Contents
2. Alex Drummond. The ban on rightward P-stranding is a global constraint.
4. Jacopo Romoli. Presupposition wipe-out can’t be all or nothing: a note on conflicting presuppositions.
7. Michelle Sheehan. A note on case assignment to CP.
Copyright
The works included in Snippets are the property of their authors and are used by permission. Readers must apply the same principles of fair use to the works in this electronic archive that they would to a printed archive. These works may be read online, downloaded and printed for personal use, copied and freely distributed, or the URL of Snippets included in another electronic document. Any reference to material included in Snippets must cite the author and the source. The texts may not be published commercially (in print or electronic form), edited, or otherwise altered without the permission of the author.

Editors
Caterina Donati (University of Rome-La Sapienza)
Orin Percus (University of Nantes)

Review Board
Klaus Abels (University College London)
Theresa Biberauer (University of Cambridge)
Sigrid Beck (University of Tübingen)
Rajesh Bhatt (University of Massachusetts, Amherst)
Valentina Bianchi (University of Siena)
Daniel Büring (UCLA)
Carlo Cecchetto (University of Milan-Bicocca)
Danny Fox (MIT)
Martina Gracanin-Yuksek (Middle East Technical University)
Valentine Hacquard (University of Maryland)
Hisatsugu Kitahara (Keio University)
Idan Landau (Ben Gurion University)
Roumyana Pancheva (USC)
Josep Quer (ICREA and UPF, Barcelona)
Norvin Richards (MIT)
Anna Roussou (University of Patras)
Uli Sauerland (ZAS, Berlin)
William Snyder (University of Connecticut)
Michal Starke (CASTL, Tromsø)

E-mail: snippetsjournal@gmail.com
EDITORIAL STATEMENT

1. Purpose.

The aim of *Snippets* is to publish specific remarks that motivate research or that make theoretical points germane to current work. The ideal contribution is the ideal footnote: a side remark that taken on its own is not worth lengthy development but that needs to be said. One encounters many short comments of this kind in the literature of the seventies. We feel that there no longer is a forum for them. We want *Snippets* to help fill that gap.

2. Content.

We will publish notes that contribute to the study of syntax and semantics in generative grammar. The notes are to be brief, self-contained and explicit. They may do any of the following things:

- point out an empirical phenomenon that goes against accepted generalizations or that shows that some aspect of a theory is problematic;
- point out unnoticed minimal pairs that fall outside the scope of any existing theory;
- point out an empirical phenomenon that confirms the predictions of a theory in an area where the theory has not been tested;
- explicitly describe technical inconsistencies in a theory or in a set of frequently adopted assumptions;
- explicitly describe unnoticed assumptions that underlie a theory or assumptions that a theory needs to be supplemented with in order to make desired predictions;
- call attention to little-known or forgotten literature in which issues of immediate relevance are discussed.

We also encourage submissions that connect psycholinguistic data to theoretical issues. A proposal for a pilot experiment in language acquisition or language processing could make for an excellent snippet.

The earliest *Linguistic Inquiry* squibs exemplify the kind of note we would like to publish. Some of them posed unobserved puzzles. For instance, a squib by Postal and Ross in LI 1:1 ("A Problem of Adverb Preposing") noted that whether or not we can construe a sentence-initial temporal adverb with an embedded verb depends on the tense of the matrix verb. A squib by Perlmutter and Ross in LI 1:3 ("Relative Clauses with Split Antecedents"), challenging the prevailing analyses of coordination and extraposition, noted that conjoined clauses neither of which contain a plural noun phrase can appear next to an "extraposed" relative that can only describe groups. Other squibs drew attention to particular theoretical assumptions. For instance, a squib by Bresnan in LI 1:2 ("A Grammatical Fiction") outlined an alternative account of the derivation of sentences containing believe and force, and asked whether there were principled reasons for dismissing any of the underlying assumptions (among them that semantic interpretation is sensitive to details of a syntactic derivation). A squib by Zwicky in LI 1:2 ("Class Complements in Phonology") asked to what extent phonological rules refer to complements of classes. None of these squibs was more than a couple of paragraphs; all of them limited themselves to a precise question or observation.

*Snippets* is an electronic journal. We will publish issues roughly twice a year, and all issues will remain on the website.

