuone 2017, 38-39). That Callisthenes was referring to the years of the Samian revolt (440-439 BC) is possible, but hard to prove: Thucydides says that Pericles, at the time, went from Samos to Caunos in Caria (Thuc. I 116, 3), not beyond the Chelidonian islands, and to assume inexactnesses in Callisthenes simply because he was a fourth-century historian (Wade-Gery 1940, 123, n. 2), is not a sound

pompus of Chios' criticism of the inscription with the treaty (the same inscription which was later to be collected by Craterus?)¹⁶. We read in Harpocration's *Lexicon of the Ten Orators*, s.v. Ἀττικοῖς γράμμασιν (context of Theopompus *FGrHist* 115 F 154):

Δημοσθένης κατὰ Νεαίρα (LIX 76) ἀντί τοῦ παλαιοῖς τὴν γὰρ τῶν κδ στοιχειῶν γραμματικὴν ὄντι παρὰ τοῖς Ἴωσιν εὑρεθῆναι. Θεόπομπος δ' ἐν τῇ κε τῶν Φιλιππικῶν (*FGrHist* 115 F 154) ἐσκευωρήσθαι λέγει τὰς πρὸς τὸν βάρβαρον συνθήκας, <ᾶς> οὐ τοῖς Ἀττικοῖς γράμμασιν ἐστηλιτεύσθαι, ἀλλὰ τοῖς τῶν Ἰώνων.

Demosthenes in *Against Neera*, in place of the (word) «ancient»; in fact, the alphabet of 24 letters was found later by the Ionians. Theopompus in book XXV of his *Philippika* says that the treaty with the barbarian has been falsified (or: fabricated), which (he says) has not been carved in Attic letters, but in Ionian.¹⁷

premise; if, on the other hand, Callisthenes' account of the Samian revolt differed from Thucydides' – which is absolutely possible – it is still to be proved that it differed on *this* detail (according to Stesimbrotus of Thasos, Pericles sailed ἐπὶ Κύπρον [toward] or «against Cypros») with sixty ships at the time of the Samian revolt [Plut. *Per.* 26, 1 = *FGrHist* 107 F 8], but since Caunos was on the route [Stadter 1989, 248; Engels 1998, 70 and Pownall 2020, 134-135], one cannot be sure that Stesimbrotus made Pericles move beyond Caunos; moreover, that Callisthenes and Stesimbrotus referred to the same expedition should not be taken for granted, for Callisthenes spoke of fifty ships). Rather, that Callisthenes referred to the aftermath of the Eurymedon battle and not to later dates, may be confirmed by the reference to the Great King's φόβος (ἔργω δὲ ποιεῖν διὰ φόβον τῆς ἡττῆς ἐκείνης κτλ.). In this regard, Diodorus, in XI 62, 2, says that Persians were fearful after the battle at the river Eurymedon (φοβούμενοι τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων αὔξησιν. Cf. Iust. II 15, 20), while he does not do the same when speaking about the Persians' morale in 449 BC (in XII 4, 2, the verb καταπλήξεσθαι is merely part of Cimon's plans). Persian *phobos*, as a consequence of the battle at the Eurymedon, is also remarked by Pl. *Menex.* 241e (δείσαντα). Cf. Lys. *Epitaph.* 56 (ἐφοβεῖτο); Ael. Arist. *De Quattuor.* 140-142 Lenz-Behr (τῷ φόβῳ). Also Plutarch's reference to the enrichment of the Athenians in *Cim.* 13, 5 recalls Diod. XI 62, 1-2, on the increasing wealth of Athens in the aftermath of the battle at the Eurymedon.

¹⁶ What follows rests on the premise that the inscription mentioned in F 154 referred to the Peace of Callias. It is clear from F 153 that Theopompus knew of more than one agreement between Athens and Persia: see n. below.

