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1.

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Futurates, directors, and have-causatives

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Copley (2008, 2009) proposes a treatment of futurate sentences like that in (1a) according to which an existentially quantified, presupposed-capable 'director' entity $d$ is asserted to be committed to the realization of the proposition expressed in the sentence. On this account, (1a) ends up entailing the event’s occurrence because the director (whoever has the ability to tell Clinton where to go, perhaps Clinton herself) is presupposed to be able to bring it about. By contrast, (1b) is unacceptable insofar as no animate director has the ability to make it rain tomorrow. It is acceptable, however, if there is someone who has the ability to make the rain event happen (God, or a screenplay writer, e.g.).

(1)    a.  Clinton travels to France tomorrow.
    b. #It rains tomorrow.

We argue that the English have-causative exemplified in (2) has the same properties as the futurate. In particular, we claim that the subject of have is the director.

(2)    Obama had Clinton travel to France last Tuesday.

In a have-causative, the embedded subject must normally be animate, in independent control of the event denoted by the embedded verb. It has long been observed (Ritter and Rosen 1993, 1997, Belvin 1993, 1996, Harley 1998) that causative have is ill-formed with uncontrollable embedded events in a way that more mundane causatives are not:

(3)    #Obama had it rain last Tuesday.
(4)    Obama made it rain last Tuesday.

(5)    #Obama had Clinton collapse last Tuesday.
(6)    Obama made Clinton collapse last Tuesday.

Causative have with such uncontrollable events is not ungrammatical, precisely. Rather, what is often termed the 'director's reading' emerges. On this reading, the subject of have is an omnipotent being with respect to the universe of the embedded predicate, arranging the dispositions and behaviors of entities in it at will. If Mary is an author of a book or the director of a movie in which the embedded subjects are characters, for example, these are good readings:

(4)    Obama made it rain last Tuesday.
(7) a. (In the opening scene), Sorkin had Barlett collapse.
b. (During Josh's big confession to Toby,) Sorkin had CJ asleep.
c. Sorkin had it rain (to give his protagonists a reason to go in the shop).

In other words, there's nothing wrong with have-causatives of normally unplannable events. It's just that to interpret them, Mary's powers must be extended from mere authority-over-actions-of-other-humans (i.e. planning-for-humans authority) to authority-over-everything-in-the-universe (planning-for-everything authority). The same effect emerges in futurates, as shown in (1) above. The contrast between regular and 'director's' readings of a have-causative thus stems from the fact that the embedded event has to be plannable (or, we might say, directable) by the subject of have, in the exact same sense that a futurate requires plannability/directability. The similarity of these constructions suggests that Copley's futurate operator and causative have are the same entity.

References