*Snippets* is intended as a service to the linguistics community. Consequently, authors are advised that, when they submit to *Snippets*, we understand them as allowing their submission to be reproduced if published. At the same time, the rights for the notes themselves will remain with the authors. As a result, citation of *Snippets* material will have to indicate the author's name and the specific source of the material.

We will accept electronic submissions at the address snippetsjournal@gmail.com. Electronic submissions may take the form of (a) the text of an e-mail message, or (b) an attached file. The attached file should be a simple text file, a Word file (Mac or Windows), or a Rich Text Format (RTF) file. All submissions must state the name and affiliation of the author(s), and a (postal or electronic) return address.

Submissions are to be a maximum of 500 words (including examples), with an additional half page allowed for diagrams, tables and references. Given that we envision the submissions themselves as footnotes, the submissions may not contain footnotes of their own. The ideal submission is one paragraph; a submission of five lines is perfectly acceptable. We will not consider abstracts.

4. Editorial policy.

Submissions will be reviewed by our editorial board, and review will be name-blind both ways. We will provide a response within 3 months of the moment when we acknowledge receipt of a submission. At the same time, we do not guarantee more than a simple yes/no response to the submitter. We will not require revisions (barring exceptional cases). We allow resubmission (once) of the same piece.
Van Riemsdijk (2002) observes structures in certain West Germanic/WGmc varieties, including Afrikaans, which permit temporal and modal auxiliaries without an accompanying lexical verb:

(1) Hy is/moet biblioteek toe [Afrikaans]
   he is/must library to
   ‘He has gone/has to go to the library’

As the translation indicates, the “missing” verb is related to motion-verb go. Van Riemsdijk accordingly postulates a “super-light” verb e[GO] for (1)-type structures. Crucially, e[GO] is not identical to the overt motion-verb, exhibiting several distinctive properties (cf. Kayne 2005 on the more general non-identity of overt and “silent” elements). One difference is e[GO]’s unavailability in finite form:

(2) *Hy e[GAAN] biblioteek toe
    he GO library to

For Afrikaans specifically, we note that hypothetical e[GAAN] appears to select for the be-auxiliary, despite Afrikaans, unlike its WGmc counterparts, systematically employing have in perfect-tense structures featuring overt lexical verbs:

(3) Hy *is/ het biblioteek toe gegaan
    he is/ has library to gone
    ‘He has gone to the library’

Also not previously registered and, to the best of our knowledge, unique to Afrikaans is a further “silent verb”-containing structure:

(4) Ek sal/moet/wil/gaan/het, etc. dat Wanda die boeke bestel
    I shall/must/want/go/have,etc. that Wanda the books order
    ‘I will/must/have organize(d)/ensure(d)/propose(d)/ask(ed) that Wanda orders the books’

As before, we observe a lexical verb omissible in the presence of modals and a temporal auxiliary – here, have and not be as in (1)-type structures. Identifying a single silent verb is less straightforward than in the latter case, however: as (4)’s (non-
exhaustive) translation shows, a range of lexical verbs may be “implied”. Nevertheless, there are clear restrictions, verbs like hope, wish and think not being possible, with feasible verbs having broadly “organizational” meanings (cf. Levin 1993). The possibility of identifying a “super-light” verb, potentially something like e_{MAAK} (Afrikaans e_{MAAK}), therefore remains.

Importantly, e_{MAAK}, like e_{GO}, would differ from overt counterparts in a range of ways, most strikingly in obligatorily requiring an overt complementizer:

(5) *Ek het Wanda bestel die boeke
I have Wanda order(ed) the books

(6) Ek het gereël...
I have organised
dat Wanda die boeke bestel
that Wanda the books order
Wanda bestel die boeke
Wanda order the books

‘I organised that Wanda orders the books’

As (6) shows, complementizer omission is possible where het selects an overt “organisation”-verb, but not where this verb is “silent” ((5)). Further, hypothetical e_{MAAK} requires finite declarative dat, being incompatible with finite interrogative of even where an ask-type meaning is implied. This follows directly if specifically “organisational” ask-that, rather than interrogative ask-if, is at stake, and can also be understood in relation to e_{MAAK}: “organisational” e_{MAAK} corresponds in relevant respects to overt maak dat (“make that”) and not maak of (“make (as) if”). Like e_{GO}, e_{MAAK}’s presence is dependent on a main-clause auxiliary, finite forms being unavailable (*Ek e_{MAAK} dat Wanda die boeke bestel). Embedded auxiliaries are, however, severely restricted, present-tense verbs being the norm in e_{MAAK}-complements.

