# snippets

# **Issue 9**

# September 2004

#### Contents

- 1. Daniel Altshuler. Relative head surgery
- 2. Bridget Copley. So-called epistemic should
- 3. Bill Haddican. Affirmation and weak islands
- 4. Uli Sauerland. "A team", definitely
- 5. Benjamin Spector. Indefinites in subject position are positive polarity items
- 6. Hidekazu Tanaka. Not so tough: a response to Harley
- 7. Tohru Uchiumi. A peculiar restriction on the long-distance "anaphor" zibun in Japanese
- 8. Roberto Zamparelli. Every two days



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#### **EDITORIAL STATEMENT**

#### 1. Purpose.

The aim of *Snippets* is to publish specific remarks that motivate research or that make theoretical points germane to current work. The ideal contribution is the ideal footnote: a side remark that taken on its own is not worth lengthy development but that needs to be said. One encounters many short comments of this kind in the literature of the seventies. We feel that there no longer is a forum for them. We want *Snippets* to help fill that gap.

#### 2. Content.

We will publish notes that contribute to the study of syntax and semantics in generative grammar. The notes are to be brief, self-contained and explicit. They may do any of the following things:

- point out an empirical phenomenon that goes against accepted generalizations or that shows that some aspect of a theory is problematic;
- point out unnoticed minimal pairs that fall outside the scope of any existing theory;
- point out an empirical phenomenon that confirms the predictions of a theory in an area where the theory has not been tested;
- explicitly describe technical inconsistencies in a theory or in a set of frequently adopted assumptions;
- explicitly describe unnoticed assumptions that underlie a theory or assumptions that a theory needs to be supplemented with in order to make desired predictions;
- call attention to little-known or forgotten literature in which issues of immediate relevance are discussed.

We also encourage submissions that connect psycholinguistic data to theoretical issues. A proposal for a pilot experiment in language acquisition or language processing could make for an excellent snippet.

The earliest Linguistic Inquiry squibs exemplify the kind of note we would like to publish. Some of them posed unobserved puzzles. For instance, a squib by Postal and Ross in LI 1:1 ("A Problem of Adverb Preposing") noted that whether or not we can construe a sentenceinitial temporal adverb with an embedded verb depends on the tense of the matrix verb. A squib by Perlmutter and Ross in LI 1:3 ("Relative Clauses with Split Antecedents"), challenging the prevailing analyses of coordination and extraposition, noted that conjoined clauses neither of which contain a plural noun phrase can appear next to an "extraposed" relative that can only describe groups. Other squibs drew attention to particular theoretical assumptions. For instance, a squib by Bresnan in LI 1:2 ("A Grammatical Fiction") outlined an alternative account of the derivation of sentences containing believe and force, and asked whether there were principled reasons for dismissing any of the underlying assumptions (among them that semantic interpretation is sensitive to details of a syntactic derivation). A squib by Zwicky in LI 1:2 ("Class Complements in Phonology") asked to what extent phonological rules refer to complements of classes. None of these squibs was more than a couple of paragraphs; all of them limited themselves to a precise question or observation.

#### 3. Submission details.

*Snippets* is an electronic journal. We will solicit submissions twice a year: the submission deadlines are April 1 and October 1. The submissions that we accept will be posted on the journal website approximately 3 months after each deadline, and all accepted submissions will remain permanently on the website.

*Snippets* is intended as a service to the linguistics community. Consequently, authors are advised that, when they submit to *Snippets*, we understand them as allowing their submission to be reproduced if published. At the same time, the rights for the notes themselves will remain with the authors. As a result, citation of *Snippets* material will have to indicate the author's name and the specific source of the material.

We will accept electronic submissions at the address <u>snippets@unimi.it</u>. Electronic submissions may take the form of (a) the text of an e-mail message, or (b) an attached file. The attached file should be a simple text file, a Word file (Mac or Windows), or a Rich Text Format (RTF) file. All submissions must state the name and affiliation of the author(s), and a (postal or electronic) return address.

Submissions are to be a maximum of 500 words (including examples), with an additional half page allowed for diagrams, tables and references. Given that we envision the submissions themselves as footnotes, the submissions may not contain footnotes of their own. The ideal submission is one paragraph; a submission of five lines is perfectly acceptable. We will not consider abstracts.

