snippets

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Contents

EDITORIAL STATEMENT

1. Purpose.

The aim of *Snippets* is to publish specific remarks that motivate research or that make theoretical points germane to current work. The ideal contribution is the ideal footnote: a side remark that taken on its own is not worth lengthy development but that needs to be said. One encounters many short comments of this kind in the literature of the seventies. We feel that there no longer is a forum for them. We want *Snippets* to help fill that gap.

2. Content.

We will publish notes that contribute to the study of syntax and semantics in generative grammar. The notes are to be brief, self-contained and explicit. They may do any of the following things:

- point out an empirical phenomenon that goes against accepted generalizations or that shows that some aspect of a theory is problematic;
- point out unnoticed minimal pairs that fall outside the scope of any existing theory;
- point out an empirical phenomenon that confirms the predictions of a theory in an area where the theory has not been tested;
- explicitly describe technical inconsistencies in a theory or in a set of frequently adopted assumptions;
- explicitly describe unnoticed assumptions that underlie a theory or assumptions that a theory needs to be supplemented with in order to make desired predictions;
- call attention to little-known or forgotten literature in which issues of immediate relevance are discussed.

We also encourage submissions that connect psycholinguistic data to theoretical issues. A proposal for a pilot experiment in language acquisition or language processing could make for an excellent snippet.

The earliest *Linguistic Inquiry* squibs exemplify the kind of note we would like to publish. Some of them posed unobserved puzzles. For instance, a squib by Postal and Ross in LI 1:1 ("A Problem of Adverb Preposing") noted that whether or not we can construe a sentence-initial temporal adverb with an embedded verb depends on the tense of the matrix verb. A squib by Perlmutter and Ross in LI 1:3 ("Relative Clauses with Split Antecedents"), challenging the prevailing analyses of coordination and extraposition, noted that conjoined clauses neither of which contain a plural noun phrase can appear next to an "extraposed" relative that can only describe groups. Other squibs drew attention to particular theoretical assumptions. For instance, a squib by Bresnan in LI 1:2 ("A Grammatical Fiction") outlined an alternative account of the derivation of sentences containing believe and force, and asked whether there were principled reasons for dismissing any of the underlying assumptions (among them that semantic interpretation is sensitive to details of a syntactic derivation). A squib by Zwicky in LI 1:2 ("Class Complements in Phonology") asked to what extent phonological rules refer to complements of classes. None of these squibs was more than a couple of paragraphs; all of them limited themselves to a precise question or observation.

3. Submission details.

Snippets is an electronic journal. We will publish issues roughly twice a year, and all issues will remain on the website.

Snippets is intended as a service to the linguistics community. Consequently, authors are advised that, when they submit to *Snippets*, we understand them as allowing their submission to be reproduced if published. At the same time, the rights for the notes themselves will remain with the authors. As a result, citation of *Snippets* material will have to indicate the author's name and the specific source of the material.

We will accept electronic submissions at the address snippetsjournal@gmail.com. Electronic submissions may take the form of (a) the text of an e-mail message, or (b) an attached file. The attached file should be a simple text file, a Word file (Mac or Windows), or a Rich Text Format (RTF) file. All submissions must state the name and affiliation of the author(s), and a (postal or electronic) return address.

Submissions are to be a maximum of 500 words (including examples), with an additional half page allowed for diagrams, tables and references. Given that we envision the submissions themselves as footnotes, the submissions may not contain footnotes of their own. The ideal submission is one paragraph; a submission of five lines is perfectly acceptable. We will not consider abstracts.

4. Editorial policy.

Submissions will be reviewed by our editorial board, and review will be name-blind both ways. We will provide a response within 3 months of the moment when we acknowledge receipt of a submission. At the same time, we do not guarantee more than a simple yes/no response to the submitter. We will not require revisions (barring exceptional cases). We allow resubmission (once) of the same piece.

1.