These newly-observed overt-“silent” asymmetries seem to us to merit more detailed investigation, both for their own sake and in developing our understanding of “silent syntax” more generally.

References
2.

Alex Drummond - Durham University
The ban on rightward P-stranding is a global constraint

alex.drummond@durham.ac.uk

English does not permit Heavy DP Shift (HDPS) of the complement of a preposition:

(1) * I talked to ty  yesterday [someone I'd met before].

This snippet will present evidence that there is a dialect of English in which this constraint cannot be stated in a “Markovian” fashion. Instead, it must be stated as a “global” constraint along the following lines:

(2) Heavy DP Shift may not apply to a DP which has been — at any stage in the derivation — the complement of a preposition.

Evidence for (2) comes from ECM subjects, which marginally undergo HDPS:

(3) ? I expect ty to do well [every boy who enters the competition].

The complement of P can be promoted to ECM subject position via pseudopassivization:

(4) I believe [every prisoner who tried to escape]ty to have been shot at t1.

Surprisingly, however, in the dialect of English under consideration, such derived ECM subjects cannot subsequently undergo HDPS ((5)). In this respect they contrast with the derived ECM subjects of ordinary passives ((6)):

(5) a. * I believe ty to have been shot at t1 by snipers [every prisoner who tried to escape].
   b. * I'll have ty shot at t1 by snipers [any prisoner who tries to escape].

(6) a. ? I believe ty to have been shot t1 by snipers [every prisoner who tried to escape].
   b. ? I'll have ty shot t1 by snipers [any prisoner who tries to escape].

This cannot be because A-movement in general fails to feed HDPS, as (7)-(8) demonstrate:

(7) * I gave t1 free books [every student in the class].
(8) ? I expect t1 to be given t1 free books [every student in the class].

Here we see that although the first object in the English double object construction cannot undergo HDPS, promotion of the first object to ECM subject position renders subsequent HDPS much more acceptable in (8) than it is in (7). Thus, it is only the ban on rightward P-stranding which cannot be obviated via A-movement. Consequently, (1) cannot be unified with (7) (as proposed e.g. by Kayne (1984 : 200), who argues that the first object in (7) is the complement of a null P).
References
3. Giorgio Magri – École Normale Supérieure
The plurality inference of object mass nouns
magrigrg@gmail.com

Plural *coins* in the upward entailing (UE) environment (1a) triggers a *plurality inference*: John is required to have two or more coins. This inference disappears in the downward entailing (DE) environment (1b): John is required not to have a single coin, not just not to have two or more. Finally, Spector (2007) notes that both behaviors are displayed in the non-monotonic environment (1c): the plurality inference survives in the UE component of the meaning, as the two students who have coins are required to have more than one each; but disappears in the DE component, as all other students are required not to have any coins.

(1) a. John has *coins* in his pocket.
= John has more than a coin.

b. John does not have *coins* in his pocket.
= John does not have a single coin.

c. Exactly two students have *coins* in their pockets.
= There are two students who have at least two coins while all other students have no coins at all.

Crucially, object mass nouns (*change*, *furniture*, *footwear*, etcetera) behave analogously, as shown in (2). In the UE environment (2a), *change* triggers a plurality inference analogous to (1a): both sentences require John to have more than a single piece of change. In a scenario where John has just a quarter in his pocket, (2a) would be infelicitous or inappropriate just as (1a). But this plurality inference disappears in the DE environment (2b): John is required not to have a single piece of change, just as for (1b). Finally, the UE and DE behaviors combine in the non-monotonic environment (2c) just as they do in (1c).

(2) a. John has *change* in his pocket.

b. John does not have *change* in his pocket.

c. Exactly two students have *change* in their pockets.

