Contents

2. Brian Buccola. A restriction on the distribution of exclusive only.
4. Maria Esipova. QUD-addressing appositives don’t have to be clause-final.
Copyright
The works included in Snippets are the property of their authors and are used by permission. Readers must apply the same principles of fair use to the works in this electronic archive that they would to a printed archive. These works may be read online, downloaded and printed for personal use, copied and freely distributed, or the URL of Snippets included in another electronic document. Any reference to material included in Snippets must cite the author and the source. The texts may not be published commercially (in print or electronic form), edited, or otherwise altered without the permission of the author.

Editors
Sam Alxatib, Graduate Center, City University of New York
Isaac Gould, Ewha Womans University
Orin Percus, Université de Nantes

Review Board
Simon Charlow (Rutgers University), Christopher Davis (University of the Ryukyus), Michael Yoshitaka Erlewine (National University of Singapore), Ilaria Frana (Università degli Studi di Enna “Kore”), Daniel Gutzmann (University of Cologne), Jeremy Hartman (University of Massachusetts, Amherst), Laura Kalin (Princeton University), Peter Klecha (Swarthmore College), Marie-Christine Meyer (Zentrum Allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft), Neil Myler (Boston University), Michelle Sheehan (Anglia Ruskin University), Yasutada Sudo (University College London), Ayaka Sugawara (Mie University), Gary Thoms (University of Glasgow), Maziar Toosarvandani (University of California, Santa Cruz), Wataru Uegaki (Leiden University), Coppe van Urk (Queen Mary University of London), Alexis Wellwood (Northwestern University), Rebecca Woods (University of Huddersfield).

The editors would also like to thank Jacopo Romoli (Ulster University) and Natasha Ivlieva (HSE Moscow) for their reviews.

Email: snippetsjournal@gmail.com
Editorial Statement

1. Purpose
The aim of Snippets is to publish specific remarks that motivate research or that make theoretical points germane to current work. The ideal contribution is brief, self-contained and explicit. One encounters short comments of this kind in earlier literature in linguistics. We feel that there no longer is a forum for them. We want Snippets to help fill that gap.

2. Content
We will publish notes that contribute to the study of syntax and semantics in generative grammar. The notes are to be brief, self-contained and explicit. They may do any of the following things:

- point out an empirical phenomenon that challenges accepted generalizations or influential theoretical proposals;
- point out unnoticed minimal pairs that fall outside the scope of any existing theory;
- point out an empirical phenomenon that confirms the predictions of a theory in an area where the theory has not been tested;
- explicitly describe technical inconsistencies in a theory or in a set of frequently adopted assumptions;
- explicitly describe unnoticed assumptions that underlie a theory or assumptions that a theory needs to be supplemented with in order to make desired predictions;
- call attention to little-known or forgotten literature in which issues of immediate relevance are discussed.

We also encourage submissions that connect psycholinguistic data to theoretical issues. A proposal for a pilot experiment in language acquisition or language processing could make for an excellent snippet.

The earliest Linguistic Inquiry squibs exemplify the kind of remark we would like to publish. Some of them posed unobserved puzzles. For instance, a squib by Postal and Ross in Linguistic Inquiry 1:1 (“A Problem of Adverb Preposing”) noted that whether or not we can construe a sentence-initial temporal adverb with an embedded verb depends on the tense of the matrix verb. A squib by Perlmutter and Ross in LI 1:3 (“Relative Clauses with Split Antecedents”), challenging the prevailing analyses of coordination and extraposition, noted that conjoined clauses, neither of which contains a plural noun phrase, can appear next to an “extraposed” relative that can only describe groups. Other squibs drew attention to particular theoretical assumptions. For instance, a squib by Bresnan in LI 1:2 (“A Grammatical Fiction”) outlined an alternative account of the derivation of sentences containing believe and force, and asked whether there were principled reasons for dismissing any of the underlying assumptions (among them that semantic interpretation is sensitive to details of a syntactic derivation). A squib by Zwicky in LI 1:2 (“Class Complements in Phonology”) asked to what extent phonological rules refer to complements of classes. None of these squibs was more than a couple of paragraphs; all of them limited themselves to a precise question or observation.
3. Submission details
Snippets is an electronic journal. We will solicit submissions twice a year. The submissions that we accept will be posted on the journal website approximately 3 months after each deadline, and all accepted submissions will remain permanently on the website. Snippets is intended as a service to the linguistics community. Consequently, authors are advised that, when they submit to Snippets, we understand them as allowing their submission to be reproduced if published. At the same time, the rights for the published snippets themselves will remain with the authors. As a result, citation of Snippets material will have to indicate the author’s name and the specific source of the material.