#### 4. Editorial policy.

Submissions will be reviewed by our editorial board, and review will be name-blind both ways. While we guarantee a response within 3 months of the submission deadline, we will only provide a yes/no response to the submitter. We will not request revisions (barring exceptional cases). We allow resubmission (once) of the same piece.

# **Daniel Altshuler** - *Rutgers University Relative head surgery*

1.

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It is generally held in the literature that Present tense in Russian relative clauses is like its English (and unlike its Japanese) counterpart insofar as it only provides indexical readings when the matrix is Past. In this snippet, I point out a fact that has not received attention: temporal interpretive possibilities vary with a restrictive/non restrictive meaning of the Russian relative clause. Along with the indexical reading, the relative Present in Russian provides simultaneous readings when embedded under Past.

Excluding the habitual reading of the embedded predicate in (1), Kondrashova (1998), Kusumoto (1999), Schlenker (2003) and many others hold that the indexical reading is the only one available in such constructions. In other words, the relative Present is only evaluated relative to the utterance time (i.e. the "now" of the speaker) and not the matrix tense. What these authors fail to consider, however, is that the temporal interpretive possibilities in constructions like (1) are affected by the restrictive/non-restrictive meaning of the relative clause.

 Ja zametil rebenka (,) kotoryj sidit na skamejke. I notice-past child who sit-present on bench "I noticed a child who is/was sitting on the bench."

Yokoyama (2001) argues that the restrictive or nonrestrictive meaning of a relative clause in Russian is correlated with the intonation of the matrix clause. For example, if the contour on the head of the relative clause in (1) is falling, then the relative clause has a non-restrictive interpretation; (1) can be paraphrased as: *At some point in the past, I noticed a child who is (now) sitting on the bench.* This is the aforementioned indexical reading and its availability is not surprising: when one assumes in the spirit of Emonds (1979) that the non-restrictive relative clause is scoped out such that the embedded Present is outside the c-command domain of the matrix PAST, then the indexical reading is expected given Stowell (1995) and other accounts of embedded tense, e.g. Ogihara (1995).

If the contour on the head of the relative clause in (1) is rising, then the relative clause has a restrictive interpretation; (1) can be paraphrased as: *At some point in the past, I noticed a child who was sitting on the bench (at the time of my noticing him/her)*. This is a simultaneous reading. When one assumes that the restrictive relative clause remains *in situ* such that the embedded Present is within the c-command domain of the matrix PAST, then the simultaneous reading is expected

on the aforementioned accounts of embedded tense.

Consider also (2). Here the head of the relative clause is the quantifier phrase "vsex detej". This construal forces a restrictive meaning of the relative clause and, as expected, (2) can be paraphrased as: *At some point in the past, I no-ticed all the children who were sitting on the bench (at the time of my noticing them).* This is a simultaneous reading and its availability is not surprising given the rough syntactic explanation for (1).

(2)	Ja	zametil	vsex	detej	kotorye	sidjat	na skamejke.
	Ιı	notice-past	all	children	who	sit-present	on bench
	"I noticed all the children who were sitting on the bench."						

I conclude that the relative Present in Russian is unlike its English (and like its Japanese) counterpart insofar as it provides both indexical and simultaneous readings when embedded under Past.

#### **Reference**

- Emonds, Joseph (1979) "Appositive Relatives Have No Properties", *Linguistic Inquiry* 10, 211-243.
- Kondrashova, Natalia (1998) "Embedded Tenses in English and Russian", ms., Cornell University.
- Kusumoto, Kiyomi (1999) Tense in Embedded Contexts, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Massachusetts.
- Ogihara, Toshiyuki (1995) "The Semantics of Tense in Embedded Clauses", *Linguistic Inquiry* 26, 663-679.

Schlenker, Philippe (2003) "A Plea for Monsters", Linguistics and Philosophy 26: 29-120.

Stowell, Tim (1995) "What do the present and past tenses mean?", in P. Bertinetto, V. Bianchi, J. Higginbotham, and M. Squartini, eds., *Temporal Reference, Aspect, and Actionality, Vol. 1: Semantic and Syntactic Perspectives, Rosenberg and Sellier*, Torino, 381-396.