Existing accounts of pattern (1) with plural count nouns rest on the idea that singular and plural morphology have the same morphological complexity and thus "compete" on semantic grounds. For example, Sauerland (2003) assumes that singular count morphology carries an *atomicity presupposition* while plural morphology carries no presupposition. As the two forms have the same morphological complexity, Heim's (1992) principle of *Maximize Presupposition* forces the use of singular morphology whenever its atomicity presupposition is satisfied. Plural morphology is thus only licit
when this atomicity presupposition is not satisfied, whereby the plurality inference in (1a). According to Spector (2007), competition happens at the level of scalar implicatures rather than presuppositions. In order to extend these approaches to the plurality inference triggered by object mass nouns in (2a), we would have to posit a competition between *change* and something like *a piece of change*. But the latter is structurally more complex, and thus not a licit competing alternative, according to recent theories of alternatives such as Katzir's (2007). In conclusion, these approaches to the plurality inference of count nouns based on a competition between singular and plural morphology miss the analogy with object mass nouns, for which there are no two competing morphological forms.

References
4.

Jacopo Romoli – Harvard University

Presupposition wipe-out can’t be all or nothing: a note on conflicting presuppositions

jromoli@fas.harvard.edu

It has been suggested that cases of conflicting presuppositions like (1) ‘may [...] be amenable to a treatment in terms of local accommodation’ (Heim, 1983:fn.5).

(1) Either John stopped smoking or he started smoking

I will focus on the lexical insertion of an $\mathcal{A}$-operator, generally regarded as a grammatical reformulation of the process of local accommodation (Beaver and Krahmer (2001:171). $\mathcal{A}$ is used as a ‘presupposition wipe-out device’ in trivalent accounts of presuppositions (Peters 1979, Beaver and Krahmer 2001, Fox 2008 and George 2008). Beaver and Krahmer (2001) propose to handle cases like (1) by inserting $\mathcal{A}$ in both disjuncts as in (3). I will show that there are cases in which this simple account does not work and needs to be amended somehow.

(2) \[ \phi \mathcal{A}\phi \]

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
1 & 1 \\
0 & 0 \\
# & 0 \\
\end{array}
\]

(3) Either $\mathcal{A}$ [John stopped smoking] or $\mathcal{A}$ [John started smoking]

Soames (1979, 1982) observes that other presuppositions, like the one of too in (4) below, can survive despite the fact that the conflicting ones are cancelled.

(4) Either Bill stopped smoking and received an award for that too, or Bill started smoking.

As Soames points out, cases like (4) are problematic for an approach to cases like (1) that assumes that disjunction can be a ‘plug’ in the sense of Karttunen (1973): the presupposition of too would be incorrectly cancelled. (4), on the other hand, is not a problem for an account in terms of $\mathcal{A}$ because it can be analyzed along the lines of (5), where too isn’t in the scope of $\mathcal{A}$.

(5) Either [ $\mathcal{A}$ [Bill stopped smoking] and [received an award for that too] ]

or [Bill started smoking]
However, the same kind of solution is not tenable for an example like (6), where we have two presuppositional triggers embedded under stopped/starred – the triggers being upset that and too. In this example, the presuppositions coming from being upset and too – respectively, the presuppositions that John left the country and that somebody else left the country – survive and indeed seem to project as presuppositions, as (7) shows. These propositions do not seem to be mere entailments of (6). It is unclear how to give scope to $\mathcal{A}$ in examples like (6) so that it could cancel only the conflicting presuppositions.

(6) Either John stopped being upset that he left the country too, or John started being upset that he left the country too.

(7) If either [John stopped being upset that he left the country too] or [John started being upset that he left the country too], he will let us know soon.

Summing up, the modified Soames cases above constitute a challenge for an account of cases of conflicting presuppositions in terms of the $\mathcal{A}$-operator.

References
5.

Philippe Schlenker – Institut Jean Nicod (CNRS) and New York University  
Generalized bishop sentences

philippe.schlenker@gmail.com

There are two main approaches to ‘donkey’ sentences such as (1). Dynamic theories argue that pronouns have the semantics of variables, but that existential quantifiers can bind outside of their c-command domain. E-type theories argue instead that pronouns have the semantics of definite descriptions, with \( it \approx \text{the donkey that the farmer owns} \) (e.g. Heim 1990) or just \( \text{the donkey} \) (Elbourne 2005). Such accounts require adoption of an event or situation semantics, but no revision of the standard notion of scope.