We will accept electronic submissions at the address snippetsjournal@gmail.com. Electronic submissions may take the form of (a) the text of an e-mail message, or (b) an attached file. The attached file should be a simple text file, a Word file (Mac or Windows), a Rich Text Format (RTF) file, or a PDF. The files must be anonymous, but must be accompanied with information about the authors: name, affiliation, and (postal or electronic) address. Submissions can be of any length below 500 words (including examples), with an additional half page allowed for diagrams, tables, and references. The submissions may not contain footnotes or general acknowledgments, except acknowledgements of funding sources, which must be credited in a line following the references. Authors who wish to acknowledge language consultants are allowed but not required to do so. We will not consider abstracts.

4. Editorial policy
Submissions will be reviewed by our editorial board and review board, and review will be name-blind both ways. While we guarantee a response within 3 months of the submission deadline, we will not necessarily provide more than a yes/no response to the submitter. We allow resubmission (once) of the same piece.

This statement reproduces with minor modifications the editorial statement in Issue 1 of Snippets (January 2000), edited by Carlo Cecchetto, Caterina Donati and Orin Percus.
A problem for Maximize Presupposition! (Locally)

Amir Anvari · Institut Jean Nicod (ENS), Paris

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7358/snip-2018-033-anva

Maximize Presupposition! (MP) is a principle of language use (rooted in Heim 1991), which says that of two competing forms that are equally informative one must use the one which has a stronger presupposition, unless this presupposition is not satisfied in the particular context. This derives the oddness of (1) with the all-variant, because the assumed context supports the stronger presupposition of the both-competitor (that John has exactly two students).

(1) [Context: John has two students]
John invited {#all, both} of his students.

Either the above formulation of MP is on the wrong track or MP is not a speech-act-level principle. A convincing argument for this claim comes from an observation due to Percus (2006). In (2), all is intuitively odd in the same way as it is in (1). However, the presupposition triggered by both in (2) is filtered through the antecedent of the conditional; the both-sentence presupposes that if John has two students, then he has two students, which is tautologous. Therefore, the presupposition of the both-sentence as a whole is not stronger than its all-alternative.

(2) If John has exactly two students, he will invite {#all, both} of them.

Percus takes (2) as evidence that the standard formulation of MP is on the wrong track. His proposal is that whenever two alternatives are equally informative, the one which contains an occurrence of the presuppositionally stronger lexical item must be used. Thus in (2) the two alternatives are equally informative because neither can be true without the other being true as well; therefore, since both is a presuppositionally stronger lexical item than all, the both-sentence is preferred.

Singh (2011) takes (2) as evidence that the standard formulation of MP is on the right track except that it needs to be relativized to local contexts (Heim 1983, Schlenker 2009). The local context of the all/both-consequents in (2) is the set of possible worlds that verify the antecedent, i.e. worlds in which John has exactly two students. Relative to this context, the stronger presupposition of the both-consequent is satisfied. The all-consequent is therefore predicted to be infelicitous, as desired.

The contrast in (3) is problematic for Singh’s proposal.

(3) I am critical of {#all, both} of the two mainstream presidential candidates.

Singh seems to predict no contrast between the two sentences in (3). This is because we do not expect the DPs [both of the two candidates] and [all of the two candidates] to differ with respect to the presuppositions they trigger. [The two candidates] already presupposes that there are exactly two candidates, and the same presupposition should, by standard assumptions, be triggered by [both of the two candidates] and by [all of the two candidates]. Note that [all of the n candidates] generally inherits the presupposition triggered by [the n candidates]:

1
(4) a. Are you critical of (all of) the \( n \) mainstream candidates?
   
b. If you are critical of (all of) the \( n \) mainstream candidates, who should we vote for?
   
\[ \Rightarrow \] There are exactly \( n \) candidates.

(3), though challenging, might ultimately be surmountable by a revision of Singh’s account. One possibility, suggested by a reviewer, is to define the local context of \textit{both/all} as the context that results after processing the restrictor. The tenability of this move, however, and the details of how it can work, must be left to future discussion. Percus’s proposal, on the other hand, captures the contrast in (3) straightforwardly.