Yokoyama, Olga (2001) "Neutral and Non-Neutral Intonation in Russian: A Reinterpretation of the IK System", *Die Welt der Slaven* XLVI, 1-26.

# **Bridget Copley -** University of Southern California So-called epistemic should

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The so-called epistemic reading of *should* has traditionally (Horn, 1989) been treated as less-than-universal quantification over the speaker's epistemically accessible worlds. As shown in (1), it is weaker than epistemic *must*, which is taken to universally quantify over those worlds. While the continuation in (1a) is unacceptably redundant, the continuation in (1b) provides additional information. (Deontic readings of *should* are ignored throughout.)

- (1) a. #Xander must be there, in fact, he should be.
  - b. Xander should be there, in fact, he must be.

(1) is consistent with an analysis in which *must* and *should* both quantify over epistemically possible worlds, but *should* quantifies over fewer of them. However, the contrast in (2) seems to point away from an epistemic analysis of "epistemic" *should*. For if an utterance of *should* p really does assert p to be true on most of the speaker's epistemically accessible worlds, (2b) ought to be as contradictory as (2a). Yet it is not.

- (2) a. # Max must be there, but I have absolutely no idea whether he is.
  - b. Max should be there, but I have absolutely no idea whether he is.

(2b) seems instead to mean that if things proceed as they are supposed to, Max is there. So rather than quantifiying over epistemic possible worlds, *should* apparently quantifies over inertially possible worlds (in the sense of Dowty, 1979). This idea might be modeled with an ordering source that picks out the best possible continuation worlds, i.e., those in which things proceed normally. The assertion is then that on those worlds, p.

On this story, an explanation for the contrast in (1) would depend on the set of inertia worlds being smaller than the set of epistemically accessible worlds. There is no reason for this to generally be so. However, another contrast, between *should* and *will*, suggests a different solution to the problem. *Will* also quantifies over inertial worlds; it also asserts that on all those worlds, p, but in addition presupposes that the actual future continuation is an inertial one (Copley, 2002) with respect to p. Note that *will* is also stronger than *should*:

(3) a. # Zoe will win, in fact, she should win.

b. Zoe should win, in fact, she will win.

Unlike *will, should* apparently does not commit the speaker to the belief that the actual future continuation will be an inertial one. Instead, the speaker merely has an expectation that the actual future will be an inertial one. There might be a presupposition to this effect, or alternatively, the expectation might stem from a restriction to inertially well-behaved continuations, without assuming that the actual future is well-behaved. Either way, the weakness of *should* is in a presupposition or restriction rather than in the assertion. But this introduces enough weakness into the meaning of *should* to explain the contrast in (3), and plausibly also the contrast in (1).

#### **Reference**

- Copley, Bridget (2002) *The Semantics of the Future*, Ph.D dissertation, MIT. (To be published by Routledge, Outstanding Dissertations in Linguistics series).
- Dowty, David (1979) Word Meaning and Montague Grammar: The Semantics of Verbs and Times in Generative Semantics and in Montague's PTQ, Reidel, Dordrecht.
- Horn, Laurence (1989) A Natural History of Negation (2nd edition), University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

# **Bill Haddican -** New York University *Affirmation and weak islands*

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3.

Several authors have proposed like analyses of negation and emphatic affirmation in English (Chomsky 1957, Laka 1990). These proposals are motivated in part by the fact that both environments trigger *do*-support.

- (1) Martin doesn't love pasta.
- (2) Martin DOES (too/so) love pasta.

Whatever the nature of do-support in sentences such as (1) and (2), it bears noting that emphatic affirmatives of this type behave differently from negation as weak island (WI) inducers. In particular, emphatic affirmative do fails to induce WIs of the kind in (3) and (4).