¹⁷ Harp. A 261 Keaney, s.v. Ἀττικοῖς γράμμασιν, transl. mine. Jacoby's original edition of Theopompus *FGrHist* 115 F 154 is limited to the words from Θεόπομπος to Ἰώνων. On F 154 see, among others, Connor 1968, 89 ff.; Shrimpton 1991, 279, n. 25; Flower 1994, 59, n. 60; Pownall 2008, especially 121-122; Hartmann 2013, 37; Morison 2014, *ad loc.* I prefer to leave out of discussion Theon *Progymn.* II 67 (Theopompus *FGrHist* 115 F 153), on which see Krentz 2009. In this regard, I will limit myself to noticing that, if F 153 refers to the Athenian agreement with Darius I in 507/6 BC, as Krentz suggests, the treaty mentioned in F 154 cannot refer to the same agreement: it is hard to see how fourth-century Athenians, who celebrated themselves as the champions of the Greeks in the fifth-century wars against the Persians, could have any interest in

As one might expect from a lexicographic entry, Harpocration is very brief on Theopompus. Nevertheless the examination of the lemma discloses some interesting details. First, Theopompus referred to an *Athenian* inscription, i.e., created by the Athenians and to be seen in fourth-century Athens, for otherwise his argument on the Attic/Ionian letters would not make sense. Second, his paleographical observation, «the treaty hasn't been carved in Attic letters, but in Ionian», would have been enough to conclude that the inscription was a later copy of a fifth-century treaty, whether real or not; but this is not, according to Harpocration, what Theopompus stated: he concluded that *the treaty has been falsified/fabricated*. Theopompus couldn't have stated that without having been informed by contemporary Athenians that the inscription was the *original* of the treaty, and without having been sure that the treaty dated to a time when the Ionic letters had not yet entered the Athenian public inscriptions¹⁸.

Thus the inscription, which Theopompus examined, was publicly indicated by fourth-century Athenians as the original of the treaty. Harpocration provides no hint of the date of the treaty that the inscription was about. But that the inscription referred to the peace at its earliest date (and no date before the 460s is provided by the sources for the Peace of Callias), may be suggested by the broader context of the fragment. At the beginning of the lemma, Harpocration refers to «Attic letters» as meaning «ancient letters» in Ps.Dem. *In Neaer.* 76, where the orator clearly aims to show both the antiquity and the originality of a law inscribed on a pillar of the sanctuary of Dionysus by the altar in Limnae (a district in the southern part of Athens). This is instructive. By specifying that the treaty was *not* inscribed in Attic letters *but* in Ionian, Theopompus probably disputed, first, that the inscription was as ancient as other inscrip-

reinscribing in Ionic letters an agreement with the Persians *against* the Greeks (πρὸς Ἑλληνας).

¹⁸ On the adoption of the Ionic alphabet at Athens, see, in synthesis, Rhodes - Osborne 2017, xxix and 341 on nr. 156. Epigraphic evidence shows that the Ionic letters appeared on Athenian public inscriptions in the second half of the V century BC, but it was with the reform of Archinus in 403/2 BC, that the Ionic alphabet became the official one in Athens. Harpocration's hint in the lemma of the invention of the Ionic letters has probably to do with Theopompus, since Theopompus was interested in the reform of Archinus: see *FGrHist* 115 F 155, and cf. Ephorus *FGrHist* 70 F 106. This does not imply that Theopompus was unaware of the appearance of Ionic letters on official inscriptions *before* 403/2: the analysis of his argument in F 154 (see below in the main text) discloses a *comparative* approach by Theopompus to epigraphic evidence, suggesting that, when in Athens, Theopompus had seen more than only one inscription, and had also compared them.

tions, still visible in Athens, were, and also that it was as ancient as one might expect on account of its contents; second, that it was as original as contemporary Athenians claimed it to be – an observation which would be especially pertinent if the inscription was (and/or was reputed to be) about the peace at its earliest date, i.e., in the 460s, when the Ionic letters surely had not yet entered the Athenian public inscriptions.

Needless to say, the fact itself that Theopompus may have been questioning the peace in the 460s doesn't imply, per se, that for him no peace between Athens and Persia was ever made. As in the case of Callisthenes, it is possible that Theopompus also denied the existence of a formal peace in 449; but whether he did, one simply cannot say.