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More unbearably light elements? Silent verbs demanding overt complementizers in Afrikaans
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Van Riemsdijk (2002) observes structures in certain West Germanic/WGmc varieties, including Afrikaans, which permit temporal and modal auxiliaries without an accompanying lexical verb:

(1) Hy **is/moet** biblioteek toe   [Afrikaans]
      he is/must library   to
      'He has gone/has to go to the library'

As the translation indicates, the "missing" verb is related to motion-verb *go*. Van Riemsdijk accordingly postulates a "super-light" verb $e_{[GO]}$ for (1)-type structures. Crucially, $e_{[GO]}$ is not identical to the overt motion-verb, exhibiting several distinctive properties (cf. Kayne 2005 on the more general non-identity of overt and "silent" elements). One difference is $e_{[GO]}$'s unavailabity in finite form:

(2) *Hy $e_{[GAAN]}$ biblioteek toe
        he GO   library   to

For Afrikaans specifically, we note that hypothetical $e_{[GAAN]}$ appears to select for the *be*-auxiliary, despite Afrikaans, unlike its WGmc counterparts, systematically employing *have* in perfect-tense structures featuring overt lexical verbs:

(3) Hy ***is/ het** biblioteek toe gegaan
      he   is/ has library   to gone
      'He has gone to the library'

    Also not previously registered and, to the best of our knowledge, unique to Afrikaans is a further "silent verb"-containing structure:

(4) Ek **sal/moet/wil/gaan/het**,etc.   dat Wanda die boeke bestel
      I   shall/must/want/go/have,etc. that Wanda the books order
       'I will/must/have organize(d)/ensure(d)/propose(d)/ask(ed) that Wanda orders the
       books'

As before, we observe a lexical verb omissible in the presence of modals and a temporal auxiliary – here, *have* and not *be* as in (1)-type structures. Identifying a single silent verb is less straightforward than in the latter case, however: as (4)'s (non-

Snippets - Issue 24 – November 2011
http://www.ledonline.it/snippets/

- 5 -

exhaustive) translation shows, a range of lexical verbs may be "implied". Nevertheless, there are clear restrictions, verbs like *hope, wish* and *think* not being possible, with feasible verbs having broadly "organizational" meanings (cf. Levin 1993). The possibility of identifying a "super-light" verb, potentially something like $e_{[MAKE]}$ (Afrikaans $e_{[MAAK]}$), therefore remains.

Importantly, $e_{[MAKE]}$, like $e_{[GO]}$, would differ from overt counterparts in a range of ways, most strikingly in obligatorily requiring an overt complementizer:

(5) *Ek **het**   Wanda bestel   die boeke
     I   have Wanda order(ed)   the books

(6) Ek het   gereël...
    I   have organised

                      dat Wanda die boeke bestel
                      that Wanda the books order

                      Wanda bestel die boeke
                      Wanda order the books

'I organised that Wanda orders the books'

As (6) shows, complementizer omission is possible where *het* selects an overt "organisation"-verb, but not where this verb is "silent" ((5)). Further, hypothetical $e_{[MAKE]}$ requires finite declarative *dat*, being incompatible with finite interrogative *of* even where an *ask*-type meaning is implied. This follows directly if specifically "organisational" *ask-that*, rather than interrogative *ask-if*, is at stake, and can also be understood in relation to $e_{[MAAK]}$: "organisational" $e_{[MAAK]}$ corresponds in relevant respects to overt *maak dat* ("make that") and not *maak of* ("make (as) if"). Like $e_{[GO]}$, $e_{[MAKE]}$'s presence is dependent on a main-clause auxiliary, finite forms being unavailable (**Ek* $e_{[MAAK]}$ *dat Wanda die boeke bestel*). Embedded auxiliaries are, however, severely restricted, present-tense verbs being the norm in $e_{[MAKE]}$-complements.

These newly-observed overt-"silent" asymmetries seem to us to merit more detailed investigation, both for their own sake and in developing our understanding of "silent syntax" more generally.

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2.

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The ban on rightward P-stranding is a global constraint

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English does not permit Heavy DP Shift (HDPS) of the complement of a preposition:

(1) * I talked to t_1 yesterday [someone I'd met before]$_1$.

This snippet will present evidence that there is a dialect of English in which this constraint cannot be stated in a "Markovian" fashion. Instead, it must be stated as a "global" constraint along the following lines:

(2) Heavy DP Shift may not apply to a DP which has been — at any stage in the derivation — the complement of a preposition.