- (3) a. Why don't you think that Ingrid fixed the car. \*downstairs interpretation of *why*.
  - b. Why DO you think that Ingrid fixed the car.  $\sqrt{downstairs interpretation of why}$ .
- (4) a. Someone doesn't love everyone.  $*\forall > \exists$ 
  - b. Someone DOES love everyone.  $\sqrt{\forall > \exists}$
  - c. Someone does TOO/SO love everyone.  $\sqrt{\forall > \exists}$

From the perspective of Relativized Minimality (RM) (Rizzi 1990), these facts are somewhat surprising, since there is no obvious reason why a negative operator in  $\Sigma P/PolP$  - but not an affirmative operator - should block raising.

At the same time, Williams (1974) observes that emphasis ameliorates WI effects as in (5) and (6). (I am not aware of any explanation for this fact in the literature.)

- (5) \* I asked how John didn't behave.
- (6) I asked how John did NOT behave.

In view of this, it might be objected that affirmation itself does induce WI's

Snippets - Issue 9 - September 2004 http://www.ledonline/snippets/

- just like negation - and that it is rather the emphatic nature of (3b) and (4b,c) that rescues these examples. Crucially, however, emphasis does little to rescue the negative examples with *why* and *everyone*, in (3a) and (4a).

- (3a') Why DON'T you think that Ingrid fixed the car. \*/?downstairs interpretation of *why*.
- (4a.') Someone DOESN'T love everyone. \*/? $\forall > \exists$

Hence, from the perspective of Relativized Minimality, and assuming a single position for affirmation and negation, a difference between negative *do* and emphatic affirmative *do* as WI inducers, remains to be explained.

#### References

Chomsky, N. (1957) Syntactic Structures, Mouton, The Hague.
Laka, I. (1990) Negation in Syntax: On the Nature of Functional Categories and Projections, MITWPL, Cambridge, Mass.
Rizzi, L. (1990) Relativized Minimality, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Williams, E. (1974) Rule Ordering in Syntax, doctoral dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

# **Uli Sauerland -** *ZAS, Berlin "A team," definitely*

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4.

One well-known quirk of the British is their tolerance of verbal plural agreement with singular nouns referring to groups of people like *committee* and *team*. For example, British speakers find (1) acceptable.

(1) A Northern team are arriving.

Elbourne (1999) and Sauerland and Elbourne (2001) discuss the fact that plural agreement interacts with total reconstruction of the subject. Consider the examples in (1): (1a) with singular verbal agreement allows the subject to take scope below or above *likely*. (1b), however, only allows the subject to take scope above *likely*.

- (2) a. A Northern team is likely to be in the final. (a >> likely, likely >> a)
  - b. A Northern team are likely to be in the final. (a >> likely, \*likely >> a) (Sauerland and Elbourne 2002: (14))

In this note, I argue that *a Northern team* when triggering plural agreement must in fact be part of a hidden definite. The impossibility of reconstruction then follows if reconstruction of definites is blocked in general, as can arguably be deduced from Fox's (2000) scope economy.

Consider what operations lead to the licensing of plural morphology on the verb in (1). Link (1991) introduces an ontology of singular and plural individuals. Groups like *a team* are represented as atomic individuals. The members of a team are represented as a distinct entity which is a plurality. Link furthermore assumes that there is an injective function  $\Gamma$  mapping a plurality x to the group whose members are x. The inverse function,  $\Gamma^{-1}$ , maps a group to the plurality of its members.  $\Gamma^{-1}$ , hence, maps a singular entity to a plural one. I propose that British English allows the structure in (3) where  $\Gamma^{-1}$  takes *a Northern team* as its argument.

(3) ([Pl]  $\Gamma^{-1}$  ([Sg] a Northern team))

I assume the presuppositional semantics of number of Sauerland (2003). [Sg] presupposes that its complement refer to an atom, [Pl] presupposes that its complement refer to a plurality. The [Sg] feature is licensed above *a Northern team* because *a Northern team* is restricted to group-atoms. (More precisely, once *a Northern team* QRs, the [Sg] feature will combine with its trace, a variable, and be

Snippets - Issue 9 – September 2004 http://www.ledonline/snippets/

licensed there.) To license [P1],  $\Gamma^{-1}$  must apply mapping the group-atom to a plurality. The verb must agree with the higher [P1] feature, while the noun agrees with the lower [Sg] feature.