In short, Plutarch *Cimon* 13, 4-5 should not be taken as a testimonium of the debate on the authenticity of any Peace of Callias, but, primarily, on the authenticity of the peace in the 460s BC. The same may be suspected for Harpocration's lemma Ἀττικά γράμματα¹⁹. Since Diodorus used fourth-century sources (Ephorus of Cyme among them)²⁰, and doesn't set the Peace of Callias in the aftermath of the Eurymedon but in 449 BC (XII 4, 4-6), one may wonder whether fourth-century historians, in general, were mainly concerned with questioning the authenticity of the peace in the 460s rather than the authenticity of any fifth-century peace between Athens and Persia.

2. THE REASONS BEHIND CALLISTHENES' (AND OTHERS') SCEPTICISM ABOUT THE PEACE IN THE 460S, AND THE NATURE OF THE PEACE IN 449 BC AS DESCRIBED BY DIODORUS

The paleographic argument used by Theopompus to question the authenticity of the peace in the 460s may not be the only reason why he denied that peace was made at that time. Now we ask, why did Callisthenes deny that peace was concluded in the 460s? One possible reason is very easy

¹⁹ Also Paus. I 8, 2 on the statue of Callias, ὃς πρὸς Ἀρταξέρῃην τὸν Ξέρξου τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν, ὡς Ἀθηναίων οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν, ἐπραξε τὴν εἰρήνην, may not be an expression of scepticism on the authenticity of the Peace of Callias as such, but on the peace according to the Athenians' credo (ὡς Ἀθηναίων οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν), i.e., the peace in the 460s. On the *timai* for Callias, cf. Plut. *Cim.* 13, 5 (included in Craterus F 13 by Erdas 2002, 169 and 172. Cf. Carawan 2007, *ad loc.*): φασὶ δὲ καὶ βωμὸν Εἰρήνης διὰ ταῦτα τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἰδρύσασθαι, καὶ Καλλίαν τὸν πρεσβεύσαντα τιμῆσαι διαφερόντως.

²⁰ For a critical review of Volquardsen's thesis on Ephorus as the only source of Diodorus' Greek history in books XI-XV of the *Bibliothèque*, see Parmeggiani 2011, 349 ff. One cannot exclude, at least *a priori*, that Diodorus read also Callisthenes and/or Theopompus.

to detect²¹. Advocates of an agreement between Athens and Persia in the 460s were, most of all, fourth-century Athenian rhetors, who addressed Athenian citizens by praising Athens' glorious victories over the Persians, very often too far beyond the limits²². They were not always precise about the chronology of the peace – which should not come as a surprise, for chronology was not their main concern – but clearly intended to make it a consequence of the battle at the river Eurymedon²³. As it seems, Callisthenes, Theopompus and, more generally, Diodorus' source(s) in XII 4, 4-6 were involved in hard polemic with such fourth-century panegyric tradition: they believed it to be wrong, at the very least, because the war between Athens and Persia did not stop after the battle at the river Eurymedon, but continued, as the Athenian expedition to Egypt ca. 460 BC happened to demonstrate.

A further reason for scepticism on the peace in the 460s BC may be detected by analysing the terms of the Peace of Callias. When talking

²¹ I leave out of discussion the possibility that Theopompus read Callisthenes or vice versa: we don't know when their historical works were available, and availability of one's work, as such, doesn't imply that that work was read and used by the other. The very fact that Theopompus, Callisthenes and Ephorus were *contemporaries* (see, e.g., Diod. IV 1, 3) is enough to show the weakness of *Quellenforschung's* easy schemes: see Parmeggiani 2011, 643.

²² We are informed from Aelius Theon (*Progymn.* II 67) that Theopompus too engaged in vigorous polemic against the Athenian panegyric tradition (*FGrHist* 115 F 153). In light of F 154 (*supra*, § 1), this should not come as a surprise.