Evidence for (2) comes from ECM subjects, which marginally undergo HDPS:

(3) ? I expect t_1 to do well [every boy who enters the competition]$_1$.

The complement of P can be promoted to ECM subject position via pseudopassivization:

(4) I believe [every prisoner who tried to escape]$_1$ to have been shot at t_1.

Surprisingly, however, in the dialect of English under consideration, such derived ECM subjects cannot subsequently undergo HDPS ((5)). In this respect they contrast with the derived ECM subjects of ordinary passives ((6)):

(5) a. * I believe t_1' to have been shot at t_1 by snipers [every prisoner who tried to escape]$_1$.
   b. * I'll have t_1' shot at t_1 by snipers [any prisoner who tries to escape]$_1$.

(6) a. ? I believe t_1' to have been shot t_1 by snipers [every prisoner who tried to escape]$_1$.
   b. ? I'll have t_1' shot t_1 by snipers [any prisoner who tries to escape]$_1$.

This cannot be because A-movement in general fails to feed HDPS, as (7)-(8) demonstrate:

(7) * I gave t_1 free books [every student in the class]$_1$.

(8) ? I expect t_1' to be given t_1 free books [every student in the class]$_1$.

Here we see that although the first object in the English double object construction cannot undergo HDPS, promotion of the first object to ECM subject position renders subsequent HDPS much more acceptable in (8) than it is in (7). Thus, it is only the ban on rightward P-stranding which cannot be obviated via A-movement. Consequently, (1) cannot be unified with (7) (as proposed e.g. by Kayne (1984 : 200), who argues that the first object in (7) is the complement of a null P).

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3.

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The plurality inference of object mass nouns

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Plural *coins* in the upward entailing (UE) environment (1a) triggers a *plurality inference*: John is required to have two or more coins. This inference disappears in the downward entailing (DE) environment (1b): John is required not to have a single coin, not just not to have two or more. Finally, Spector (2007) notes that both behaviors are displayed in the non-monotonic environment (1c): the plurality inference survives in the UE component of the meaning, as the two students who have coins are required to have more than one each; but disappears in the DE component, as all other students are required not to have any coins.

(1) a. John has *coins* in his pocket.
         = John has more than a coin.
   b. John does not have *coins* in his pocket.
         = John does not have a single coin.
   c. Exactly two students have *coins* in their pockets.
         = There are two students who have at least two coins while all other students
           have no coins at all.

Crucially, object mass nouns (*change*, *furniture*, *footwear*, etcetera) behave analogously, as shown in (2). In the UE environment (2a), *change* triggers a plurality inference analogous to (1a): both sentences require John to have more than a single piece of change. In a scenario where John has just a quarter in his pocket, (2a) would be infelicitous or inappropriate just as (1a). But this plurality inference disappears in the DE environment (2b): John is required not to have a single piece of change, just as for (1b). Finally, the UE and DE behaviors combine in the non-monotonic environment (2c) just as they do in (1c).

(2) a. John has *change* in his pocket.
   b. John does not have *change* in his pocket.
   c. Exactly two students have *change* in their pockets.

Existing accounts of pattern (1) with plural count nouns rest on the idea that singular and plural morphology have the same morphological complexity and thus "compete" on semantic grounds. For example, Sauerland (2003) assumes that singular count morphology carries an *atomicity presupposition* while plural morphology carries no presupposition. As the two forms have the same morphological complexity, Heim's (1992) principle of *Maximize Presupposition* forces the use of singular morphology whenever its atomicity presupposition is satisfied. Plural morphology is thus only licit

when this atomicity presupposition is not satisfied, whereby the plurality inference in (1a). According to Spector (2007), competition happens at the level of scalar implicatures rather than presuppositions. In order to extend these approaches to the plurality inference triggered by object mass nouns in (2a), we would have to posit a competition between *change* and something like *a piece of change*. But the latter is structurally more complex, and thus not a licit competing alternative, according to recent theories of alternatives such as Katzir's (2007). In conclusion, these approaches to the plurality inference of count nouns based on a competition between singular and plural morphology miss the analogy with object mass nouns, for which there are no two competing morphological forms.

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4.