In example (2b) the subject must have structure (3) as well to license plural verbal agreement. But then reconstruction is expected to be impossible if the reconstruction of definites is impossible:  $\Gamma^{-1}$  is a definite of the semantic type <e,e> pre-supposing the existence of a set of members of the team. (4) shows that  $\Gamma^{-1}$  is blocked in the *there*-existential construction.

(4) \*There were a committee holding a meeting in here. (Sauerland and Elbourne 2001: (26d))

The analysis proposed here is simpler than Sauerland and Elbourne's proposal for (2), which relies on PF-movement and several assumptions about feature checking. While Sauerland and Elbourne present two further arguments in favor of PF-movement that are not affected by the point raised in this snippet, the assumptions about feature checking they introduce to account for (2) become unnecessary if the account of (2) in this snippet is adopted.

#### References

- Elbourne, Paul (1999) "Some correlations between semantic plurality and quantifier scope," in P. Tamanji et al. eds, *Proceedings of NELS 29*, GLSA, Amherst, Mass, 81-92.
- Fox, Danny (2000) *Economy and Semantic Interpretation*, MIT Pres/ MITWPL, Cambridge, Mass.
- Link, Godehard (1991) "Plural," in A. von Stechow and D. Wunderlich eds, *Semantik: Ein internationales Handbuch der zeitgenössischen Forschung*, De Gruyter, Berlin, 418-440.
- Sauerland, Uli (2003) "A new semantics of number," in *Proceedings of SALT 13*, CLC Publications (Cornell University), Ithaca.
- Sauerland, Uli and Paul Elbourne (2002) "Total reconstruction, PF-movement, and derivational order," *Linguistic Inquiry* 33, 283-319.

# **Benjamin Spector -** *(Univ. de Paris 7/ Ecole Normale Supérieure)* Indefinites in subject position are positive polarity items

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5.

Indefinites in subject position generally take scope over negation :

- (1) Three students didn't come to Peter's class
  (a) available reading : there are three students who didn't come
  (b) unavailable reading : it is false that three students came
- (2) Many students didn't come to Peter's class
  (a) available : there are many students who didn't come
  (b) unavailable : it is false that many students came

(Some speakers find the "unavailable" readings above to be merely dispreferred. This is the case for all "unavailable" readings cited in this snippet.)

Consider however the following examples :

- (3) If three students had not come to Peter's class, it would have been a failure
- (4) If many students had not come to Peter's class, it would have been a failure

(3) and (4) both have a reading (given in (5) and (6)) where negation takes scope over the subject:

- (5) If it had not been the case that three students came to Peter's class, it would have been a failure.
- (6) If it had not been the case that many students came to Peter's class, it would have been a failure.

In fact, at least some indefinites obey the following generalization: in nondecreasing contexts, they must take scope over negation when they occur in subject position, while in decreasing contexts, they can take scope either above or below negation. In order to substantiate this claim, let me also mention the following twosentence example:

(7) Peter will be surprised if many people don't go to the demonstration. Even though he thinks that there are a lot of people who won't go to the demonstration, he also believes that many others will.

(7) is a coherent discourse, and it can be so only if *many people*, in the first sentence, takes scope below negation.

This behaviour is reminiscent of that of positive polarity items (PPIs): PPIs must scope over negation in simple negative sentences, but can take scope below negation when the negation itself occurs in an NPI-licensing, i.e. downward-entailing, context (Szabolcsi 2004):

- (8) John hasn't read some books
   √ some books >> Negation
   \* Negation >> Some books
- (9) If John had not read some books, he would be ignorant possible reading: Negation >> Some books

Yet *many students* or *three students* are not PPIs in the usual sense, since, in object position, they can take scope below negation with no restriction.

*Therefore there appear to exist indefinites that are PPIs in subject position only.* While this fact is quite mysterious, it suggests that

a) there is no syntactic constraint that forces indefinite subjects to occur higher than negation at LF (otherwise indefinite subjects would *always* take scope over negation, even in decreasing contexts), and

b) polarity sensitivity, and more specifically PPI-like behaviour, cannot always be explained only in terms of the lexical properties of the sensitive item, since no subject-object asymmetry is expected on such grounds.

