Feeling Like a Bat: A Critique of Thomas Nagel

Abstract

ABSTRACT

According to Thomas Nagel’s thought, human beings are incapable of subjectively experiencing what a bat experiences. The only possibilities outlined by the philosopher are: (1) the objective analysis of ethological expressions, that is, the description of the phenomenon of the bat; (2) analogical projection, which we shall refer to as analogism to distinguish it from the concept of analogy used in evolutionary biology – effectively, anthropomorphism. If, by definition, objective analysis cannot be considered subjective, the second point entails an even more radical negation, as it relies on a human-centred projection. The human perspective undoubtedly possesses specific characteristics, yet the error lies in viewing these as exclusive. This mistake stems from the enduring influence of an essentialist conception of living beings that characterises the humanist approach. Such a view tends to treat the umwelt as a kind of self-contained monad, shared solely within the human species. From an evolutionary standpoint, however, different species share broad traits, meaning that various umwelten exhibit overlapping domains. Given that the strict distinction between objectivity and subjectivity is itself debatable – Nagel himself refers to the bat’s echolocation – the true error lies in assuming that analogism is the only available approach.