²³ See especially Isoc. *Paneg.* 117-120 (where, *pace* Stylianos 1992, 342-343, reference to the Eurymedon in ch. 118 is clear to me); Lycurg. *Leoc.* 73 (see *supra*, n. 8). Cf. Pl. *Menex.* 242a (where εἰρήνη, *pace* Stylianos 1992, 343-344, refers to the peaceful state of the Greeks in the aftermath of the Eurymedon up until the battle of Tanagra in 458/7 BC: cf. Badian 1993, 63-64). Later writers with strong connections with the Athenians' panegyric tradition stress how the Athenian success at the Eurymedon stopped the war against the Persians or set a formal peace: Ael. Aristid. *Panath.* 271-276 Lenz-Behr (but see 202-209 Lenz-Behr, with Stylianos 1992, 346-347); *De Quattuor.* 139-142 Lenz-Behr; Amm. Marc. XVII 11, 3; Syncell. 470, p. 296 Mosshammer; *Suid.* κ 1620 Adler, *s.v.* Κίμων. Elsewhere fourth-century Athenian rhetors are vague on chronology (see Isoc. *Panath.* 59; Dem. XV 29 and XIX 273) or stress Persian difficulties without explicitly mentioning formal peace (Isoc. *Areopag.* 80, where the reference to the time prior to 461 BC is anyway clear to me; Lys. *Epitaph.* 56-57). Note that fifth-century BC evidence is rather elusive too: if Hdt. VII 151 can be taken as an allusion to the negotiations which led to the Peace of Callias, it is rather difficult to detect a reference to the 460s or to 449 BC; Thuc. VIII 56, 4 (year 412/1 BC) suggests that there had been restrictions on the King's freedom to act (Hornblower 2003, 180-181; cf. 2008, 924), but when such restrictions were decided, is not clear. As we see, Stylianos 1992 goes too far, by maintaining that *all* ancient sources clearly mean the peace as made in 449 BC; despite his objections, Sordi 2002 (1971), Meister 1982 and Badian 1987 (see also the response by Badian 1993, 61 ff. to Stylianos) had some reason in emphasizing that many sources set the peace in the 460s.

about it – be it dated to the 460s or to 449 BC – sources agree that it set the course for the freedom of the Greeks. However, some details, in Diodorus XII 4, 4-6, are worth stressing:

Ἀρταξέρξης δὲ ὁ βασιλεὺς πυθόμενος τὰ περὶ τὴν Κύπρον ἐλαττώματα, καὶ βουλευσάμενος μετὰ τῶν φίλων περὶ τοῦ πολέμου, ἔκρινε συμφέριν ἐιρήνην συνθέσθαι πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας, ἔγραψε τοίνυν τοῖς περὶ Κύπρον ἡγεμόσι καὶ σατράπαις, ἐφ' οἷς ἂν δύνωνται συλλύσασθαι πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας. διόπερ οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀρτάβαζον καὶ Μεγάβυζον ἔπεμψαν εἰς τὰς Ἀθήνας πρεσβευτὰς τοὺς διαλεξομένους περὶ συλλύσεως, ὑπακουσάντων δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ πεμφάντων πρέσβεις αὐτοκράτορας, ὧν ἡγεῖτο Καλλίας ὁ Ἱππονίκου, ἐγένοντο συνθήκαι περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ τοῖς συμμάχοις πρὸς τοὺς Πέρσας, ὧν ἐστὶ τὰ κεφάλαια ταῦτα· αὐτονόμους εἶναι τὰς κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις ἀπάσας, τοὺς δὲ τῶν Περσῶν σατράπας μὴ καταβαίνειν ἐπὶ θάλατταν κατωτέρω τριῶν ἡμερῶν ὁδόν, μηδὲ ναῦν μακρὰν πλεῖν ἐντὸς Φασήλιδος καὶ Κυανέων· ταῦτα δὲ τοῦ βασιλέως καὶ τῶν στρατηγῶν ἐπιτελούντων, μὴ στρατεύειν Ἀθηναίους εἰς τὴν χώραν, ἧς βασιλεὺς [Ἀρταξέρξης] ἄρχει. συντελεσθεῖσάν δὲ τῶν σπονδῶν Ἀθηναῖοι τὰς δυνάμεις ἀπήγαγον ἐκ τῆς Κύπρου λαμπρὰν μὲν νίκην νενικηκότες, ἐπιφανεστάτας δὲ συνθήκας πεποιημένοι.