#### **Reference**

Szabolcsi, A. (2004) "Positive polarity-negative polarity", *Natural Language and Linguistic Theory 22:2.* 

## 6.

# Hidekazu Tanaka - University of York Not so tough: a response to Harley

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In Snippets 2, Heidi Harley points out the grammaticality of (1).

(1) [ How tough to please ] is the tenure committee?

Based on this sentence, she argues against the *tough*-movement (NP-movement) analysis of "*the tenure committee is tough to please*" type constructions. Her reasoning is that if *tough*-constructions involved raising, (1) should be ungrammatical, since raising a phrase containing a trace in it out of the c-command domain of the trace's antecedent results in ungrammaticality due to Proper Binding Condition, as noted by Lasnik and Saito (1992).

- (2) a. \*[ How likely *t* to be a riot ] is there?
  - b. \*[How likely *t* to be taken of John ] is advantage?

Since this prediction is not borne out, Harley argues, the preposed phrase in (1) cannot contain a trace of NP-movement. As a matter of fact, if her reasoning is on the right track, (1) also poses a problem for Chomsky's (1977) *wh*-movement analysis of *tough*-constructions, as long as traces of *wh*-movement must be bound. In this snippet, I show that the grammaticality of (1) does not point to her conclusion.

Note that *tough*-adjectives can take a beneficial phrase, headed by *for*, as in (3a), or can have unbounded dependency, as in (3b). (There is some variation with respect to the judgments on these sentences.)

- (3) a. The tenure committee is tough for all the assistant professors to please.
  - b. The tenure committee is tough to persuade all the assistant professors to please.

Note that these types of sentences do not allow the relevant portion to be preposed.

- (4) a. \*[ How tough for all the assistant professors to please t ] is the tenure committee?
  - b. \*[ How tough to persuade all the assistant professors to please t ] is the tenure committee?

The ungrammaticality of these examples contradicts Harley's claim: (4) in fact should be grouped with (2). It thus seems reasonable to suppose that *tough*-

constructions involve movement (either NP-movement or wh-movement).

The problem then is why (1) is grammatical. It is true that, as Harley argues, if (1) had a trace in the preposed phrase, the example should be ungrammatical, on par with (2) and (4). I would like to suggest that sentences like *the tenure committee is tough to please* are derivationally ambiguous, but (3) is not. In particular, *tough-to-please* seems to form an adjective, as evidenced by the fact that it can appear prenominally.

(5) a [ tough to please ] tenure committee

In English, prenominal adjectives cannot have a complement.

(6) \* a [ good at syntax ] student (cf. a student [ good at syntax ])

This suggests that *tough-to-please* in (5) behaves like a bare adjective without a complement in syntax. Perhaps it is stored as an adjective in the lexicon. This would give us a principled reason why (1) does not have a trace: it is not a *tough*-constructions in the same way as (3).

The *tough*-phrases in (3) cannot be bare adjectives due to the presence of the beneficial *for* phrase or long-distance dependency: these examples necessarily involve a trace, resulting in violation of the PBC in (4). For this reason, they cannot be prenominal modifiers. (7) is ungrammatical.

(7) \* a [ tough for the assistant professor to please ] tenure committee

\* a [ tough to persuade the assistant professor to please ] tenure committee

To summarize, I have shown that Harley's sentence in (1) should be treated separately from typical cases of *tough*-constructions in (3).

#### **References**

Chomsky, N. (1977) "On wh-movement," in P. Culicover, T. Wasow, and A. Akmajian eds, *Formal Syntax*, Academic Press, New York. Harley, H. (2000) "Tough-movement is even tougher than we thought," *Snippets* 2, 11-12. Lasnik, H. and M. Saito (1992) *Move-alpha: Conditions on its Application and Output*, Current Studies in Linguistics 22, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.

## 7.

# **Tohru Uchiumi** - *McGill University A peculiar restriction on the long-distance "anaphor"* zibun *in Japanese*

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It has been observed that the Japanese "anaphor" *zibun* 'self', as opposed to other anaphors like *kare-zisin* 'him-self' and *zibun-zisin* 'self-self', allows a long distance antecedent with relative freedom as in (1).