(2) poses well-known difficulties for E-type theories. Since the two antecedents play semantically symmetric roles, it is difficult to get \( he \) and \( him \) to refer to distinct individuals (note that \( \text{the bishop that meets a bishop} \) and \( \text{the bishop that a bishop meets} \) are synonymous). Dynamic theories have no such difficulty: each existential quantifier simply binds a separate pronoun.

(1) A farmer owns a donkey. He beats it.
(2) [A bishop, met [a bishop]]. He [blessed him].

We will show that dynamic approaches are faced with a similar ‘bishop’ problem in minimally different examples such as (3). The source of the difficulty is that numerals give rise to maximal readings, as shown in (4).

(3) At least two bishops will(each) meet at least two bishops. They will each bless them.
(4) (Tomorrow,) I will meet at least two bishops. They will bless me.

\[ \Rightarrow \] All bishops that I meet (tomorrow) will bless me.

Dynamic theories have resorted to two strategies to capture the maximality condition. Both backfire with (3):

[1] First, \( \text{at least two} \) could be treated as a generalized quantifier in the framework of Kamp and Reyle 1993 (they also give a ‘cardinal quantifier’ treatment, similar to the second theory we discuss below). They posit an ‘abstraction’ operation which makes it possible for the pronoun \( they \) to be interpreted as \( \text{the sum of bishops that I will meet} \) (\( \sum x: x \text{ bishop} \& I \text{ will-meet} x \)). When this strategy is applied to (3), it yields the analysis in (6).

(5) \[ \text{at least two bishops}, I \text{ will-meet} x. [\Sigma x: x \text{ bishop} \& I \text{ will-meet} x] \text{will-bless} \]
(6) \[ \text{at least two bishops}, _x \text{ will-meet} y. [\Sigma x: x \text{ bishop} \& \text{at least two bishops}, x \text{ meet} y] \text{each, will-bless} [\Sigma y: y \text{ bishop} \& x \text{ meet} y] \]

Kamp and Reyle do not discuss the case in which abstraction produces an expression with a free variable, as happens with the object pronoun (in bold; by contrast, in the...
underlined expression corresponding to the subject pronoun, Kamp and Reyle's abstraction procedure produces an expression with no free variable). Here we have opted to bind the variable with a distributive operator each. But our argument can be given for any plausible resolution of the object pronoun: the problem already arises with the subject pronoun.

Consider the situation in (7). Meetings, which are symmetric, are here represented as dotted lines; blessings, which are asymmetric, are represented with arrows.

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{b}_1 & \text{b}_2 \\
\text{b}_3 & \text{b}_4
\end{array}
\]

Intuitively, (7) makes (3) true, with they denoting \{b\_1, b\_2\} and them denoting \{b\_3, b\_4\}. But the analysis in (6) predicts (3) to be false in (7): they must denote all the bishops who each met at least two bishops, i.e. \{b\_1, b\_2, b\_3, b\_4\}. But with this denotation, the second sentence of (3) is predicted to be false, since it is false that each of these individuals did some blessing (b\_3 and b\_4 didn’t).

[2] Now consider van den Berg’s analysis (1994) (it is rather close in this case to Kamp and Reyle’s ‘cardinal quantifier’ analysis p. 458). (8a) is analyzed as in (8b), with the truth conditions in (8c) (\(\varepsilon\)) is a dynamic existential quantifier and \(M_x\) is a maximality operator; \(\geq 2(x', x)\) means that at least two elements of \(x'\) are in \(x\).

(8) a. \(\geq 2 y: \text{bishops } y\) I will-meet \(y\)
   b. \(\varepsilon y \land \varepsilon y' \land M_y (\text{bishops } y') \land M_y (y \subseteq y' \land I \text{ will-meet } y) \land \geq 2(y, y')\)
   c. There is a set \(y\), and there is a set \(y'\), and \(y'\) is a maximal set of bishops, and \(y\) is a maximal subset of \(y'\) whose members I will meet, and there are at least two members of \(y'\) that are in \(y\).

Interpreting all predicates as distributive, (3) receives the analysis in (9) (for legibility, we leave the underlined part unanalyzed).