References


Amir Anvari
amiraanvari@gmail.com
Institut Jean Nicod
UMR 8129
Pavillon Jardin
École Normale Supérieure
29, rue d’Ulm
75005 Paris, France
A restriction on the distribution of exclusive *only*

Brian Buccola · Laboratoire de Sciences Cognitives et Psycholinguistique (CNRS)

The sentences in (1) license upper-bound inferences, viz. that the alternatives obtained by increasing the numeral are false.

(1)  
   a. Alice read three books.  
   b. Four people can fit in this car.  
   c. Five students gathered in the hallway.  
   d. Bob ran for six minutes.

The sentences in (2) license lower-bound inferences, viz. that the alternatives obtained by decreasing the numeral are false.

(2)  
   a. Three eggs are sufficient to bake this cake.  
   b. Five guests drank over half the beers between them.  
   c. Bob ran to the store in six minutes.

These bound inferences can be explained as routine scalar implicatures by observing that, in each case, the degree predicate \([\lambda \, n. \, \phi(n)]\) obtained by abstracting over the numeral is either downward scalar (\(\phi(n)\) entails \(\phi(n-1)\)) or upward scalar (\(\phi(n)\) entails \(\phi(n+1)\)). For instance, \([\lambda \, n. \, \text{Alice read } n \, \text{books}]\) is downward scalar, because if Alice read three books, then she also read two; thus, higher numerals are more informative than lower numerals, and so we draw upper-bound inferences (Horn 1972). Conversely, \([\lambda \, n. \, n \, \text{eggs are sufficient to bake this cake}]\) is upward scalar, because if three eggs are sufficient, then so are four (Beck and Rullmann 1999); thus, lower numerals are more informative than higher numerals, and so we draw lower-bound inferences.

As is well known, the exclusive *only* may attach to the sentences in (1) to turn the upper-bound inference into a semantic entailment, suggesting that *only* happily combines with downward-scalar numerical sentences to exclude higher-numeral alternatives.

Curiously, attaching *only* to the sentences in (2) yields an unexpected result: *only* cannot act as a lower-bounding exclusive. For example, (3a) does not have the reading ‘three and no fewer than three eggs are sufficient to bake this cake’. At most, *only* may have an evaluative construal (‘it is surprising that merely three eggs are sufficient’), and the lower bound is a routine implicature. (The evaluative construal can be accessed by reading the sentences with surprise; it is perhaps more accessible with *merely* or *just*.)

(3)  
   a. Only three_F eggs are sufficient to bake this cake.  
   b. Only five_F guests drank over half the beers between them.  
   c. Bob ran to the store in only six_F minutes.
This finding is made clearer in (4), where the sentences in (3) are embedded in downward-entailing environments. If only semantically excluded the more informative alternatives, as it is expected to, then (4a) should mean that Alice doubts that three but not two eggs are sufficient to bake the cake, that is, that Alice thinks that two eggs are sufficient. However, (4a) does not have this meaning; similar remarks hold for the other examples in (4).

(4)  
a. Alice doubts that only three\textsubscript{F} eggs are sufficient to bake this cake.  
b. Never have only five\textsubscript{F} guests drunk over half the beers between them.  
c. Bob didn’t run to the store in only six\textsubscript{F} minutes.

The generalization seems to simply be that only \( \phi(n) \) is exclusive only if \( \phi \) is downward entailing, but why should that be?

The finding is especially striking from the perspective of Fox (2007), who draws a tight connection between only and the grammatical exhaustification operator \( \text{exh} \): they have the same semantics (modulo presupposing vs. entailing its prejacent). If \( \text{exh} \) is responsible for the bound inferences in (1) and (2), then it is mysterious why only should only act as an exclusive when attaching to the former but not the latter.

References


Brian Buccola  
brian.buccola@gmail.com  
Laboratoire de Sciences Cognitives et Psycholinguistique  
École Normale Supérieure  
29 rue d’Ulm, 75005 Paris  
France
Collective predication and ellipsis

Patrick D. Elliott · Leibniz-Zentrum Allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7358/snip-2018-033-elli

Collective predicates like *meet* pose a challenge to the identity condition on ellipsis. Such predicates are typically assumed to only compose with expressions denoting pluralities, on the basis of contrasts like those in (1). This can be modeled as a presupposition, as in (2), assuming a Link (1983)-style ontology for pluralities.

