ABSTRACT. – The Linguistic Turn is about language and the role it plays for our being in the world. How can a view of validity centered on judgment and exemplarity help us to understand better the relation of Habermas’s version of critical theory to the Linguistic Turn and to pragmatism, and what can be learnt from the difficulties incurred by Habermas’s approach?

I understand the relation of critical theory, in the Habermasian version, to pragmatism and the Linguistic Turn as the missing of an important occasion. To anticipate my point, Habermas’s interpretation of the Linguistic Turn and its implications is in my opinion one of the most articulate among those available today, but the solution that he devises for the problems left open by the Linguistic Turn – most notably, the question of how to conceive of the universalistic dimension of language – suffers from an underestimation of the contribution that pragmatism can offer in that respect. I understand my own attempt to reformulate the notion of justice as an oriented reflective judgment concerning the conditions for the flourishing of an inclusive identity that embeds the conflicting parties as an attempt that is somehow more in line with a full appreciation of the pragmatist contribution and in a way constitutes a radicalization of it in the direction of an exemplarist view of validity.

I will then divide my paper in three parts. First, I will briefly re-
construct Habermas’s interpretation of the Linguistic Turn. Second, I will outline an alternative path, more receptive to the pragmatist approach, for responding to the problems left unsolved by the Linguistic Turn. Third, I will briefly comment on how the authenticity and exemplarity conception of validity and the ‘judgment view of justice’ fit within this alternative pragmatist path and radicalize it.

1. HABERMAS’S INTERPRETATION OF THE LINGUISTIC TURN

In a 1998 essay titled *Hermeneutic and Analytic Philosophy. Two Complementary Versions of the Linguistic Turn*? 1, Habermas presents Apel’s and his own discursive approach to universalistic validity as an approach capable of avoiding the shortcomings of two equally reductive ways of articulating the basic insights of the Linguistic Turn. According to Habermas, the Linguistic Turn is a drama in three acts. The first act opens up with Humboldt’s philosophy of language. Then two complementary reductive versions of the 20th century linguistic revolution follow up, namely Wittgenstein’s analytic philosophy and Heidegger’s ontological hermeneutics. Finally the universalistic insights of Humboldt’s originary vision are restored in the program of a universal formal pragmatics. At stake in this drama is the full vindication of the cognitive and representational function of language within a full-fledged reconstruction of the relation of language to the mind and the world.

Writing on the Herderian theme of the contribution of language to the emergence of the national identity of a people, Humboldt distinguished three functions of language: 1. the cognitive function of forming thoughts and representing facts, 2. the expressive function of manifesting emotions and arousing feelings and 3. the communicative function of talking, of raising objections or coming to an agreement. The mind of a nation is constituted by language in the same way as the individual mind, the subject of cognition, is for Kant constituted by the *a priori*

forms of space and time and by the categories of the understanding. Humboldt’s collective transcendentalism is reflected in his statement that «each language draws a circle around the nation to which it belongs, a circle the leaving of which is possible only to the extent of one’s moving, at the same time, into the circle of another language» ². Such view constitutes a break with the conception of language traditionally embedded in Western philosophy. According to Habermas, at least four reasons account for why Humboldt’s philosophy of language really constitutes a ‘proto-Linguistic Turn’. First, his holistic conception of language runs against the classical view according to which the meaning of complex sentences can be reduced to the sum of the partial meanings of their component parts. Second, Humboldt takes distance from the idea, prominent in Western philosophy word from Plato to Locke, that the primary function of language is to represent objects and facts, and in the footprints of Herder suggests instead that the primary function of language is to shape a people’s spirit: language is not as a tool that we make use of, but a medium in which we are immersed. Third, Humboldt challenges the classical view according to which linguistic signs are somehow attached to pre-linguistic concepts and judgments which are somehow antecedents to the linguistic forms used in order to ‘name them’. For him, instead, the formation of ideas is influenced by the linguistic forms contingently available. Fourth, Humboldt emphasizes the fact that «language is never the private property of an individual speaker, but generates intersubjectively shared meanings» ³.

What is fascinating and yet unsettling about Humboldt linguistic, as opposed to cognitive, transcendentalism is the fact that he sees no tension between the formative function of a plurality of concrete historical languages spoken by distinct peoples, and the basic unity of the world which ‘appears one and the same to all people’ and allows for the testing of propositions that are formed in just one specific language. How is such remarkable convergence possible?