- (1) a. Masao<sub>i</sub>-wa [Mai-ga zibun<sub>i</sub>/\*kare-zisin<sub>i</sub>/\*zibun-zisin<sub>i</sub>-o yobidasi-ta-to] Masao<sub>i</sub>-TOP [Mai-NOM self<sub>i</sub>/ \*him-self<sub>i</sub>/\*self-self<sub>i</sub>-ACC page-PERF-COMP] omot-ta. think-PERF 'Masao<sub>i</sub> thought that Mai had paged him<sub>i</sub>.'
  b. Sano<sub>i</sub>-san-wa [kazoku-ga [zibun<sub>i</sub>/\*kare-zisin<sub>i</sub>/\*zibun-zisin<sub>i</sub>-ga
  - Sano<sub>i</sub>-TOP [family-NOM [self<sub>i</sub>/\*him-self<sub>i</sub>/\*self-self<sub>i</sub>-NOM

mada dokoka-de iki-te-iru-to] sinzi-te-iru-to] omot-ta. still somewhere-at live-PRT-PROG-COMP] believe-PRT-PROG] think-PERF

'Mr. Sano<sub>i</sub> thought that his family believed that he<sub>i</sub> was still alive somewhere.'

However, when *zibun* is in the subject position of a finite clause, there appears to be a peculiar restriction on its long-distance use. Namely, the verb of the clause containing *zibun* cannot be a copula as shown in (2). As can be seen in (2b), this restriction is valid even if the copula is phonologically null.

(2)	a.	*Tomomi <sub>i</sub> -wa [otoko-tati-ga Tomomi <sub>i</sub> -TOP [man-PL-NOM	[zibuni-ga [self <sub>i</sub> -NOM	bizin-da-to] beauty-be-COMP]			
		omot-te-iru-to] sinzi-te-iru. think-PRT-PROG-COMP] believe-PRT-PROG					
		'Tomomii believes that the men think that she <sub>i</sub> is beautiful.'					

b. \*Tomomi<sub>i</sub>-wa [otoko-tati-ga [zibuni-ga kawaii-Ø<sub>be</sub>-to] Tomomi<sub>i</sub>-TOP [man-PL-NOM [self<sub>i</sub>-NOM pretty-Ø<sub>be</sub>-COMP] omot-te-iru-to] sinzi-te-iru. think-PRT-PROG-COMP] believe-PRT-PROG

'Tomomi<sub>i</sub> believes that the men think that she<sub>i</sub> is pretty.'

As shown in (3), the restriction does not hold for local zibun.

(3) a. Tomomi<sub>i</sub> -wa [zibuni-ga bizin-da-to] omot-te-iru. Tomomi<sub>i</sub> -TOP [selfi-NOM beauty-be-COMP] think-PRT-PROG

'Tomomi<sub>i</sub> thinks that she<sub>i</sub> is beautiful.'

b. Tomomi<sub>i</sub> -wa [zibuni-ga kawaii- $\emptyset_{be}$ -to] omot-te-iru. Tomomi<sub>i</sub> -TOP [self<sub>i</sub>-NOM pretty- $\emptyset_{be}$ -COMP] think-PRT-PROG

'Tomomi<sub>i</sub> thinks that she<sub>i</sub> is pretty.'

Even more curiously, in the ECM counterparts of (2) *zibun* has no problem taking a long-distance antecedent as shown in (4).

(4)	a.	Tomomi <sub>i</sub> -wa Tomomi <sub>i</sub> -TOP	[otoko-tati-ga [man-pl-NOM	[zibun <sub>i</sub> -o [self <sub>i</sub> -ACC	bizin-da-to] beauty-be-COMP]
		omot-te-iru-to	] ]G-COMP]	sinzi-te-iru. believe-PRT-	PROG

'Tomomi<sub>i</sub> believes that the men think her<sub>i</sub> to be beautiful.'

b. Tomomi<sub>i</sub>-wa [otoko-tati-ga [zibun<sub>i</sub>-o kawaii-Ø<sub>be</sub>-to] Tomomi<sub>i</sub>-TOP [man-PL-NOM [self<sub>i</sub>-ACC pretty-Ø<sub>be</sub>-COMP] omot-te-iru-to] sinzi-te-iru. think-PRT-PROG-COMP] believe-PRT-PROG

'Tomomi<sub>i</sub> believes that the men think her<sub>i</sub> to be pretty.'