(9) a. \(\geq 2 x: \text{bishops } x\) \(\geq 2 y: \text{bishops } y\) (x will-meet y). x blessed y.
   b. \(\varepsilon x \land \varepsilon x' \land M_x (\text{bishops } x') \land M_x (x \subseteq x' \land \geq 2 y: \text{bishops } y) (x \text{ will-meet } y)) \land \geq 2(x, x')\)
   c. \(\varepsilon y \land \varepsilon y' \land M_y (\text{bishops } y') \land M_y (y \subseteq y' \land x \text{ will-meet } y') \land \geq 2(y', y)\)
   \(\land x \text{ will-bless } y\)

Without fully simplifying these truth conditions, it is enough to observe that the constraint on \(x\) which appears in bold guarantees that its denotation should include all of \{b\_1, b\_2, b\_3, b\_4\}: by treating the underlined part in the same way as in (8) (replacing \(I\) with \(x'\)), we end up with a requirement that \(x\) denote the maximal set of bishops who (each) met at least two bishops, i.e. \{b\_1, b\_2, b\_3, b\_4\}. With this denotation, \(x\text{ will bless } y\) cannot be satisfied in (7).
In fact, plausible truth conditions can be obtained, but at the cost of separating the existential quantifiers $\exists_x$ and $\exists_y$ (boxed below) from their maximality conditions, as in (10a), which can be simplified to (10b) (because $\forall y'$ plays the same role as $\forall x'$):

(10) a. $\exists_x \land \exists_y \land [\exists_{x'} (\text{bishops } x') \land M_x (x \subseteq x' \land x \text{ will-meet } y) \land \geq 2(x', x)] \land [\exists_{y'} (\text{bishops } y') \land M_y (y \subseteq y' \land y \text{ will-meet } y) \land \geq 2(y', y)] \land x \text{ will-bless } y$

b. $\exists_x \land \exists_y \land [\exists_{x'} (\text{bishops } x') \land M_x (x \subseteq x' \land x \text{ will-meet } y) \land \geq 2(x', x)] \land [M_y (y \subseteq x' \land x \text{ will-meet } y) \land \geq 2(x', y)] \land x \text{ will-bless } y$

c. There is a set $x$, and there is a set $y$, and [there is a set $x'$ which is the maximal set of bishops, and $x$ is the maximal subset of $x'$ which meets $y$, and there are at least two members of $x'$ that are in $x$], and [y is a maximal subset of $x'$ which $x$ will meet, and there are at least two members of $x'$ that are in $y$], and $x$ will bless $y$.

The separation between existential force and maximality might be surprising; but it is also used in Sher’s (1991) analysis of branching readings of generalized quantifiers.

References
Moro (1997, 2006) proposes that existential sentences containing there (and Italian counterparts with ci) are derived from a structure in which there originates as a predicate of the “associate” DP and moves to surface subject position by a process of predicate inversion:

(1) [IP [IP There are [VP tV [SC [many copies of the book] tthere ]] [in the studio]]]

This view, coupled with the assumption that there can acquire the agreement features from the associate via predication, could allow a non-ad hoc explanation for long distance agreement in this construction (which has otherwise invoked the machinery of Agree (Chomsky 2000)). The structure and movement in (1) are claimed to be required independently, to account for inverse copular sentences:

(2) [IP [The cause of the riot] is [VP tV [SC [a picture of the wall] tpred ]]]

Moro’s central argument is that (1) patterns sufficiently similarly with (2) to pursue a unification. I disagree.

Moro focuses on two environments where existentials and inverse copulas are purported to parallel each other. The first involves which-NP phrases. Inverse copular sentences disallow their extraction:

(3) *Which picture of the wall do you think the cause of the riot was t?

Moro claims the same is true for existentials:

(4) *Which girls do you think that there are t in the room?

I contend that (4) does not generalize the way (3) does. Specifically, the examples in (5) are grammatical:

(5) a. Which magazines did you say there were t in the waiting room?
   b. Which eco-friendly options do you think there will be t on the new Lexus?

An obvious difference between (4) and (5) lies in the interpretation of the WH-phrase: (5) naturally invokes a reading where the answer set contains kinds rather than particular tokens. This is unavailable in (4). Crucially, however, extraction from inverse copulas cannot be saved by this “trick”: (6a,b) should allow the same sorts of answers as (5a,b), but they are ungrammatical.