Habermas interrogates the Humboldtian texts with his own agenda in mind. How is it possible for us to hold on to the formative function of

² Ibidem, p. 415.
³ Ibidem, p. 416.
language and escape relativism? It is possible because Humboldt – as Habermas reconstructs him – does not conflate the cognitive-representational function of language, the only one which contains a universalistic, context-transcending potential, with the semantics of linguistic forms. Rather, Humboldt proceeds from the assumption that such representational function is always exerted in the context of linguistic interaction or dialogue. If understood from a merely semantic point of view, the formative role of language becomes a prison for subjectivity. For then the peculiarities of our languages become the peculiarities of our worlds and we are entrapped in this plurality without escape. However, if we add a pragmatic dimension to our understanding of the formative role of language, in the sense that the shaping or disclosing of worlds always unfolds in dialogue, in the context of a process of communication where differently located participants do want to come to an understanding about the world despite their differences, then we recover a universalistic potential on a different basis, a non-semantic but indeed pragmatic one. As Habermas puts it:

The encounter of strangers learning to understand each other over the linguistic distances takes place, from the start, in formal anticipation of a 'third' point of view [the point of convergence of an objective world]. To the extent that strangers can dispute controversial views of what they take to be the 'same' state of affairs […] they will find a common language and learn to understand each other. Linguistic expressions can be understood only when people know the specific conditions in which they could be used to reach an agreement over something in the world. A shared view of reality as a 'territory halfway between' the 'world views' of different languages is a necessary condition for meaningful dialogues to come about at all. This internal relation between understanding linguistic expressions and knowing how to use them for reaching an agreement about something in the world explains why Humboldt attaches a cognitivist promise to the communicative function of language. In discourse, a world view is supposed to prove itself against the opposition of others in a way that brings about, with the progressive decentration of individual perspectives, the

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4 In a sense, in these three distinct functions of language – the representational or cognitive, the dialogical or communicative, and the world-disclosing or expressive function – is reflected the tripartition of the modern value spheres (the cognitive, the practical and the expressive).
enlargement – and progressive overlapping – of the meaning horizons of all participants 5

Seen from this perspective, Humboldt’s proto-Linguistic Turn had the merit of highlighting «the pragmatic interplay of the cognitive and the communicative functions of language» 6 and to show how the partiality of ‘local worlds’ constituted by locally dominant languages could be overcome not by stepping out of language but, on the contrary, by way of relativizing each of the ‘local worlds’ in the process of confrontation with the inhabitants of other worlds. The limit of Humboldt’s account of the context-transcending capacity of language, in Habermas’s opinion, lies in the fact that he conceives of such ‘pragmatic interplay’ along the lines of a hermeneutics of mutual understanding and not along the lines of a ‘theory of argumentation’. Fruitful as it might be at explaining how differently constituted perspectives on the world may come to overlap in the process of intercultural communication, Humboldt’s approach in the end fails to explain «how facts can be apprehended in the vertical dimension of reference to the objective world, and how knowledge is improved by the controversy about statements of fact» 7. This inadequacy of the account of the representational function of language will pass on to the entire subsequent hermeneutic tradition.

Coming now to our century, we observe a symmetrical distribution of strengths and weaknesses across the two basic versions of the Linguistic Turn proper. According to Habermas, the analytic strand, inaugurated by Frege and reaching its most complete articulation in Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus* 8, focuses on the semantic relation of language to the world and highlights how language can represent something outside of language. The hermeneutic strand, championed by Heidegger, focuses on the world-disclosing function of language and highlights how linguistic forms can create a world of possible events within which we can then,  

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5 *Ibidem*, p. 419.
6 *Ibidem*, p. 421.
7 *Ibidem*, p. 422.
8 Wittgenstein can be credited for a full transcendentalization of language or linguistification of the transcendental: the limits of my language «are the limits of my world» and the propositions of the *Tractatus* somehow reveal the «infrastructure of the world» to us (see *ibidem*, p. 423).
subsequently talk about facts. In establishing such a strong priority of ‘aletheia’ over ‘adaequatio’, of the ‘happening of truth’ over the ‘truth of predicative sentences’, such version of the Linguistic Turn «precludes any interaction of linguistic knowledge and knowledge of the world».