Artaxerxes the King, however, when he learned of the reverses his forces had suffered at Cyprus, took counsel on the war with his friends and decided that it was to his advantage to conclude a peace with the Greeks. Accordingly he dispatched to the generals in Cyprus and to the satraps the written terms on which they were permitted to come to a settlement with the Greeks. Consequently Artabazus and Megabyzus sent ambassadors to Athens to discuss a settlement. The Athenians obeyed and dispatched ambassadors plenipotentiary, the leader of whom was Callias the son of Hipponicus; and so the Athenians and their allies concluded with the Persians a treaty of peace, the principal terms of which run as follows: all the Greeks *poleis* of Asia are to be autonomous; the satraps of the Persians are to come no nearer to the sea than a three days' journey and no Persian warship is to sail inside of Phaselis of the Cyanaean rocks; and if these terms are observed by the King and the generals, the Athenians are not to send troops into the territory over which the King is ruler. After the treaty had been solemnly concluded, the Athenians withdrew their armaments from Cyprus, having won a brilliant victory and concluded most noteworthy terms of peace.²⁴

Diodorus dates the peace to 449 BC²⁵. He claims to report only the principal terms of the treaty (τὰ κεφάλαια); more importantly, he is *the only source who points out that the Athenians were under obligation*

²⁴ Diod. XII 4, 4-6, transl. Oldfather 1946, with some changes.

²⁵ See also Aristodemus *FGrHist* 104 F 1, 13, 2, on which see *infra*, § 3.

not to trouble the King's land (μη στρατεύειν Ἀθηναίους εἰς τὴν χώραν, ἧς βασιλεὺς [Ἀρταξέρξης] ἄρχει). Moreover, according to Diodorus, the Athenians, after the peace was concluded, withdrew their forces from Cyprus (συντελεσθεισῶν δὲ τῶν σπονδῶν Ἀθηναῖοι τὰς δυνάμεις ἀπήγαγον ἐκ τῆς Κύπρου). This means that the Athenians left Cyprus to the King, i.e. they recognized that it was part of the King's land. Now, the fact that Cyprus and Egypt were definitely left to the King could be even taken as an inglorious step back, if looked against the background that the Greeks had been fighting for Cyprus since Pausanias' generalship of the Panhellenic coalition in 478 BC (Thuc. I 94. Cf. Diod. XI 44, 2), i.e., even before the so called Delian League had come into existence. Judging from Diodorus, the price paid by the Athenians in 449 BC was very high²⁶.

Diodorus emphasizes that the peace was a great accomplishment by the Athenians (λαμπρὰν μὲν νίκην νενικηκότας, ἐπιφανεστάτας δὲ συνθήκας πεποιημένοι)²⁷. His source(s) probably were more detailed about the terms of the peace – so the Diodoran τὰ κεφάλαια suggests – and one may think that they didn't fail to appreciate Athens' achievement, although one cannot prove that they were as enthusiastic as Diodorus²⁸. In any case, they offered a more balanced representation of the Peace than those

²⁶ Meiggs (1972, 483) is right in emphasizing that «by the Peace of Callias Athens renounced her military ambitions in the eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus was left to fend for herself». Cf. Green 2006, 182, n. 18 and 184, n. 24.

²⁷ See also Diod. XII 2, 1: μάλιστα δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι τῆ τε δόξῃ καὶ ἀνδρείᾳ προκόψαντες διωνομάσθησαν καθ' ὅλην σχεδὸν τὴν οἰκουμένην· ἐπὶ τοσοῦτο γὰρ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ἠῴησαν, ὥστε ἄνευ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Πελοποννησίων ἰδίᾳ μεγάλας δυνάμεις Περσικὰς καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν κατηγωνίσαντο, καὶ τὴν περιβόητον Περσῶν ἡγεμονίαν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐταπείνωσαν, ὥστε ἀναγκάσαι πάσας τὰς κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν πόλεις ἐλευθερῆσαι κατὰ συνθήκας.