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Presupposition wipe-out can't be all or nothing: a note on conflicting presuppositions

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It has been suggested that cases of conflicting presuppositions like (1) 'may [...] be amenable to a treatment in terms of local accommodation' (Heim, 1983:fn.5).

(1) Either John stopped smoking or he started smoking

I will focus on the lexical insertion of an $\mathcal{A}$-operator, generally regarded as a grammatical reformulation of the process of local accommodation (Beaver and Krahmer (2001:171). $\mathcal{A}$ is used as a 'presupposition wipe-out device' in trivalent accounts of presuppositions (Peters 1979, Beaver and Krahmer 2001, Fox 2008 and George 2008). Beaver and Krahmer (2001) propose to handle cases like (1) by inserting $\mathcal{A}$ in both disjuncts as in (3). I will show that there are cases in which this simple account does not work and needs to be amended somehow.

(2)
φ	$\mathcal{A}\varphi$
1	1
0	0
#	0

(3) Either $\mathcal{A}$ [John stopped smoking] or $\mathcal{A}$ [John started smoking]

Soames (1979, 1982) observes that other presuppositions, like the one of *too* in (4) below, can survive despite the fact that the conflicting ones are cancelled.

(4) Either Bill stopped smoking and received an award for that too, or Bill started smoking.

As Soames points out, cases like (4) are problematic for an approach to cases like (1) that assumes that disjunction can be a 'plug' in the sense of Karttunen (1973): the presupposition of *too* would be incorrectly cancelled. (4), on the other hand, is not a problem for an account in terms of $\mathcal{A}$ because it can be analyzed along the lines of (5), where *too* isn't in the scope of $\mathcal{A}$.

(5) Either [$\mathcal{A}$ [Bill stopped smoking] and [received an award for that too]]
   or [Bill started smoking]

However, the same kind of solution is not tenable for an example like (6), where we have two presuppositional triggers embedded under *stopped/started* – the triggers *being upset that* and *too*. In this example, the presuppositions coming from *being upset* and *too* – respectively, the presuppositions that John left the country and that somebody else left the country – survive and indeed seem to project as presuppositions, as (7) shows. These propositions do not seem to be mere entailments of (6). It is unclear how to give scope to *A* in examples like (6) so that it could cancel only the conflicting presuppositions.

(6) Either John stopped being upset that he left the country too, or John started being upset that he left the country too.

(7) If either [John stopped being upset that he left the country too] or [John started being upset that that he left the country too], he will let us know soon.

Summing up, the modified Soames cases above constitute a challenge for an account of cases of conflicting presuppositions in terms of the *A*-operator.

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5.

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Generalized bishop sentences

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There are two main approaches to 'donkey' sentences such as (1). Dynamic theories argue that pronouns have the semantics of variables, but that existential quantifiers can bind outside of their c-command domain. E-type theories argue instead that pronouns have the semantics of definite descriptions, with *it ≈ the donkey that the farmer owns* (e.g. Heim 1990) or just *the donkey* (Elbourne 2005). Such accounts require adoption of an event or situation semantics, but no revision of the standard notion of scope.

(2) poses well-known difficulties for E-type theories. Since the two antecedents play semantically symmetric roles, it is difficult to get *he* and *him* to refer to distinct individuals (note that *the bishop that meets a bishop* and *the bishop that a bishop meets* are synonymous). Dynamic theories have no such difficulty: each existential quantifier simply binds a separate pronoun.

(1) A farmer owns a donkey. He beats it.

(2) [A bishop]$_i$ met [a bishop]$_k$. He$_i$ blessed him$_k$.

We will show that dynamic approaches are faced with a similar 'bishop' problem in minimally different examples such as (3). The source of the difficulty is that numerals give rise to maximal readings, as shown in (4).

(3) At least two bishops will(each) meet at least two bishops.They will each bless them.

(4) (Tomorrow,) I will meet at least two bishops. They will bless me.

=> All bishops that I meet (tomorrow) will bless me.