Heidegger «simply does not allow for the possibility that the meaning of a vocabulary is affected by the results of learning processes within the worlds». Further down along this road, we lose all possibility of distinguishing between the validity of an utterance and its social acceptance.

The source of these symmetrical weaknesses lies according to Habermas in a characteristic shared by both analytical philosophy and existential analytics: despite their approaching language from opposite starting points, both confine themselves to the semantics of language, and «neither of them expects from the pragmatic features of speech any essential contribution to the rationality of communication».

Finally, Habermas objects that in prioritizing semantics over pragmatics, both the analytic philosophy of language and Heidegger’s ontologically tinged hermeneutics fall somehow behind the level of differentiation inherent in Humboldt’s view of language.

If this is the philosophical picture that we inherit from the first half of the 20th century, what can be done to solve these difficulties? One line of response is that of simply pushing forward and radicalizing in various ways the primacy-of-‘aletheia’-over-‘adaequatio’-stance common to Wittgenstein and Heidegger: this line is adopted by the post-empiricist philosophy of science, neopragmatist linguistic philosophy and the post-structuralist critique of reason. The other line is to continue the empiricist analysis of language inaugurated by Russell and Carnap «with a purely methodological understanding of the linguistic turn, a stand that has gained world-wide predominance with Quine and Davidson».

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10 Ibidem.
11 Ibidem.
12 Ibidem.
Habermas rightly observes, the reductionism of the tradition which originates in Frege and in the early Wittgenstein risks making us lose sight of the intersubjective, ‘objective spirit’ dimension of language.

Habermas’s suggests a third line of response, for which he modestly credits the names of Putnam, Dummett and Apel, leaving his own name aside. What these authors have in common is that «they take the linguistic turn seriously, in the sense of a change of paradigm, without paying the price of the culturalist assimilation of ‘being true’ to ‘taking for true’ (sic.)» 14. To make a long story short, Habermas fully shares Apel’s program of rescuing the universalist dimension of linguistic representation which went lost in the Wittgensteinian-Heideggerian version of the Linguistic Turn. Such rescue should take place in the footprints of Peirce, namely by means of investigating the pragmatic presuppositions of all cooperative search for truth. This project of a ‘discourse theory of truth’, later complemented by a discourse ethics, is ‘inspired by a hermeneutic concept of language’, but what Habermas finds still lacking in Apel «except for a reception of Peircian semiotics, is the very core of a theory of language – a ‘meaning theory’» 15. This theory of meaning, embedded in the program of a formal pragmatics, is understood by Habermas as his own contribution to the overcoming of the two equally onesided versions of the Linguistic Turn.

The full recovery of the cognitive and representational function of language – understood as crucial in order to restore the universalistic dimension of validity via pragmatics – is achieved in three steps. First, Habermas links meaning and validity by defining ‘understanding a sentence’ as ‘knowing how to justify its truth’ and ‘knowing what obligations follow from one’s accepting it as true’. Second, communication aimed at agreement takes place by focusing on the certainties of the life-world in the context of a discourse; third, the ability of discursively reached insights to transcend the boundaries of locally accepted interpretive frameworks

is explained by the discursive processing of the […] disappointing experiences we make in our attempts to cope with an objective

14 ibidem.
15 ibidem, p. 437.
world presupposed as identical and independent, on the one hand, and in our interactive dealings with members of a social world presupposed as shared, on the other\textsuperscript{16}.

In the context of this last step, the cognitive function of language is supposed to attain a relative independence from the function of world disclosure and to enter a tension or dialectic with it – a tension or dialectic between the formative power of world-disclosing horizons and the recalcitrant aspects of reality highlighted in the course of learning processes.

2. NIETZSCHE AND THE PRAGMATIST PATH

Habermas’s interpretation of the symmetrical weaknesses of the analytic and hermeneutic versions of the Linguistic Turn, as well as his intent to overcome the relativistic consequences of the asserted primacy of the world-disclosing function of language, are certainly to be shared. Questionable is instead his choice of the means that can restore a universalistic dimension to validity in general and to language in particular. It is unclear how the cognitive, representational function of language – brought back into play via the idea of ‘disappointing experiences with the world’ – can really bridge the gap opened by the clash of competing language games, paradigms, traditions, conceptual schemes or avenues for world-disclosure. In fact, if we take seriously the world constituting function of language, disagreement over forms of world-disclosure seems likely to generate disagreement over the ‘disappointingness’ of supposedly disappointing experiences.