²⁸ Diod. IX 10, 5 (*Exc. de Sent.* 44, pp. 284-285 Boissvain = Diod. IX fr. 14, pp. 140-141 Cohen-Skalli) is an interesting piece in this respect. The text reads: Ἔνιοι δὲ φασὶ μὴ Χίλωνος εἶναι μὴδὲ πολιτικὸν τὸ μηδενὶ τῶν φίλων ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις χρεῖαις ἐπαρκεῖν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὰς καταβεβαιώσεις ἀπαγορεύειν καὶ τὸ κατατεταμένως ἐγγυᾶσθαι τε καὶ διορίζεσθαι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων, ὡς ποιῆσαι τοὺς Ἕλληνας ὅτε κατηγωνίσαντο τὸν Ξέρξην. ὅμοσαν γὰρ ἐν Πλαταιαῖς παραδώσειν παῖδων παισὶ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς Πέρσας ἔχθραν, ἕως ἂν οἱ ποταμοὶ ῥέωσιν εἰς τὴν θάλατταν καὶ γένος ἀνθρώπων ἢ καὶ γῆ καρποὺς φέρῃ· τὸ δὲ τῆς τύχης εὐμετάπυτον βεβαίως ἐγγυόμενοι μετὰ τινα χρόνον ἐπηρεβεύοντο πρὸς Ἀρταξέρξην τὸν υἱὸν Ξέρξου περὶ φιλίας καὶ συμμαχίας. If this is a reference to the Peace of Callias of 449 BC (cf. Cohen-Skalli 2012, 141, n. 36), it clearly testifies to a *critical* perspective on the Athenians, who are described here as violating the famous 'oath of Plataea' (cf. Diod. XI 39, 3 and, on the oath, see Rhodes - Osborne 2003, nr. 88; Lycurg. *Leoc.* 80-81. Theopompus was sceptical about its authenticity: see *FGH Hist* 115 F 153. In general on the oath, see also Vannicelli 2014). Note that Diod. XII 4, 4-6 doesn't describe the peace in 449 in terms of «friendship» and «alliance» between the Athenians and the Persians; if the Peace of Callias of 449 is meant in IX 10, 5, Diodorus' source was rather caustic towards the Athenians.

who celebrated it as made in the 460s BC: Diodorus' source(s) neither suppressed the obligation upon the Athenians, nor did they lose sight of the broader political scene; in so doing, they emphasized that the Peace of Callias was *not* an unconditional surrender by the Persians²⁹.

What we have observed above helps to make our point clear. While sources about the peace in the 460s insist on an agreement which was one-sided, as if the Athenians had set limits to the Persian empire (e.g. Isoc. *Paneg.* 120, τότε μὲν γὰρ ἡμεῖς φανησόμεθα τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν βασιλείως ὀρίζοντες)³⁰, Diodorus' source(s) about the peace in 449 BC did insist on a *bilateral* peace, which implied obligations on both sides (i.e., both Athens and Persia). They had no reason to question a bilateral peace, such as that we are told had been negotiated in 449 BC; they had, instead, very good reasons to question a unilateral peace, such as that which was supposed to have been negotiated in the 460s: the King of Persia would never have accepted any formal peace with the Athenians which did not imply any obligation on their part.

To sum up, Callisthenes, Theopompus and, more generally, Diodorus' source(s) had at least two good reasons for questioning the existence of a peace between Athens and Persia in the 460s: first, war between Athens and Persia continued after the battle at the river Eurymedon, as the Athenian expedition to Egypt ca. 460 BC happened to show; second, the King would never have accepted an agreement without obligations on the Athenian side: although victorious, Athens was not in such a high position as to set the terms of any agreement with the Persians to its own exclusive advantage; nor would the King, on his part, have accepted an agreement that implied something like a formal – and, as such, quite unlikely – *proskynesis* to Athens. Such a surrender by the King, evoked as it was by those Athenians who set the peace in the 460s BC, was absolutely unbelievable.