Dynamic theories have resorted to two strategies to capture the maximality condition. Both backfire with (3):

[1] First, *at least two* could be treated as a generalized quantifier in the framework of Kamp and Reyle 1993 (they also give a 'cardinal quantifier' treatment, similar to the second theory we discuss below). They posit an 'abstraction' operation which makes it possible for the pronoun *they* to be interpreted as *the sum of bishops that I will meet* (= *[Σx: x bishop & I will-meet x])*. When this strategy is applied to (3), it yields the analysis in (6).

(5) [at least two bishops]$_x$ I will-meet x. [Σx: x bishop & I will-meet x] will-bless me.

(6) [at least two bishops]$_x$ [at least two bishops]$_y$ x will-meet y.   [Σx: x bishop & [at least two bishops]$_y$ x meet y] each$_x$ will-bless **[Σy: y bishop & x meet y]**

Kamp and Reyle do not discuss the case in which abstraction produces an expression with a free variable, as happens with the object pronoun (in bold; by contrast, in the

underlined expression corresponding to the subject pronoun, Kamp and Reyle's abstraction procedure produces an expression with no free variable). Here we have opted to bind the variable with a distributive operator *each*. But our argument can be given for any plausible resolution of the object pronoun: the problem already arises with the subject pronoun.

Consider the situation in (7). Meetings, which are symmetric, are here represented as dotted lines; blessings, which are asymmetric, are represented with arrows.

$$b_1 \quad\quad\quad b_3$$

(7) $\quad\quad b_2 \quad\quad\quad b_4$

Intuitively, (7) makes (3) true, with *they* denoting $\{b_1, b_2\}$ and *them* denoting $\{b_3, b_4\}$. But the analysis in (6) predicts (3) to be false in (7): *they* must denote *all* the bishops who each met at least two bishops, i.e. $\{b_1, b_2, b_3, b_4\}$. But with this denotation, the second sentence of (3) is predicted to be false, since it is false that each of these individuals did some blessing (b_3 and b_4 didn't).

[2] Now consider van den Berg's analysis (1994) (it is rather close in this case to Kamp and Reyle's 'cardinal quantifier' analysis p. 458). (8a) is analyzed as in (8b), with the truth conditions in (8c) (ε_x is a dynamic existential quantifier and M_x is a maximality operator; $\geq 2(x', x)$ means that at least two elements of x' are in x).

(8) a. [≥ 2 y: bishops y] I will-meet y

b. $\varepsilon_y \wedge \varepsilon_{y'} \wedge M_{y'}(\text{bishops } y') \wedge M_y(y \subseteq y' \wedge I \text{ will-meet } y) \wedge \geq 2(y', y)$

c. There is a set y, and there is a set y', and y' is a maximal set of bishops, and y is a maximal subset of y' whose members I will meet, and there are at least two members of y' that are in y.

Interpreting all predicates as distributive, (3) receives the analysis in (9) (for legibility, we leave the underlined part unanalyzed).

(9) a. [≥ 2 x: bishops x] [≥ 2 y: bishops y] (x will-meet y). x blessed y.

b. $\varepsilon_x \wedge \varepsilon_{x'} \wedge M_{x'}(\text{bishops } x') \wedge \mathbf{M_x(x \subseteq x' \wedge [\geq 2 \text{ y: bishops y] (x will-meet y))}}$
$\quad\quad \wedge \geq 2(x', x)$

$\wedge \varepsilon_y \wedge \varepsilon_{y'} \wedge M_{y'}(\text{bishops } y') \wedge M_y(y \subseteq y' \wedge x \text{ will-meet } y') \wedge \geq 2(y', y)$

$\wedge x \text{ will-bless } y$

Without fully simplifying these truth conditions, it is enough to observe that the constraint on *x* which appears in bold guarantees that its denotation should include all of $\{b_1, b_2, b_3, b_4\}$: by treating the underlined part in the same way as in (8) (replacing *I* with *x'*), we end up with a requirement that *x* denote the maximal set of bishops who (each) met at least two bishops, i.e. $\{b_1, b_2, b_3, b_4\}$. With this denotation, *x will bless y* cannot be satisfied in (7).