This problem emerges in a clearer way in practical discourses. If for a norm to be just (the universalistic element) means to be ‘equally good for everybody’, and we have a controversy over the good (the world-disclosing but particularistic moment), then we are not likely to come to the same assessment of the justness of the norm.

To go back to the cognitive side, we could ask the question in Kantian parlance: how are disappointing experiences possible at all? In an-

\textsuperscript{16} I	extit{bidem}, p. 439.
swering this question, we are bound to either assert that the disappointing quality of our experiences is independent of world-disclosure or, in other words, of the conceptual schemes through which we apprehend the world – in which case we have not remedied the relativism of the Wittgenstein-Heidegger conception, but we have simply denied that conception – or concede that the clash between distinct forms of world-disclosure is going to inevitably result also in a different assessment of the disappointing quality of our experiences.

The problem with the project of a formal-pragmatic completion of the Linguistic Turn is that the universalist aspect of the use of language continues to be unduly conflated with the cognitive or representational function, as though the cognitive function could work independently of that world-disclosing moment that in principle should be supplemented with a more universalistic moment but not suppressed as such.

At this juncture it becomes clear how the pragmatist conception of the universalistic moment in language could save us some of the difficulties of Habermas’s otherwise quite sensible project of correcting the relativistic bias of the Linguistic Turn.

Before addressing the contribution that pragmatism can offer towards redressing the relativistic bias of the Linguistic Turn, it is worth considering the perspective of a non-cognitivist and non-pragmatist philosopher: Nietzsche. For the ‘disappointing experiences’ mentioned in passing by Habermas are indeed at the center of Nietzsche’s view of truth.

In his 1873 essay On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense, Nietzsche starts from the idea that when we talk about trees, colors, snow and flowers we believe to know something about these things but all we have within our grasp are metaphors, not reflections of the things themselves. The so-called truths are «a mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms – in short, a sum of human relations which have been enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically, and which after long use seem firm, canonical, and obliga-

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tory to a people»\(^\text{18}\). Truths in other words are «illusions about which one has forgotten that this is what they are; metaphors which are worn out and without sensuous power; coins which have lost their pictures and now matter only as metal, no longer as coins»\(^\text{19}\). Falsehood in this picture is the truth of yesterday, a metaphor that is no longer functional to the reproduction of the human species. In these passages the connection of truth and the pragmatic motive of preserving human life and thus preventing the ultimate disappointing experience – the loss of human life – is explored in a somewhat reductive way. Nietzsche assumes a universal human interest in the preservation of *physical* life, an overarching interest which guides the sorting out of metaphors into those which function and those who do not.

What pragmatism has to offer for the purpose of recapturing the universalist potential of language in terms other than a purely cognitive-representational function is not just a harnessing of this universalist potential to the mere reproduction of physical human life, but to a richer concept of the flourishing of human life. Such implicit eudaimonistic coloring of the notion of truth could not be expressed more eloquently than in a passage of *Reconstruction in Philosophy* where Dewey writes:

> If ideas, meanings, conceptions, notions, theories, systems, are instrumental to an active reorganization of the given environment, to a removal of some specific trouble and perplexity, then the test of their validity and value lies in accomplishing this work. If they succeed in their office they are reliable, sound, valid, good, true. If they fail to clear up confusion, to eliminate defects, if they increase confusion, uncertainty and evil when they are acted upon, then they are false. […] The hypothesis that works is the true one; and truth is an abstract noun applied to the collection of cases, actual, foreseen and desired, that receive confirmation in their works and consequences \(^\text{20}\).

What is of interest here is not Dewey’s propensity to replace the notion of truth with a pragmatic criterion of truth, but the eudaimonistic coloring of the notion of truth. Dewey’s rendering of truth is not a straightforward or unequivocal expression of the pragmatic motive of preserving human life, but a complex and rich interpretation of the role of ideas in the flourishing of human life.

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\(^{18}\) *Ibidem*, p. 46.

\(^{19}\) *Ibidem*, p. 47.

of truth with that of warranted assertibility, a propensity certainly shared by Habermas, but his refusal to harness the universalism of warranted assertibility to cognitive representation. The universalistic claim raised by true assertions is rather grounded in their conduciveness to human well-being and flourishing, not just survival.