²⁹ Also Diodorus' emphasis on the King as reasoning to his own advantage (ἐκρίνε συμφέρειν) and carefully instructing his officials on the basic terms for negotiations (ἐφ' οἷς ἂν δύνωνται συλλύσασθαι πρὸς τοὺς Ἑλληνας), and also on the Athenians as accepting them (ὑπακουσάντων δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων), is telling in this regard. Hyland (2018, 32) rightly emphasizes that «the sequence of communication and response (*scil.* in Diodorus' representation of the negotiations) fits the symbolic language of Achaemenid royal strength [...]. In Persian terms, the king issued a summons and Athens obeyed».

³⁰ Cf. also Craterus' inscription, *if* it included references to Egypt and Libya (Crat. F 18, on which see *supra*, n. 13) as boundaries imposed by the Athenians to the Persians, and not by the Persians to the Athenians.

3. A REFERENCE TO THE NILE
IN ARISTODEMUS' TESTIMONY ON THE PEACE OF CALLIAS?

The so called 'Aristodemus' (*Cod. Paris. Suppl. Gr.* 607 = *FGrHist* 104)³¹ is the only source who, together with Diodorus, explicitly sets the peace in the year 449. Indeed he mentions the Peace of Callias after the Athenians' success at Salamis of Cyprus (450 BC) and before the Second Sacred War (ca. 448 BC):

οὗτος ὁ Καλλίας ἐσπέισατο πρὸς Ἀρταξέρξην καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς Πέρσας. ἐγένοντο δὲ αἱ σπονδαὶ ἐπὶ τοῖσδε· ἐφ' ᾧ ἐντὸς Κυανέων καὶ Νέσσου ποταμοῦ καὶ Φασηλίδος, ἧτις ἐστὶν πόλις Παμφυλίας, καὶ Χελιδονέων μὴ μακροῖς πλοίοις καταπλέωσι Πέρσαι, καὶ ἐντὸς τριῶν ἡμερῶν ὁδόν, ἣν ἂν ἵππος ἀνύσῃ διωκόμενος, μὴ κατιῶσιν. καὶ σπονδαὶ οὖν ἐγένοντο τοιαῦται.

This Callias was dispatched to Artaxerxes and the rest of the Persians. A treaty was made and its terms were as follows: the Persians are not to sail with warships west of the Cyanaean rocks and of the river Nessos, and also of Phaselis, which is a city of Pamphylia, and of the Chelidonian islands, nor are they to approach the coast within the limit of a three-day journey, that which a horse covers at a gallop. And such were the terms of the treaty.³²

As opposed to Diodorus, Aristodemus does not openly state that the Athenians were under obligation not to trouble the King's land. Still his text may implicitly suggest this. For one may wonder whether, in Aristodemus' text, the enigmatic Νέσσου ποταμοῦ (cf. ποταμὸς Νέσσοσ in Planudes' scholion), if it is not one of those unnamed rivers which reach the north shore of Anatolia in the vicinity of the Cyanean islands³³, is a corrupted form for Νείλου ποταμοῦ, i.e., the river Nile. If this is the case, Aristodemus' text would confirm Diodorus XII 4, 4-6, suggesting that in 449 BC both Athenians and Persians agreed that Egypt was part of the Persian empire.

The sequence Cyanaean islands - Nile - Phaselis - Chelidonian islands may appear strange at first sight, but it is not inexplicable. While the mention of the Cyanean islands first and then of the Nile helped to define the limits of an 'ideal line' (North to South) dividing a western 'Athenian

³¹ On Aristodemus, see Liuzzo 2015.