(6) a. *Which magazines did you say the cause of the riot was t?
   b. *Which options do you think the cause of the recall was t?
Moro’s second argument is based on the observation that existentials (8), like inverse copulars (7), are disallowed in small clauses:

(7) *Mary considers [the cause of the riot a picture of Stalin].

(8) *The District Attorney considers [there insufficient evidence to prosecute].

In fact, when we consider passive examples, it seems that the parallel breaks down again: the contrast between (9) and (10) for some (but not all) speakers demonstrates another context where existentials are fine but inverted copular constructions are not. (Note that Heycock 1995 uses (9) to suggest that the problem with (7) is plausibly not the lack of a landing site for the inverted predicate, contra Moro.)

(9) *The cause of the riot is considered a picture of Stalin.

(10) There is considered insufficient evidence to prosecute.

Thus, the two environments that were meant to provide independent evidence for (1) being analogous to (2) in fact militate against that conclusion.

References
Some predicates allow for a passive form with promoted CP objects (henceforth CP-passives), whereas other predicates do not:

(1) It was thought/believed/that he was a spy.
(2) *It was complained/prayed that he was a spy.
(3) *That it was raining was complained.

Crucially, this does not appear to correlate with general Case assignment possibilities. Although complain fails to assign accusative Case to DP complements, the same is true of other verbs such as hope which nonetheless permit a CP-passive (cf. Alrenga 2005 amongst others):

(4) I’m hoping/wishing *(for) rain.
(5) It was hoped/wished/insisted that it would rain.

Nor does the split appear to depend on factivity, as many factive verbs allow a CP-passive:

(6) It was revealed/divulged/recognised that he was a spy.

Moltmann (2009) provides a crucial diagnostic which appears to distinguish the class of verbs represented by complain from the class represented by hope. While the (factive/non-factive) hope-class can (marginally) combine with a non-referring ‘special’ pronoun something, the complain-class cannot:

(7) (?)Mary hoped/wished/reasoned/revealed/divulged something.
(8) *Mary complained/prayed something.

The interesting thing here is the extremely restricted distribution of Case assignment with hope-type verbs. As Moltmann shows, the special pronouns are only possible where they have propositional content. Where the complement has non-propositional content, a preposition is required in active sentences. Where passives are permitted in such cases, they take the form of pseudo-passives:

(9) John hoped *(for) something (replacing a DP)
(10) A solution was hoped/wished/reasoned for.

Assuming that the passive is derived via Case-absorption, it follows that hope must assign Case to special pronouns. As CPs can also form passives in exactly those languages which license these special pronouns, the implication is that some predicates assign a special kind of case to clausal complements. Crucially, though, the data
strongly suggest that not all CPs have Case. Verb such as *complain* fail to license Case on either DP or CP complements. This suggests that a more nuanced version of Stowell’s (1981) Case Resistance Principle, or whatever replaces it, is required. It is not the case that DPs require Case whereas CPs do not. Some, in fact, most CPs do require a kind of Case, though not the kind assigned to full DPs with non-propositional content.

**References**


8.

Gary Thoms - University of Strathclyde
P-stranding diagnoses A′-movement in tough constructions

gary.thoms@gmail.com

“Tough movement” (TM) is exemplified by the pair in (1).

(1) a. It is tough to please linguists.
   b. Linguists are tough to please.

The literature on TM reports that it exhibits both A- and A′-properties, and some analyses (e.g. Hicks 2009) have proposed to account for this by decomposing TM derivations into two steps, where the first is A′-movement to the embedded Spec,CP and the second A-movement to Spec,TP. Here I provide a new argument for diagnosing the first step as A′-movement with data from preposition stranding (p-stranding) across languages.

P-stranding languages like English allow for p-stranding with TM:

(2) Magicians are difficult to talk to.

As one might expect, non-p-stranding languages like Italian do not allow for TM with p-stranding:

(3) a. *I maghi sono difficili da parlare a
   the magicians are difficult to talk.
   ‘Magicians are difficult to talk to.’
   b. È difficile parlare ai maghi.
   is difficult talk to the magicians.
   ‘It is difficult to talk to magicians.’