Yet what flourishing is and how the relative contribution to the flourishing of human life, on the part of an assertion or cluster of assertions grouped into a theory, can be the object of agreement among those who approach the world from within competing conceptual schemes is not immediately obvious and remains to be clarified. The suspicion arises that we have come full circle to the Habermasian difficulty of identifying ‘disappointing’ experiences that are ‘equally disappointing’ across the whole spectrum of conceptual schemes through which they are considered.

Perhaps we run into these difficulties because we have a problematic notion of universalism and of context-transcendence.

3. EXEMPLARY UNIVERSALISM

A still underexplored path, different from the idea of harnessing the context transcending potential of language to its representational or even its pragmatic function, whether in the Nietzschean or in the pragmatist version, consists in revisiting the modern notion of universalism from the perspective of the paradigm of reflective judgment and its core notion of exemplary validity. The advantages that this Kantian-Arendtian model of universalism can offer are not self-evident. For, at first sight, it seems that by embracing it we lose the kind of certainty, reliability and demonstrability which on the more mainstream views we associate with valid judgments. It seems that we only manage to expand the murkiness of aesthetic judgments and judgments of taste in all areas – cognitive, moral, political, legal – where we are used to expect firmer ground. At the same time, the great advantage afforded by the judgment and exemplarity approach to validity has its roots in the new horizon opened up by the Linguistic Turn. The problem of translating across contexts, and back and forth between what is particular and what is (supposedly) universal
simply fades away. The promise of the model of validity based on the force of exemplarity is that of freeing us from the twin dangers – the Scylla and Charybdis of today’s philosophy – of either trivializing difference, by postulating perfect commensuration and translatability in a neutral language, or of jeopardizing universalism by failing to reunify the plurality of local contexts and ultimately remaining hostage to it.

A philosophical anticipation of an exemplary approach to validity can be found in the notion of authenticity, which first arose in 18th century and Romantic moral thought – for instance, in the ethical views of Rousseau, Herder and Schiller. Embedded in their moral notion of authenticity is a new form of universalism – exemplary universalism – different and in some respects opposed to generalizing universalism. All ethics of authenticity somehow is based on the distinction between succeeding in being oneself or failing at it, and the judgment that leads us to the conclusion that our identity is flourishing or stagnating, is being fulfilled or on the contrary is being betrayed, is a kind of judgment – a reflective judgment, not a determinant one, to use Kant’s terminology – in which the object of evaluation is the optimal selfcongruence of a symbolic whole in its own terms, juxta propria principia.

Now, a notion of authenticity so conceived is of interest today not just by virtue of the vicissitudes of the history of moral doctrines but also by virtue of its promise to free us from the tension that a certain version of the Linguistic Turn has created between our universalistic aspirations, scaled down to the claim that something originating here and now might have a significance also there and then and, on the other hand, our pluralistic intuitions. It can free us from such tension because the kind of universalism presupposed by it is based on the exemplary selfcongruence of a symbolic whole and is independent of external standards that do not


translate easily across different ways of disclosing the world. Authenticity – itself originally a moral term – can be used in order to generalize this kind of validity which does not rely on external standards to all sorts of realms outside the aesthetic: to moral theory, political philosophy, legal theory and so on. Authenticity, integrity, exemplarity or some similar concept derived from it can be of use also in order to further spell out what from a pragmatist perspective ‘working in the service of our practices’ or ‘being conducive to flourishing’ might mean or, to go back to Habermas’s argument, what the ‘disappointing experiences’ that enlighten us about the limits of our shared framework might mean. On this exemplarist or radicalized pragmatist view, the world impinges on our distinct conceptual frameworks not by way of throwing recalcitrant facts at us – in fact, we can always immunize our frameworks against single recalcitrant facts – but holistically, by way of making lives lived in the light of these framework fulfilling or unfulfilling.

One of the terrains on which the authenticity and exemplarity approach to validity can in my opinion prove useful is the discussion of justice as well as a series of related themes, such as the nature of democratic constitutionalism, of reasonability, of political justification, of the grounding of cultural rights and of the right to privacy, of radical evil, of the phenomenon known as ‘identity politics’, and many others. In all of these debates, but especially in the discussion over which notion of justice can be embraced by the free and equal citizens of a democratic society who subscribe to different and in some cases conflicting conceptions of the good, we constantly have the problem of bringing together normativity and pluralism, the need for common standards and the diversity of moral and political cultures that have to live peacefully side by side and which are only partially commensurable.