(1) a. Jorge and Ivan met in the corridor.
    b. *Jorge met in the corridor.

(2) \[\text{meet}_{\text{sum}} = \left[ \lambda x \in D_e : \text{atom}(x) = 0 \right] \text{meet}'(x)\]

We claim here that the elliptical examples in (3) and (4) are grammatical, based on an informal acceptability survey of approximately ten native English speakers, and the author’s own native judgements. Admittedly, some speakers find (3) and (4) degraded in an out-of-the-blue context, but they improve considerably in a context where the ellipsis-containing clause is treated as an afterthought.

(3) [Jorge and Ivan] \(F\) met in the corridor,\[stripping\]
    and Tanya \(\Delta\) too.
    \(\Delta \neq [t \text{ met}]\)

(4) Jorge and Ivan met in the corridor,\[contrast sluicing\]
    but I don’t know which OTHER person \(\Delta\)
    \(\Delta \neq [t \text{ met}]\)

Given our assumptions concerning collective predication, the isomorphism between the ellipsis site and its antecedent would involve application of a collective predicate to a singular trace, as schematized above. (5a) and (5b) show two putative ellipsis sites which circumvent this issue.

(5) a. \ldots Tanya/which OTHER person \(\langle [\text{Jorge, Ivan and } t] \text{ met} \rangle\)
   b. \ldots Tanya/which OTHER person \(\langle \text{Jorge and Ivan met } t \rangle\)

Both of these solutions are problematic, however. First, it isn’t clear which material in (3/4) is isomorphic to the elided material in (5a/5b). Moreover, (5a) involves adding the remnant as a conjunct and extracting it. This is parallel to what Chung, Ladusaw and McCloskey (1995) describe as *sprouting*, since \{Tanya/which OTHER person\} lacks a correlate. However, this involves violating the Coordinate Structure Constraint, and Chung, Ladusaw and McCloskey show that sprouting is island-sensitive. (5b) does not run into this issue, but it involves manipulating the argument structure of the predicate, which violates Chung, Ladusaw and McCloskey’s *Fixed Diathesis* constraint (see also Barros 2014); argument structure alternations are generally not tolerated under ellipsis.
Ellipsis-specific considerations aside, the interpretation of the putative sources in (5) is simply too weak. (4) imposes a same event requirement - that is to say, it implies that there is a meeting event involving Jorge, Ivan and another person, of which the meeting event involving Jorge and Ivan is a proper part. The putative sources in (5) both have a reading according to which the meeting events are non-overlapping.

An analysis of (3) and (4) needs to meet an additional desideratum - the collective predicates which allow a singular remnant under ellipsis all fall into Winter’s (2001) class of set predicates (meet, gather, etc). Winter’s collective atom predicates, such as to be a good team, give rise to unacceptability.

(6)  
|   a. *Jorge and Ivan are a good team, and Tanya too. |
|   b. *Jorge and Ivan are a good team, but I don’t know which OTHER person. |

References


Patrick Elliott
elliott@leibniz-zas.de
Leibniz-Zentrum Allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft
Schützenstr. 18
D-10117 Berlin
Germany
QUD-addressing appositives don’t have to be clause-final

Maria Esipova · New York University

Koev (2012) claims that only clause-final, but not clause-medial appositive relative clauses can address questions under discussion (QUDs) (in all the examples below $A_N$ is a complete or partial answer to the question $Q_N$):

(1)  
   a. A: [Who did you meet at the party]$Q_1$ and [what did they bring]$Q_2$?  
   
   b. A: [What did Paula bring]$Q_1$ and [when did she leave the party]$Q_2$?  

Koev proposes that appositives can acquire at-issue status if and only if the issue raised by the main clause has been fully resolved. A similar analysis is adopted by AnderBois et al. (2013), who propose that a clause-final appositive can raise an issue on its own, forcing an immediate acceptance of the preceding issue.

I observe that Koev’s generalization as is doesn’t hold in structured coordinated responses:

(2)  
   Context: B just watched a debate between two opponents, after which the audience voted on who was more convincing.