In fact, plausible truth conditions can be obtained, but at the cost of separating the existential quantifiers ε_x and ε_y (boxed below) from their maximality conditions, as in (10a), which can be simplified to (10b) (because $\varepsilon y'$ plays the same role as $\varepsilon x'$):

(10) a. $\boxed{\varepsilon_x \wedge \varepsilon_y} \wedge [\varepsilon_{x'} \wedge M_{x'}(\text{bishops x'}) \wedge M_x(x \subseteq x' \wedge x \text{ will-meet y}) \wedge \geq 2(x', x)] \wedge$
$[\varepsilon_{y'} \wedge M_{y'}(\text{bishops y'}) \wedge M_y(y \subseteq y' \wedge x \text{ will-meet y}) \wedge \geq 2(y', y)] \wedge x \text{ will-bless y}$

    b. $\boxed{\varepsilon_x \wedge \varepsilon_y} \wedge [\varepsilon_{x'} \wedge M_{x'}(\text{bishops x'}) \wedge M_x(x \subseteq x' \wedge x \text{ will-meet y}) \wedge \geq 2(x', x)] \wedge$
$[M_y(y \subseteq x' \wedge x \text{ will-meet y}) \wedge \geq 2(x', y)] \wedge x \text{ will-bless y}$

    c. There is a set x, and there is a set y, and [there is a set x' which is the maximal set of bishops, and x is the maximal subset of x' which meets y, and there are at least two members of x' that are in x], and [y is a maximal subset of x' which x will meet, and there are at least two members of x' that are in y], and x will bless y.

The separation between existential force and maximality might be surprising; but it is also used in Sher's (1991) analysis of branching readings of generalized quantifiers.

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6.

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There *does not undergo predicate inversion*

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Moro (1997, 2006) proposes that existential sentences containing *there* (and Italian counterparts with *ci*) are derived from a structure in which *there* originates as a predicate of the "associate" DP and moves to surface subject position by a process of predicate inversion:

(1) [$_{IP}$ [$_{IP}$ There are [$_{VP}$ t_V [$_{SC}$ [many copies of the book] t_{there}]]] [in the studio]]

This view, coupled with the assumption that *there* can acquire the agreement features from the associate via predication, could allow a non-ad hoc explanation for long distance agreement in this construction (which has otherwise invoked the machinery of Agree (Chomsky 2000)). The structure and movement in (1) are claimed to be required independently, to account for inverse copular sentences:

(2) [$_{IP}$ [The cause of the riot] is [$_{VP}$ t_V [$_{SC}$ [a picture of the wall] t_{pred}]]]

Moro's central argument is that (1) patterns sufficiently similarly with (2) to pursue a unification. I disagree.

Moro focuses on two environments where existentials and inverse copulars are purported to parallel each other. The first involves *which-NP* phrases. Inverse copular sentences disallow their extraction:

(3)   *Which picture of the wall do you think the cause of the riot was *t* ?

Moro claims the same is true for existentials:

(4) *Which girls do you think that there are *t* in the room?

I contend that (4) does not generalize the way (3) does. Specifically, the examples in (5) are grammatical:

(5) a. Which magazines did you say there were *t* in the waiting room?
   b. Which eco-friendly options do you think there will be *t* on the new Lexus?

An obvious difference between (4) and (5) lies in the interpretation of the WH-phrase: (5) naturally invokes a reading where the answer set contains kinds rather than particular tokens. This is unavailable in (4). Crucially, however, extraction from inverse copulars cannot be saved by this "trick": (6a,b) should allow the same sorts of answers as (5a,b), but they are ungrammatical.

(6) a. *Which magazines did you say the cause of the riot was *t* ?
   b. *Which options do you think the cause of the recall was *t* ?

Moro's second argument is based on the observation that existentials (8), like inverse copulars (7), are disallowed in small clauses:

(7) *Mary considers [the cause of the riot a picture of Stalin].

(8) *The District Attorney considers [there insufficient evidence to prosecute].

In fact, when we consider passive examples, it seems that the parallel breaks down again: the contrast between (9) and (10) for some (but not all) speakers demonstrates another context where existentials are fine but inverted copular constructions are not. (Note that Heycock 1995 uses (9) to suggest that the problem with (7) is plausibly not the lack of a landing site for the inverted predicate, contra Moro.)

(9) *The cause of the riot is considered a picture of Stalin.