If we agree that the impossibility of total incommensurability applies also to the identities of the conflicting parties in any controversy of value or interest, then a notion of justice capable of resolving the conflict without invoking any principle or notion external to the parties involved can treat the area of overlap between the conflicting identities – that area which must be assumed to exist for conflict to make sense at all – as an identity, however thin, in its own right, from specific requisites for its fulfilment, integrity or authenticity. From the vantage point of this area
of overlap, then, a new ‘we’ becomes visible, which includes the contending parties: the basic idea of a judgment view of justice – anticipated in Walzer, Taylor, and Rorty – is that the impartial yet immanent standpoint from which the controversies between parties who embrace different conceptions of the good can be solved is constituted by the requisites of the fulfillment, integrity or authenticity of that superordinate identity, however minimal, to which the parties, in the process of their contending, inevitably give rise. The universalism of justice can be reconstructed, from this point of view, as the result of an oriented reflective judgment, oriented by certain dimensions of the fulfillment of identities (coherence, vitality, depth and maturity), but also oriented by an additional guideline: namely, the modern ideal of equal respect. And the moral point of view can be understood as the vantage point of the fulfillment of humanity in its entirety, taken as the most inclusive imaginable identity. The fulfillment of humanity is not a formula, an abstract principle of reciprocity or consistency, but a kind of ‘concrete universal’ bound up with substantive presuppositions that change over time. It was substantively different in the era before nuclear weapons, in the era when the total aggregate output of the production processes still posed a limited threat to the integrity of the natural environment, or when science was in no position to interfere with genetic processes, or in the time when population growth posed no threat to the survival of the species.

Justice conceived along judgment lines is as contextual and particular as the good, because humankind is not immutable in the characteristics that are relevant for justice, but at the same time this notion of justice also has the power – as the theorists who lean toward the model of generalizing universalism like to emphasize – to ‘transcend’ the particularity of all local contexts. This is possible not because a judgment based notion of justice can be disentangled from context dependency but because the context wherefrom it arises and within which it is operative is the largest imaginable context, which includes all other human contexts.

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24 Ibidem, pp. 210-213.
By way of concluding I will briefly recall one feature that is central both to the authenticity and exemplarity view of validity in general and to its political-philosophical specification – namely, the judgment view of justice. This feature, which brings to completion the critique of foundationalism inaugurated by the Linguistic Turn, is the **radically selfreflexive format** of the argument which justifies both conceptions. The conception that anchors normative universalism to authenticity and exemplarity cannot be vindicated in the traditional philosophical way through a transcendental argument, a philosophical anthropology or any other type of foundationalist argument. The moment that we understood the normative notion of authenticity as a kind of ‘principle of authenticity’ in the traditional sense of the term, we would immediately incur a performative contradiction. Instead, both the authenticity and exemplarity view of validity and the judgment view of justice are justified in **radically reflexive terms**. The authenticity and exemplarity conception claims validity as the one view of validity that is most authentic for people like us, situated at our juncture in our philosophical history, to embrace\(^{26}\). The judgment view of justice claims validity as the conception of justice whose rejection by us would cause us to become less ‘we’ than we would be by accepting it\(^{27}\). In both cases, this judgment depends on the exemplariness of a narrative – a narrative of a basically historical nature – on who we are and on why we cannot, given who we are and the way we have come to be the way we are, but consider a view of validity and of justice conceived in terms of exemplarity and judgment as more in line with ourselves.

Underlying both the authenticity and exemplarity approach to validity and the more specific ‘judgment view of justice’ is then a common methodological core, constituted by a radically selfreflexive mode of justification which solidly anchors their peculiar universalism to the post-metaphysical horizon inaugurated by the Linguistic Turn and at the same time brings the Linguistic Turn to completion by way of freeing it from the problems raised by connecting the context-transcending moment of language with its cognitive, representational or generically pragmatic

\(^{26}\) See Id., *Reflective Authenticity* cit., pp. 163-164.  
\(^{27}\) See Id., *Justice and Judgment* cit., pp. 229-230.
function. The context-transcending function of language is best accounted for in terms of the capacity of language to help us to interpret exemplarity and to be the vehicle of exemplarity.

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