   A: [Who were the opponents]$Q_1$ and [how many votes did they get]$Q_2$?  
   B: [The opponents were Uma, [who got 100 votes]$A_1$, and Zoe]$A_2$, [who got 80]$A_2$.

(3)  
   Context: B is a priest and just married a couple.

   A: [Who did you just marry]$Q_1$ and [what were they wearing]$Q_2$?  
   B: [I married Uma, [who was wearing a white dress]$A_1$, and Zoe]$A_1$, [who was wearing a black tux]$A_2$.

The native speakers of English that I consulted all agreed that in both (2) and (3) B’s response is an appropriate and complete response to both A’s questions.

However, (2) and (3) contain only one main clause each and can’t be treated as instances of full clause coordination with ellipsis in the second clause. In (2) we see both morphosyntactic evidence for that (plural agreement on the copula), as well as semantic evidence, since neither Uma nor Zoe can be described as the opponents individually; it is their mereological sum only that satisfies the description. Similarly, in (3) the theme of the predicate *married* is the sum of Uma and Zoe, not either of them individually. Yet, in both cases the single main clause is interrupted by an appositive partial answer to the second QUD.

Of course, $A_1$ in both cases could be conceptualized as two separate partial answers to $Q_1$. In (2), those answers would be, roughly, of the form ‘Uma (Zoe) is an atom of the sum denoted by the opponents’, and in (3) they would be, roughly, of the form ‘Uma (Zoe) is an atom of the theme of married’, but the syntax-semantics mapping would then become quite non-trivial.
To sum up, data such as (2) and (3) urge us to revisit our ideas about when appositives can address QUDs, on the one hand, and encourage us to think about how speakers structure their responses to multiple QUDs, on the other.

References


Maria Esipova
masha.esipova@nyu.edu
Department of Linguistics
New York University
10 Washington Place
New York, NY 10003
USA
Dative adjuncts are not interveners in Tamil tough-movement

Naga Selvanathan · National University of Singapore

From Hartman 2011, Bruening 2014, and Keine & Poole 2017, the following putative generalization emerges: an adjunct cannot occur between the matrix predicate and the infinitival clause in tough movement (TM). The two positions that are most relevant to the discussion are shown below.

(1) a. It is (to me)₁ important (to me)₂ to avoid cholesterol.
   b. Cholesterol is (to me)₁ important (*to me)₂ to avoid.

While Bruening (2014) suggests that this shows a restriction on the position of the infinitival clause, Hartman (2011) proposes that this is an intervention effect even though English experiencer PPs do not otherwise show intervention effects. Whatever the correct analysis of (1) proves to be, it must take into account the observation put forward here, that the effect in (1b) is not found in all languages with TM. This will be illustrated for TM in Tamil.

First, note that Tamil TM has A/A'-properties, similar to English (Postal 1971).

(2) a. .bufā:no adikr (somu-ve kattaayepadutta)] solābomaa iru-nd-icc
   Balan-ACC beat.INF Somu-ACC convince easy be-PST-3S.NEUT
   ‘It was easy (to convince Somu) to beat Balan.’
   b. .bufā:i [__, adikr (somu-ve kattaayepadutta)] solābomaa
   Balan-NOM beat-INF Somu-ACC convince easy
   iru-nd-ā be-PST-3S.MASC

(2a) shows an expletive construction like (1a). The embedded object (underlined) has accusative case and the matrix verb shows default neuter agreement. (2b), the TM variant, shows ‘Balan’ with nominative case, triggering matrix verb agreement, typical of clause subjects. The fact that ‘Balan-NOM’ crosses the argument ‘Somu-ACC’, and triggers agreement with the matrix verb, shows that Tamil TM is like English TM in having A/A'-properties.

Now consider dative experiencer placement, starting with an expletive construction.

(3) [bufā:no adikr (ṇēkkui)₂ solābomaa (ṇēkkui)₁] iru-nd-icc
   Balan-ACC beat.INF PRN.1st.DAT easy be-PST-3S.NEUT
   ‘It was easy (for me) to beat Balan.’