(10) There is considered insufficient evidence to prosecute.

Thus, the two environments that were meant to provide independent evidence for (1) being analogous to (2) in fact militate against that conclusion.

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7.

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A note on case assignment to CP

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Some predicates allow for a passive form with promoted CP objects (henceforth CP-passives), whereas other predicates do not:

(1) It was thought/believed/ that he was a spy.

(2) *It was complained/prayed that he was a spy.

(3) *That it was raining was complained.

Crucially, this does not appear to correlate with general Case assignment possibilities. Although *complain* fails to assign accusative Case to DP complements, the same is true of other verbs such as *hope* which nonetheless permit a CP-passive (cf. Alrenga 2005 amongst others):

(4) I'm hoping/wishing *(for) rain.

(5) It was hoped/wished/insisted that it would rain.

Nor does the split appear to depend on factivity, as many factive verbs allow a CP-passive:

(6) It was revealed/divulged/recognised that he was a spy.

Moltmann (2009) provides a crucial diagnostic which appears to distinguish the class of verbs represented by *complain* from the class represented by *hope*. While the (factive/non-factive) *hope*-class can (marginally) combine with a non-referential 'special' pronoun *something,* the *complain*-class cannot:

(7) (?)Mary hoped/wished/reasoned/revealed/divulged something.

(8) *Mary complained/prayed something.

The interesting thing here is the extremely restricted distribution of Case assignment with *hope*-type verbs. As Moltmann shows, the special pronouns are only possible where they have propositional content. Where the complement has non-propositional content, a preposition is required in active sentences. Where passives are permitted in such cases, they take the form of pseudo-passives:

(9) John hoped *(for) something (replacing a DP)

(10) A solution was hoped/wished/reasoned for.

Assuming that the passive is derived via Case-absorption, it follows that *hope* must assign Case to special pronouns. As CPs can also form passives in exactly those languages which license these special pronouns, the implication is that some predicates assign a special kind of case to clausal complements. Crucially, though, the data

strongly suggest that not all CPs have Case. Verb such as *complain* fail to license Case on either DP or CP complements. This suggests that a more nuanced version of Stowell's (1981) Case Resistance Principle, or whatever replaces it, is required. It is not the case that DPs require Case whereas CPs do not. Some, in fact, most CPs do require a kind of Case, though not the kind assigned to full DPs with non-propositional content.

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8.

8.

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P-stranding diagnoses A'-movement in **tough** *constructions*

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"Tough movement" (TM) is exemplified by the pair in (1).

(1) a. It is tough to please linguists.

    b. Linguists$_1$ are tough to please t$_1$.

The literature on TM reports that it exhibits both A- and A′-properties, and some analyses (e.g. Hicks 2009) have proposed to account for this by decomposing TM derivations into two steps, where the first is A'-movement to the embedded Spec,CP and the second A-movement to Spec,TP. Here I provide a new argument for diagnosing the first step as A'-movement with data from preposition stranding (p-stranding) across languages.

      P-stranding languages like English allow for p-stranding with TM:

(2) Magicians$_1$ are difficult to talk to t$_1$.

As one might expect, non-p-stranding languages like Italian do not allow for TM with p-stranding:

(3) a. *I maghi   sono difficili da parlare a
     the magicians   are difficult DA talk.INF to
  'Magicians are difficult to talk to.'

    b. È difficile parlare   ai maghi.
     is difficult talk.INF to.the magicians.
    'It is difficult to talk to magicians.'

It is known that some languages, such as Danish and Icelandic, allow for p-stranding with A′-movement but not A-movement, while there are no known languages that allow for p-stranding in A-movement but not A′-movement. The Danish stranding data is in (4) and the Icelandic in (5) (from Truswell 2009):

(4) a. Hvem har Peter snakket med?
    Who has Peter talked   with
    'Who has Peter talked with?'

    b. *Han blev grinet   af
     He   was laughed at
    'He was laughed at.'

Snippets - Issue 24 – November 2011
http://www.ledonline.it/snippets/

- 20 -

(5) a. Hvern hefur Pétur talað   við?
      Who   has Peter talked with
      'Who has Peter talked with?'

  b. *Ég tel   Vigdísi vera   oftast   talað□ vel   um.
      I   believe Vigdis be.INF most.often   spoken well of
      'I believe Vigdis to be most often spoken well of.'