The above data cannot be taken to indicate that ECM makes subject *zibun* local to the antecedent somehow, say by raising-to-object, because, as illustrated in (5), local anaphor *kanozyo-zisin* 'her-self' and *zibun-zisin* 'self-self' are still impossible in this construction.

(5) a. \*Tomomi<sub>i</sub>-wa [otoko-tati-ga [kanozyo-zisin<sub>i</sub>/zibun-zisin<sub>i</sub>-o bizin-da-to] Tomomi<sub>i</sub>-TOP [man-PL-NOM [her-self<sub>i</sub>/self-self<sub>i</sub>-ACC beauty-be-COMP] omot-te-iru-to] sinzi-te-iru. think-PRT-PROG-COMP] believe-PRT-PROG

'Tomomi<sub>i</sub> believes that the men think her<sub>i</sub> to be beautiful.'

 \*Tomomi<sub>i</sub>-wa [otoko-tati-ga [kanozyo-zisin<sub>i</sub>/zibun-zisin<sub>i</sub>-o kawaii-Ø<sub>be</sub>-to] Tomomi<sub>i</sub>-TOP [man-PL-NOM [her-self<sub>i</sub>/self-self<sub>i</sub>-ACC pretty-Ø<sub>be</sub>-COMP] omot-te-iru-to] sinzi-te-iru. think-PRT-PROG-COMP] believe-PRT-PROG

'Tomomi<sub>i</sub> believes that the men think her<sub>i</sub> to be pretty.'

The exact nature of the restriction is unclear, but it is probably safe to say that for *zibun*, at least in its long-distance use, there are quite different licensing conditions involved than for other anaphors.

# **Roberto Zamparelli -** University of Bergamo *Every two days*

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8.

One puzzling aspect of the quantifier *every* is that it can appear with a plural noun only when a cardinal or *few* is present.

- (1) Every {day / \*days}
- (2) Every {two / three / few} days

Moreover, *every two* N contrasts with *any/no two* N in that N must be an object which can find a place along a spatial or temporal sequence. Thus (3) is good, but (4) and (5) -- where the desired meaning should be "every (possible) pair of days/houses/numbers" -- is very marginal. The problem is that days/houses/numbers are not linearly ordered.

- (3) Every three {days / hours / miles / margheritas}, John drinks a bloody Mary.
- (4) a. I could mark {?? every / any} two days in the calendar.b. {??Every / Any / No} two houses are identical.
- (5) {\*Every / Any / No} two winning numbers would give you a lot of money (cannot mean "every combination of two winning numbers...")

A largely overlapping restriction is that, even with nouns like days, the every+Card+N construction is marginal as an argument (even with measure verbs: ?? He counted/measured every two days ). All well-formed occurrences are frequency adjuncts.

Kayne (2002) accounts for the contrast (1)/(2) by proposing that cardinals/*few* may be followed by the abstract word NUMBER, which is (optionally) singular. *Every* would agree with NUMBER and not with the plural *days*. This idea however doesn't explain the meaning restrictions noted in (4/5). An alternative in the same spirit is that 2 *days* in *every* 2 *days* is a measure phrase (MP) measuring an abstract singular noun like TIME or LENGTH; it is this noun which agrees with *every*.

- (6) a. Every  $[_{MP} 2 \text{ days}]$  TIME
  - b. Every [MP three miles] LENGTH

The apparent head of the construction only provides a unit of measure for a (contex-

tually defined) linear sequence. A formal semantic representation should aim to capture a meaning along these lines:

(7) Every [two miles] LENGTH =  $\lambda E$  [For all P such that P is the endpoint of a two-mile segment along a certain path, E is an event and E happens at P]

This approach immediately derives *\*Every days* (MPs need numerals), (5) (winning numbers cannot measure anything), and (8) (units of measure must be identical).

(8) \*Every two different days

#### **References**

Kayne, R. (2002) "On the syntax of quantity," ms. New York University.