It is known that some languages, such as Danish and Icelandic, allow for p-stranding with A′-movement but not A-movement, while there are no known languages that allow for p-stranding in A-movement but not A′-movement. The Danish stranding data is in (4) and the Icelandic in (5) (from Truswell 2009):

(4) a. Hvem har Peter snakket med?
   Who has Peter talked with
   ‘Who has Peter talked with?’
   b. *Han blev grinet af
   He was laughed at
   ‘He was laughed at.’

(5) a. Hvem har Peter snakket med?
   Who has Peter talked with
   ‘Who has Peter talked with?’
   b. *Hann blei grinit af
   He was laughed at
   ‘He was laughed at.’
(5) a. Hvern hefur Pétur talað við?
    Who has Peter talked with
    ‘Who has Peter talked with?’
b. *Ég tel Vigdís vera oftast talað vel um.
    I believe Vigdis to be most often spoken of
    ‘I believe Vigdis to be most often spoken well of.’

These languages can diagnose whether or not TM – specifically the step of movement from the base position – is A- or A’-movement: if p-stranding is possible in Icelandic and Danish TM, the first step must be A’-movement.

Danish (6) and Icelandic (7) show that these languages allow for p-stranding under TM:

(6) a. Tryllekunstnere er svære at tale med
    Magicians are tough to talk with
    ‘Magicians are tough to talk to.’
b. Det er svært at tale med tryllekunstnere
    Expl. is tough to talk with magicians.
    ‘It is tough to talk to magicians.’

(7) a. Töframenn eru erfiðir að tala við.
    Magicians are difficult to talk with.
    ‘Magicians are difficult to talk to.’
b. Pað er erfitt að tala við töframenn
    Expl. is tough to talk with magicians
    ‘It is tough to talk to magicians.’
c. Hinrik VIII var erfiðir að búa með
    Henry VIII was difficult to live with (Thráinsson 2007: 431)

This indicates that the first move in TM dependencies must be A’-movement.

References
Gapping is normally understood as a construction in which the verbal head is ‘gapped’ in a coordination context. One of the questions in the study of gapping is whether other ‘gapped’ constructions have the same derivation as the well-known cases of gapping in the verbal domain (Verbal Gapping: VG). One of the unique properties of VG is so-called cross-conjunct binding (Johnson 1996/2004, McCawley 1993): a quantifier in the first conjunct can bind the subject in the second conjunct only when the verb is gapped as in (1).

(1)  a. No one₁ will eat beans and his₁ friend eat rice.
   b. *No one₁ will eat beans and his₁ friend eat rice


A similar binding relation also exists in gapping in the nominal domain (Nominal Gapping: NG, Chaves 2005, Jackendoff 1971, Postal 2004, Yoshida 2005), which thus suggests that NG has the same type of derivation as VG, namely ATB movement under small constituent coordination (NP-coordination). In (2), for example, the head noun in the second conjunct is gapped and the genitive/possessive pronoun in the second conjunct is bound by the quantifier in the first conjunct.

(2)  Not every doctor₁’s knowledge of tax law or his₁ accountant’s knowledge of medicine is reliable.

However, interestingly, such a binding relation can be achieved even without the gap (3a), or even in the non-coordination context (3b).

(3)  a. Not every doctor₁’s knowledge of tax law or his₁ accountant’s knowledge of medicine is reliable.
   b. No parent₁’s attitude toward politics should bias his₁ children’s (attitude) toward religion.

These examples show that the cross-conjunct binding does not provide us with a reliable testing ground for the structure of NG.

This leads us to question whether the derivation of NG involves ATB movement or ellipsis. Interestingly, the distribution of NG perfectly overlaps with that of NP-ellipsis (NPE): whenever NPE is licensed, NG is licensed as well. The examples in (4) illustrate that NPE and NG are both licit subsequent to possessives, all, numerals, and
superlatives and are both illicit subsequent to determiners and bare attributive adjectives.

(4) a. John read Mary’s/the shortest book of music and Bill’s/all/three/the longest/ book (of poems) (as well).
   

The examples in (5) demonstrate that in embedded contexts, NG and NPE are both licensed.

(5) a. Mary’s book of rock music was published because Bill’s book (of heavy metal) was so successful.
   
   b. I read Mary’s book of music and John says he read Bill’s book (of poems).

In sum, the difference between VG and NG in terms of cross-conjunct binding indicates that VG and NG are derived differently. Unlike VG, NG seems to involve ellipsis rather than ATB movement.

References