These languages can diagnose whether or not TM – specifically the step of movement from the base position – is A- or A′-movement: if p-stranding is possible in Icelandic and Danish TM, the first step must be A′-movement.

Danish (6) and Icelandic (7) show that these languages allow for p-stranding under TM:

(6) a. Tryllekunstnere er   svære at tale med
      Magicians   are   tough to talk with
      'Magicians are tough to talk to.'

  b. Det   er svært at tale med tryllekunstnere
     Expl. is tough to talk with magicians.
     'It is tough to talk to magicians.'

(7) a. Töframenn eru erfiðir   að tala við.
      Magicians are difficult to talk with.
      'Magicians are difficult to talk to.'

  b. Það   er erfitt   að tala við   töframenn
     Expl. is tough to talk with magicians
     'It is tough to talk to magicians.'

  c. Hinrik VIII var erfiðir   að búa með
     Henry VIII was difficult to live with   (Thráinsson 2007: 431)

This indicates that the first move in TM dependencies must be A′-movement.

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9.

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Cross-conjunct binding in nominal gapping

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Gapping is normally understood as a construction in which the verbal head is 'gapped' in a coordination context. One of the questions in the study of gapping is whether other 'gapped' constructions have the same derivation as the well-known cases of gapping in the verbal domain (Verbal Gapping: VG). One of the unique properties of VG is so-called cross-conjunct binding (Johnson 1996/2004, McCawley 1993): a quantifier in the first conjunct can bind the subject in the second conjunct only when the verb is gapped as in (1).

(1) a. No one$_1$ will eat beans and his$_1$ friend ~~eat~~ rice.

b. *No one$_1$ will eat beans and his$_1$ friend eat rice

Among other interesting properties, cross-conjunct binding provides strong support for the Across-the-Board (ATB) movement under VP-coordination analysis of VG (Johnson 1994, 1996/2004, 2006, 2009, Lin 2000 among others).

A similar binding relation also exists in gapping in the nominal domain (Nominal Gapping: NG, Chaves 2005, Jackendoff 1971, Postal 2004, Yoshida 2005), which thus suggests that NG has the same type of derivation as VG, namely ATB movement under small constituent coordination (NP-coordination). In (2), for example, the head noun in the second conjunct is gapped and the genitive/possessive pronoun in the second conjunct is bound by the quantifier in the first conjunct.

(2) Not every doctor$_1$'s knowledge of tax law or his$_1$ accountant's ~~knowledge~~ of medicine is reliable.

However, interestingly, such a binding relation can be achieved even without the gap (3a), or even in the non-coordination context (3b).

(3) a. Not every doctor$_1$'s knowledge of tax law or his$_1$ accountant's knowledge of medicine is reliable.

b. No parent$_1$'s attitude toward politics should bias his$_1$ children's (attitude) toward religion.

These examples show that the cross-conjunct binding does not provide us with a reliable testing ground for the structure of NG.

This leads us to question whether the derivation of NG involves ATB movement or ellipsis. Interestingly, the distribution of NG perfectly overlaps with that of NP-ellipsis (NPE): whenever NPE is licensed, NG is licensed as well. The examples in (4) illustrate that NPE and NG are both licit subsequent to possessives, *all*, numerals, and

superlatives and are both illicit subsequent to determiners and bare attributive adjectives.

(4) a. John read Mary's/the shortest book of music and Bill's/all/three/the longest/ ~~book~~ (of poems) (as well).

   b. *John read the/a/a long/ book of music and the/a/a short ~~book~~ (of poems).

The examples in (5) demonstrate that in embedded contexts, NG and NPE are both licensed.

(5) a. Mary's book of rock music was published because Bill's ~~book~~ (of heavy metal) was so successful.

   b. I read Mary's book of music and John says he read Bill's ~~book~~ (of poems).

In sum, the difference between VG and NG in terms of cross-conjunct binding indicates that VG and NG are derived differently. Unlike VG, NG seems to involve ellipsis rather than ATB movement.

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