Since Tamil is head-final, then by hypothesis, positions 1 and 2 in (3) occur in reverse linear order to English, but in comparable structural positions. Crucially, the experiencer cannot be analyzed as an embedded subject and must be a matrix-level adjunct (as it is in English according to Hartman and Bruening); as (4a) shows, the subject of adi ‘beat’ takes nominative marking, not dative, and as (4b) shows, embedded subjects cannot occur after the embedded verb, unlike in (3).
(4) a. [naan ba:l-ə-ṇo adikr] solɔbɔmɑa یرυ-nd-çci
   PRN.1.NOM Balan-ACC beat.INF easy be-PST-3S.NEUT
   ‘It was easy for me to beat Balan.’

b. *[__, ba:l-ə-ṇo adikr] naan, solɔbɔmɑa یرυ-nd-çci
  Balan-ACC beat.INF PRN.1.NOM easy be-PST-3S.NEUT

(5) shows TM.

(5) ba:lɛi [[__ i adikr] (ɛŋakkum)2 solɔbɔmɑa (ɛŋakkum)1 ] یرυ-nd-ː;
  Balan-NOM beat.INF PRN.1st.DAT easy be-PST-3S.MASC
  ‘Balan was easy (for me) to beat.’

In this structure, ‘Balan’ is in the highest [Spec,TP]. Position 1 is between the matrix copula and the matrix predicate solɔbɔmɑa ‘easy’, and like in English it is not expected to cause ungrammaticality. However, unlike in English, the experiencer is also acceptable in position 2. Assuming that English and Tamil TM have similar (albeit reversed) structures, position 2 should still lead to the kind of effect we see in (1b).

In sum, the generalization regarding adjuncts does not hold cross-linguistically, and thus any complete theory of TM must account for the cross-linguistic contrast between (1b) and (5). What remains to be seen is to what extent the proposals cited above are able to account for this contrast.

References


Keine, Stefan and Ethan Poole. 2017. Intervention in tough-constructions revisited. Ms.


Naga Selvanathan
ellns@nus.edu.sg
Department of English Language and Literature
National University of Singapore
Block AS5, 7 Arts Link
Singapore 117570
Quantifiers and the derivation of fragments

Gary Thoms · University of Glasgow

Merchant (2004) argues that fragment answers are derived from full clauses by movement of the focused answer constituent plus TP-deletion. Ott and Struckmeier (2018) have argued against the movement component of his analysis and in favor of an alternative where the answer stays in situ and the clause is removed by non-constituent deletion. Weir (2014) defends a similar position, rejecting Merchant’s proposal that fragments are moved in the syntax. Merchant’s “move-and-delete” analysis is in (1B), and the non-constituent deletion analysis of Ott and Struckmeier is given in (1B’).

(1) A: What did you buy yesterday?
   B: [DP A goat], [TP I bought it yesterday]
   B’: [I bought [DP A goat] yesterday]

Some arguments in favor of the in-situ analysis come from examples where acceptable fragment answers correspond to constituents that are not normally amenable to movement. One case which Weir discusses is that of bare quantifiers like everyone: these cannot be clefted or topicalized, but they can be fragments, and so Weir concludes that this is problematic if the movement involved in fragments is syntactic. (See also van Craenenbroeck and den Dikken 2006 for an argument from NPI fragments.)

(2) A: Who did they invite?
   B: Everyone.

(3) a. ??Everyone, John invited.
   b. *It was everyone that John invited.

This snippet shows related data, involving negative quantifier fragments, that seem to support the move-and-delete analysis. The data consist of cases where a high position for the scope of negation is distinguishable from a low one. In (4), the fragment answer responses have readings where negation scopes over an intensional verb, while the unreduced answer sentences lack this interpretation.

(4) A: What do you regret telling John to buy?
   B: Nothing.
   B’: I regret telling him to buy nothing.

Thus (4B) has the reading “I don’t regret telling John to buy anything,” where negation scopes over regret, but (4B’) lacks this interpretation; thus, (4B) is compatible with a situation where A has no regrets over what she told John to buy, while (4B’) would not be, as she regrets telling him
to abstain from buying stuff. Similar results obtain in similar sentences with *require, refuse* and other such verbs.

These results follow from Merchant’s analysis, since the negative quantifiers are moved to a high position where they may take wide scope over the embedding predicates, but they do not follow from the in-situ analyses, which predict that the fragments should have the same scope readings as their unreduced counterparts. Crucially, NegDPs are just as resistant to topicalization and clefting as universal quantifiers (*it was nothing that John ate*), so if proponents of in-situ deletion were to contend that at least some examples are derived by move-and-delete (such as (4)), then the instances of failed fronting in (3) would lose their value as arguments against the move-and-delete account of (2).

