Individualism without Atomism in Animal and Environmental Ethics

Abstract

ABSTRACT

Environmental ethicists have long debated which nonhuman entities bear intrinsic value, or matter for their own sake. I assess the merits of arguments that sentient nonhuman animals matter, and that nonsentient species and ecosystems matter, and argue that the former case is far more convincing, while the latter case is uncertain at best. For this reason, I argue that sentient animals should take moral priority over nonsentient entities. However, drawing on and reinterpreting the arguments of holists, I make the case that many nonsentient entities can be understood as communities that are deeply important to, and in some ways inseparable from, the well-being of individual sentient animals. Because of this, while I lean toward ethical individualism when it comes to who bears intrinsic value, I argue against an atomistic individualism and instead advocate attention to relationships and interdependence. In at least some cases, such a modified, non-atomistic individualism may create practical overlap with holist prescriptions.