³² *FGrHist* 104 F 1, 13, 2, transl. mine. Cf. Max. Planud. *schol. in Hermog.* V, p. 388 Walz: εἶτα σπονδῶν Ἑλληνισι γενομένων καὶ βαρβάρους, αἷς ὄρια ἐπεπήγεσαν Κυάναει πέτραι, καὶ ποταμὸς Νέσσοσ καὶ Φάσηλις πόλις Παμφυλίας καὶ Χελιδονεαὶ ἀκρωτήριον.

³³ It goes without saying that the Nessos river we are dealing with is not to be confused with the Nessos of Thracia (otherwise known as Nestos).

area' from an eastern 'Persian area', the mention of the city of Phaselis and the Chelidonian islands served to identify two points in the middle, the former on the land and the latter on the sea, which were very near to the 'ideal line' and therefore served as real boundaries. In this regard, it should be noted that, according to Eratosthenes of Cyrene, the meridian through the Canobic mouth of the Nile and the meridian through the Cynaean rocks were one and the same (Strab. II 1, 39)³⁴; and also that, according to Strabo (XIV 3, 8), the Chelidonian islands were thought to lie approximately opposite Canobus³⁵. Cyprus was obviously east of the meridian, i.e., in the 'Persian area'. As we see, if the correction of Νέσσου with Νείλου is accepted, Aristodemus' sequence of names may have its reasons.

As for the corruption of Νείλου into Νέσσου, one may wonder if it was a change inspired precisely by the strangeness of the sequence Cynaean islands - Nile - Phaselis - Chelidonian islands. Such sequence had its reasons, as we have shown above, but was not understood, hence the (misleading) correction of Νείλου with Νέσσου, which seemed to be a more acceptable geographical indication than Νείλου because of the involved area: Nessos was the name also of the most famous river of Thrace, a barbaric (and traditionally bound to Persia) region close to the Aegean and Asia Minor, which was, in the Athenians' traditional view, the focal point of the Peace of Callias.

Obviously, one cannot leave out the possibility that Νέσσου is correct and no corruption/change occurred: as we observed at the beginning of this paragraph, it cannot be excluded that Nessos was the name of one of the rivers which reach the north shore of Anatolia in the vicinity of the Cynaean islands. But let's assume that Aristodemus' text really read Νείλου and not Νέσσου. An implication of the reference to the Nile as a limit is that Libya was not recognized as being part of the King's land. In this regard, it is worth noticing, first, that in the 450s, the Athenian survivors of the *megale strateia* found their way home through Libya and Cyrene³⁶, which may suggest that, around that time, the King was losing control of the area³⁷; and second, that in 445/4 BC, Athens was provided with grain by a certain Psammetichus/Psammitichus, identified as ὁ τῆς Λιβύης βασιλεὺς by a scholion to Aris-

³⁴ Strab. II 1, 39: φησὶν (*scil.* Hipparchus) εἶναι κατ' Ἐρατοσθένη τὸν αὐτὸν μεσημβρινὸν τὸν τε διὰ τοῦ Κανωβικοῦ στόματος καὶ τὸν διὰ Κουανέων.

³⁵ Strab. XIV 3, 8: δοκοῦσι δὲ αἱ Χελιδόνια κατὰ Κάνωβόν πως πίπτειν.

³⁶ See Thuc. I 110, 1 and Diod. XI 77, 5.

³⁷ See Hornblower 2003, 176.

tophanes³⁸. Such details may suggest that, around 449 BC, Libya was not under Persian control.

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³⁸ See *schol. b* in Aristoph. *Vesp.* 718. The date is suggested by *schol. a* in Aristoph. *Vesp.* 718 (Philochorus *FGrHist* 328 F 119: ἐπὶ Λυσιστρατίδου). See also Plut. *Per.* 37, 4, with Stadter 1989, 336, for the suspect that Psammetichus/Psammitichus is another name for Thannyras (Hdt. III 15), or his brother. Herodotus says that Thannyras, the son of Inaros, became king with the consent of the Persians, but this does imply neither that Thannyras was always loyal to the Persians nor that around 449 BC Libya was still under Persian control. On Psammetichus/Psammitichus as Thannyras or his successor, see also Law 1978, 102.

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