**References**


Gary Thoms
gary.thoms@gmail.com
12 University Gardens
School of Critical Studies
University of Glasgow
Glasgow, United Kingdom
G12 8QH
Müller (2017) argues that, whereas Merge builds structure, a mirror-image operation Remove removes structure. This squib provides more evidence for Remove, arguing that it explains an otherwise puzzling nominal-preposing paradigm.

Remove is feature-driven and highly local, being subject to (1):

(1) **Strict Cycle Condition (SCC)** (ibid:4)
Within the current XP $\alpha$, a syntactic operation may not exclusively target some item $\delta$ in the domain of another XP $\beta$ if $\beta$ is in the domain of $\alpha$.

(2) The **domain** of a head $X$ is the set of nodes dominated by XP that are distinct from and do not contain $X$.

A head’s Remove-feature can target a maximal projection ($[-Y_{2}^{-}]$) or a head ($[-Y_{0}^{-}]$). In the former case, the entire YP is removed ((3)). In the latter case, the head $Y$ and its “shell” are removed, and its dependents reattached to the main tree ((4)).

\[(3) \quad \text{XP} \quad \Rightarrow \quad X \quad \text{YP} \quad \text{[–}Y_{2}\text{–}] \]
\[(4) \quad \text{XP} \quad \Rightarrow \quad \text{XP} \quad \text{YP} \quad \text{ZP} \quad \text{[–}Y_{0}\text{–}] \]

The Remove hypothesis predicts that a head should be able to attract an XP and remove its XP shell. This is correct. When *though* attracts a predicate nominal headed by $a$, the $a$ must disappear for many speakers, myself included (Levine 2001:152; cf. Ross 2000):

\[(5) \quad \text{Though she is a good doctor . . .} \]
\[(6) \quad (?)A \quad \text{good doctor though she is . . .} \]

On the Remove hypothesis, this is straightforward to explain. Assume that $a$, the nominal’s head, is a Numeral (Perlmutter 1970, though cf. Yasui 1975). *Though* optionally (i.e. in (6), but not (5)) bears a Numeral-probe with an EPP-subfeature ([*Nmrl*]$_{EPP}$). In (6), it probes, finds the $a$-nominal (satisfying [*Nmrl*]), and attracts it (satisfying the EPP-subfeature). This version of *though* also bears a Remove-feature [–Nmrl$_{0}$–], as a lexical idiosyncrasy (on which more below). It therefore removes $a$ (and the NmrlP shell):
This analysis makes several predictions.

First, when the though lacking \([\ast \text{Nmrl}\ast]^{\text{EPP}}\) is chosen (so the \(a\)-nominal does not move), though should be unable to remove \(a\) long-distance—because Remove obeys the SCC ((1)), preventing long-distance Remove. This is correct:

(8) **Though she is good doctor . . .

Secondly, recall that the cooccurrence of \([\neg \text{Nmrl}_0\neg]\) and \([\ast \text{Nmrl}\ast]^{\text{EPP}}\) on (one version of) though is a lexical idiosyncrasy. Nothing in the theory forces the though-bearing \([\ast \text{Nmrl}\ast]^{\text{EPP}}\) to also bear \([\neg \text{Nmrl}_0\neg]\). Therefore, it is possible for there to be grammars in which a version of though bears \([\ast \text{Nmrl}\ast]^{\text{EPP}}\) but not \([\neg \text{Nmrl}_0\neg]\), so an \(a\)-nominal can prepose around though and retain its \(a\). There are indeed: for Postal (1998:29), (9) is acceptable.

(9) %A good doctor though she was . . .

Thirdly, if indeed the Remove-feature is \([\neg \text{Nmrl}_0\neg]\), it should not remove the (a D). This is correct. For a reviewer, certain the-nominals can prepose around though, but the the must remain:

(10) %The best doctor though she might be . . .

Remove, then, makes possible an explanation of the otherwise strange phenomenon of \(a\)-deletion, its strictly local nature, and the idiolectal variation it displays.
References


This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship Program under Grant No. DGE-1339067. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation.

Erik Zyman
ezyman@uchicago.edu
Department of Linguistics
University of Chicago
1115 E. 58th Street
Rosenwald Hall, Room #224
Chicago, IL 60637
USA